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ABSTRACT
Scanlon’s Contractualism and Its Critics
by
Kenneth R Weisshaar
Advisor: Sibyl A Schwarzenbach, Ph.D.
This dissertation examines whether Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism satisfactorily
explains its intended domain of morality which he terms “what we owe to each other.” Scanlon
proposes that such interpersonal morality is based on justifying one’s actions to others by
behaving according to principles that could not be reasonably rejected. This idea accounts for
two key functions of a moral theory: explaining how moral judgments are made and why agents
generally act according to these judgments. After reviewing the nature of constructivist moral
theories to show why I chose to focus on Scanlon’s theory, I assess how effectively it fulfills
these two roles. I argue that the concept of justifiability is necessary for making moral judgments
because it enables agents to determine which of an action’s attributes are morally relevant and to
choose between conflicting principles. However, I also argue that the contractualist procedure is
unable to specify principles in certain cases where the aggregation of harms across multiple
persons legitimately outweighs an individual’s concerns and in other cases where differences in
agents’ experiences and sensibilities lead to conflicting moral judgments and objectionable
relativism. Regarding normativity, I argue that justifiability provides sufficient reason for agents
to act in accordance with these principles in most, but not all, cases, even if the agents are not
motivated by the contractualist goal of finding common principles. In summary, I conclude that
contractualism provides an insightful account of morality, but it is one with several significant
defects that cannot be remedied.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Moral philosophy has a rich tradition ranging from the classical theories of Plato and
Aristotle, through the Enlightenment theories of Hume and Kant, to today’s naturalist and noncognitivist alternatives. Each theory differs in its conception of the essence of morality, and there
appears to be no likelihood that moral theorists will converge on a common view about the
critical questions a theory must address: the nature of moral judgments, how agents are able to
make these judgments, and why these judgments strongly influence agents’ actions.
Kant promulgated the idea that morality is based on people’s rational nature. According
to Kant, the fundamental moral law is the categorical imperative which says that right actions
comply with maxims that one can will to be principles for everyone without contradiction.
Kant’s theory is said to be “constructivist” in that moral principles are determined by a rational
procedure—they do not exist independently of the agents who apply the formula. In the latter
part of the twentieth century, John Rawls’s adoption of what he terms Kantian constructivism for
his political theory of justice marked the beginning of a renewed interest in constructivist
theories. Rawls’s ideas have influenced other philosophers, like Christine Korsgaard and Thomas
Scanlon, who have developed constructivist theories with different goals and procedures.
I have been interested in constructivist theories ever since I encountered Kant’s
categorical imperative. Morality, I believe, should be based on reasons and justification: what are
the relevant reasons for and against an action, and do these reasons, properly understood, warrant
the action being proposed. Constructivist theories use this kind of reasoning while many other
types of theories do not. At the same time, I am well aware of the issues critics raise about
constructivist theories. Thus, my goal for this dissertation is to select the constructivist theory
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that is likely to provide the best account of morality and then to assess whether it can, in fact,
deliver what it promises. This introduction provides a road map of that investigation.
Chapter 2 explains why I decided to focus my analysis on Thomas Scanlon’s
contractualism.1 The first part provides an overview of constructivist moral theories along with
two other competing types or moral theories, realist and expressivist; and it includes a summary
of the main objections raised against the last two types. My aim is to give the reader a sense of
why I am dissatisfied with these latter theories rather than to provide a formal critique because I
recognize that proponents have developed detailed and sophisticated responses to these
objections.
The rest of the chapter examines three well-known constructivist theories: Rawls’s justice
as fairness,2 Korsgaard’s procedural realism,3 and Scanlon’s contractualism. These overviews
are designed to illustrate the nature of constructivist theories and to highlight differences among
the theories. Rawls’s goal is to develop the basic principles of justice for a liberal democratic
society. He develops these principles using what he terms the “original position”—a hypothetical
initial situation that limits the information available to rational and reasonable representatives
who must select the principles of justice that provide the best outcome for all the society’s
citizens. Korsgaard’s goal is to determine all practical reasons for action including moral
reasons. She argues that human rationality requires individuals to take control of their actions,

1

T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1998). Hereafter referred to in the text as 'WWO.'
2
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971,
1999). Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Hereafter referred to in the
text as 'TJ' and 'PL,' respectively.
3
Christine M. Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996). Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution : Agency, Identity, and
Integrity (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Hereafter referred to in the text as 'SN' and
'SC,' respectively.
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and that a successful person “unifies herself” by choosing her own actions rather than following
the dictates of outside forces. Successful unification requires acting according to Kant’s
categorical imperative which is then the source of moral principles. Finally, Scanlon’s goal is to
provide an account of people’s obligations to others. He argues that valuing life requires
recognizing and respecting humans’ distinctive capacity to actively govern their lives, and that
this is best done by treating others in ways that they could not reasonably reject. Hence, moral
principles are ones that cannot be reasonably rejected by others as determined by the theory’s
procedure.
All these constructivist theories are interesting, but ultimately three features made
Scanlon’s theory compelling to me. First, Scanlon’s idea of “justification to others” based on
“reasonable rejection” provides a convincing unified explanation for both the way moral
principles are determined and the reason agents have for acting morally. Second, the
contractualist procedure seems likely to provide a wide range of workable moral principles. And,
finally, the normativity of these principles is explained by the value of the relationships that
result from acting in ways that others cannot reasonably reject. Many philosophers provide
excellent critiques of particular elements of Scanlon’s theory, but I have not found a work that
assesses how well it meets all the critical aspects of a moral theory. My goal is to fill that gap.
Before proceeding to my assessment, it is important to note there are two types of ethical
theories. Realist and expressivist theories are classified as metaethical theories because they seek
to understand the metaphysics of moral facts and the meaning of moral language. In contrast,
contractualism is classified as a normative theory which focuses on the examination of standards
for the rightness and wrongness of actions and does not directly concern itself with metaphysics
and language. Scanlon is not concerned about this difference. In his view, the key issues in
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understanding morality are characterizing the method of reasoning on which moral judgments
are based and explaining why these judgments are given an important role in determining
actions. If these are understood, the metaphysical status of moral facts is no longer interesting, at
least for him (WWO 2). Also, Scanlon views his claims about morality as consistent with any
account of reasons that is compatible with ordinary notions of reasons and rationality; thus,
contractualism is not dependent on a certain conception of the nature of reasons. Scanlon himself
takes the idea of a reason to be primitive and is a realist about reasons (WWO 17). He defends
this view at length in Being Realistic About Reasons.4 For those so inclined, the combination of
Scanlon’s metaphysical view of reasons and his contractualist moral theory go a long way to
creating a metaethical account of morality. However, this dissertation will bracket any
metaphysical questions and adhere to Scanlon’s focus on questions about the determination and
normativity of contractualism’s principles.
Returning to the road map, Chapters 3 examines how effectively contractualism uses the
concept of reasonable rejection to determine moral principles. After reviewing the key elements
of the contractualist procedure, I assess three key criticisms. The most basic criticism is that the
concept of reasonable rejection is unnecessary to determine principles. Certain properties of
actions like cruelty or unfairness are what make actions immoral, and any judgment of
reasonable rejection is somehow based on existing views about whether actions have these
properties. I argue, however, that the concept is not redundant because it is needed to understand
which of an action’s attributes are relevant in making a moral judgment. Justifiability to others
also provides an additional reason to act morally in certain situations where an agent is wavering.
Further, the need to justify actions to others is a primary factor in explaining why agents are

4

T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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motivated to act according to contractualist principles. Thus, the contractualist procedure passes
the basic test of being necessary for the determination of moral principles and being able to
determine at least some of the desired principles.
Nonetheless, there are two situations where the procedure has difficulty or is unable to
determine moral principles: cases of aggregation and cases of problematic relativism. Cases
involving aggregation pose a dilemma for contractualism. One of the theory’s strengths is that its
procedure restricts the reasons for determining reasonable rejection to those of single individuals,
thus preventing small benefits to many persons from being used to justify significant harms
being incurred by one or a few. However, this feature raises questions about how contractualism
deals with situations where widely held moral intuitions support the aggregation of harms, such
as when a rescuer has a binary choice to save either one or many persons. Scanlon argues that
contractualism can still justify a principle requiring the rescue of the larger number when harms
are equal. I disagree and argue that contractualism cannot have it both ways. The same procedure
cannot be used to distinguish situations where the individual should be protected from those in
which aggregation of harms is appropriate. Further, there are cases where potential harms are
unequal but aggregation is justified because the lesser harm is sufficiently severe that it would be
right to prevent multiple occurrences by allowing a greater harm to a small number of people. I
argue that it is not possible to justify a contractualist principle that would cover these cases; and,
if one could, it would have the unintended consequence of justifying the aggregation of extreme
numbers of trivial harms which would permit the initial aggregation problem that contractualism
is designed to avoid. Thus, cases of aggregation pose a significant problem for contractualism.
Contractualism is also susceptible to undesirable relativism. Under contractualism, moral
judgments are made by individuals, and variations in individuals’ experiences and sensibilities
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can lead to conflicting judgments in situations where it is difficult to compare competing reasons
for rejecting alternative principles. Scanlon argues that this problem is minimized by the
universality of reason judgments, a principle stating that the same reasons apply to individuals
who are in relevantly identical situations. He also argues that unacceptable practices that are
permitted by certain societies will be rejected under contractualism’s procedure because valid
reasons are based on what persons have reason to want, not what they actually think or want due
to cultural acclimation. I use the nature of contractualist judgments along with various examples
to argue that these considerations are insufficient to prevent objectionable relativism. Even if the
same reasons apply, different agents may “weigh” those reasons in varied ways and justify
conflicting principles, particularly given Scanlon’s inability to offer much guidance on how such
judgments should be made. When this happens, there is no agent-neutral way to determine which
principle is correct, and the theory results in conflicting principles for morally similar situations.
Likewise, there is no principled way to exclude many practices that are condoned by certain
societies but conflict with widely held moral intuitions. Thus, concerning contractualism’s ability
to determine principles that dictate actions, the procedure faces significant problems in cases
where aggregation is required and where unacceptable relativism is unavoidable.
Chapter 4 examines the normativity of contractualist principles. I argue that justifiability
provides sufficient reason for agents who endorse contractualism to act in accordance with these
principles in most, but not all, cases. According to Scanlon, agents should follow principles that
cannot be reasonably rejected because this is the best way to respect the value of an individual’s
capacity to choose how to live, and acting in such a way supports a desirable relationship of
mutual recognition with others. Critics question whether the value of such a relationship can
overcome competing reasons to act immorally from the point of view of a conflicted agent. I
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argue that it can, particularly when the agent also considers additional reasons to act morally
based on the negative effect immoral actions, such as cruelty or deception, have on others. At the
same time, I argue that there are situations where reasons supporting morality are insufficient
from the point of view of an agent who has strong personal reasons to act otherwise, perhaps to
protect a friend or loved one. My argument questions Scanlon’s version of personal
relationships and personal projects which relies on an inherent sensitivity to the demands of right
and wrong, thus limiting the way these relationships and projects can be pursued. Several
examples are used to illustrate that an agent’s moral judgment about a principle is a different
kind of judgment than that of deciding what action to take in a conflicted situation. Thus, an
agent can recognize an action as immoral while still having greater reason to pursue it.
A related issue is whether contractualist principles apply to persons who do not care
about morality and are not motivated by contractualism’s goal of identifying and living by
principles that others cannot reasonably reject. Critics contend that such principles do not apply
to these persons because their lack of moral motivation places them outside the scope of
contractualism. Here, I argue that Scanlon’s position that principles do apply is correct because
the importance of having (at least some) interpersonal relationships applies to the unmotivated
regardless of whether they care about these relationships from a moral perspective. Finally, there
is the question of how contractualism relates to persons who follow other moralities. I point out
that contractualists should be able to live harmoniously with those who ascribe to moral theories
that respect contractualism’s basic tenets of human equality and self-determination. Also,
contractualists should attempt to, and be able to, incorporate religious or culturally-based reasons
into their judgments of which principles cannot be reasonably rejected if such reasons are
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significantly important to a way of life and do not prevent the recognition of other
contractualists’ similarly significant reasons.
Finally, Chapter 5 steps back and summarizes my overall assessment of contractualism. I
conclude that, while the theory provides an insightful account of morality, it has significant flaws
in its ability to specify moral principles. Interestingly, its reliance on the idea of reasonable
rejection and its emphasis on individuals are sources of both its strengths and weaknesses. On the
side of attractiveness, the theory reflects common views about morality in its focus on
relationships between people and its emphasis on reasons and justifications. The concepts of
‘reasonable rejection’ and ‘justification to others’ provide a unified explanation of how moral
principles are determined and why agents have strong reasons to follow them. At the same time,
however, the theory faces serious problems in the determination of moral principles due to
problems in certain situations involving the aggregation of harms and certain situations resulting
in objectionable relativism as described above. Further examination of the sources of these issues
indicates that the aggregation problem can be somewhat alleviated, but that there is not a way to
modify the theory to address both of these issues satisfactorily. Thus, my assessment is that
contractualism is an insightful but flawed theory. It provides an explanation of many facets of
morality but ultimately disappoints those who are looking for a complete moral theory.

8

Chapter 2
The Nature of Moral Constructivism
In constructivist theories, moral principles are derived from a procedure of rational
deliberation or choice. The procedure determines the principles; it is not a method for gaining
knowledge about truths that already exist. This type of account differs significantly from other
types of moral theories. For example, realist theories posit the existence of agent-independent
moral facts, and expressivist theories claim that moral judgments represent an agent’s feelings or
attitudes. This chapter illustrates the general nature of constructivist theories by first contrasting
them with realist and expressivist theories. It then compares three prominent constructivist
theories: John Rawls’s justice as fairness, Christine Korsgaard’s procedural realism, and
Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism. Finally, the chapter explains why I chose Scanlon’s theory for
a detailed assessment and outlines my approach.
My purpose here is to present a general picture of the way moral theories differ in order
to help the reader understand why I am sympathetic to constructivist theories and to explain why
Scanlon’s theory is the most suitable account for my analysis. I am not trying to provide a formal
critique of the non-constructivist theories mentioned or a general defense of constructivism—
these goals are outside the scope of my project.
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1. Types of Moral Theories
This section provides an overview of constructivist, realist, and expressivist theories. It
also summarizes some of the main objections to the latter theories as a partial explanation of why
I have focused my efforts on constructivist theories.
1.1. Constructivist theories: Constructivism and contractualism are different types of
moral theories that often overlap in practice.1 According to Onora O’Neill,
Contractualists ground ethical or political justification in agreement of some sort, whereas
constructivists ground them in some conception of reason. This will not provide any neat separation
of the two approaches to justification since agreement may provide a basis for reasons and reasoning
a way of achieving agreement.2

Moral contractualism represents a family of theories that attempt to justify morality by appealing
to rational or reasonable agreement among individuals who are subject to morality’s constraints.
Different versions of contractualism are distinguished by the philosophical goals of the theories
and by the type of agreement involved in determining moral principles.3 In contrast, moral
constructivism holds that insofar as there are normative truths, they are generated by an idealized
process of rational or reasonable deliberation or choice. Significantly, constructivists reject—or
at least bracket as unknowable or unprovable—the stronger claims of moral realism, taking the
alternative position that the existence and nature of moral properties are decided by the theory’s
procedure. Thus, the constructivist is not using the theory’s procedure to discover or understand
pre-existing agent-independent moral truths. There are no moral truths without the procedure.

1

Reviews of the nature of constructivist and contractualist moral theories can be found in the following
papers: Christine M. Korsgaard, "Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy,"
Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003); Onora O'Neill, "Constructivism Vs. Contractualism," Ratio
16, no. 4 (2003); Mark Timmons, "The Limits of Moral Constructivism," ibid.; Carla Bagnoli,
"Constructivism in Metaethics," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2011).
2
O'Neill, 319.
3
Scanlon references the following theories as being among those “commonly called contractualist”:
Rawls’s justice as fairness, David Gauthier’s morals by agreement, and Brian Barry’s justice as
impartiality (WWO 375, fn.2).
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In the latter part of the twentieth century, Rawls’s adoption of what he terms Kantian
constructivism for his political theory of justice marked the beginning of a renewed interest in
constructivism. Kantian constructivism pays particular attention to the nature of the moral agent.
The term ‘Kantian’ comes from the resemblance to Kant’s doctrine rather than any strict
adherence to Kant. According to Rawls:
What distinguishes the Kantian form of constructivism is essentially this: it specifies a
particular conception of the person as an element in a reasonable procedure of construction,
the outcome of which determines the content of the first principles of justice. Expressed
another way: this kind of view sets up a certain procedure of construction which answers to
certain reasonable requirements, and within this procedure persons characterized as rational
agents of construction specify, through their agreements, the first principles of justice.4
As will be discussed, the way Korsgaard and Scanlon conceive of agents also plays a significant
role in their theories.
Another crucial aspect of constructivism, according to Rawls, is that justification of
principles is not an epistemological problem of understanding existing moral rules; rather it is a
practical problem.5 Korsgaard, too, emphasizes that for constructivism the function of a
normative concept is not to describe reality; instead, a normative concept refers to the solution of
a practical problem. A constructivist account of a moral concept is an attempt to work out a
solution to that problem.6 In providing these solutions, constructivists still hold that at least some
objective, action-guiding ethical principles can be justified despite their dependence on human
judgment and the lack of agent-independent moral facts. Thus, to be successful, it is necessary
that a constructivist theory’s conception of an individual and the specific procedure it uses
combine effectively to determine sufficiently objective principles.

4

John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 9 (1980):
516.
5
Ibid., 554.
6
Korsgaard, "Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy," 99.
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1.2. Realist theories: The key claim of realist theories is that morality refers to an
independent realm of moral facts and values so that judgments about these facts are either true or
false. What is right or wrong exists separately from, and prior to, any efforts to determine what is
moral. The independence of moral facts is said to accord morality a special kind of authority
because it is not influenced by prejudices or emotions. This special status is attractive to many
who see morality as a code that forces people to face and overcome their frailties.
A classic example can be found in Plato’s conception of moral value as an impersonal,
absolute reality. For Plato, the forms of the good and of justice existed apart from objects in the
world and people’s thoughts or feelings. Today, realist theories divide into two types: nonnaturalist theories akin to Plato’s and naturalist theories in which moral value is somehow
related to properties and facts that can be understood using the senses.
According to non-naturalist versions of moral realism, moral facts are not reducible to
any kind of natural fact and are beyond the apprehension of the natural sciences.7 This view
ensures that morality is objective, and the separation of moral values from features of the world
seems consistent with morality’s role of prescribing what people ought to do as opposed to
describing the way things are. However, non-naturalism raises significant questions about the
nature of moral facts and the way moral truths are known since they are not scientific truths that
can be accessed empirically. Further, even if it is possible to learn about such truths, how do they
motivate people if they have no obvious connection to their interests or desires?
Naturalist versions of realism attempt to deal with these concerns by holding that moral
facts are identical with, or constituted by, natural facts in some way, and thus are empirically

7

Non-natutalist realism is described and defended in Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism : A Defence
(Oxford; Oxford; New York: Clarendon ; Oxford University Press, 2003). My discussion of the
characteristics of various moral theories is based partly on this work.
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accessible. For example, one naturalist theory is based on the idea of an individual’s “objective
personal interests”—what would be best for her independent of her actual desires and level of
knowledge.8 Moral rightness is said to reflect a hypothetical society in which each individual’s
objective interests are given equal consideration. This type of theory is less susceptible to
epistemological and motivational issues if one accepts the difficult assumption that an
individual’s best interests can be determined. However, there are still significant questions about
whether objective interests based on natural well-being, or some other naturalist formulation, can
do justice to the wide variety of moral issues that need to be addressed. Further, a morality based
on objective interests most likely favors the welfare of society at the expense of individual rights,
and it is not concerned about how benefits are distributed. These features conflict with the moral
intuitions of many people.
1.3. Expressivist theories: Expressivist theories, by contrast, avoid concerns about the
nature of moral facts and their motivational efficacy. These theories claim moral judgments
express feelings, attitudes or stances; they are not judgments about external facts or values. For
example, moral judgments might express states of approval or disapproval; they might also
express states of norm-acceptance or of planning to act in some way.9 Expressivists are noncognitivists who deny that moral statements are literally true or false. Thus, expressivism fits
comfortably with a scientific view of the world because there are no non-scientific facts that
need to be explained and known. People recognize what is right or wrong based on the way they

8

Peter Railton's theory as described in Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," The Philosophical Review 95, no.
2 (1986).
9
The theories of Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, respectively. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the
Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford
University Press, 1984); Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Allan
Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings : A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1990); Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
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respond to a given moral situation, and the nature of their response motivates them to act in a
certain way. The appeal of expressivist theories is based, in large part, on their simple
explanation of the nature of morality and the way this explanation avoids concerns about realism.
The view that moral judgments are projections of agents’ own attitudes removes most
questions about how morality is apprehended and why moral judgments are motivating;
however, critics argue that expressivist theories still face a number of problems.

10

First, such

theories are subject to charges of objectionable relativism because there is no single standard for
choosing among differing moral judgments given that competing attitudes are accorded equal
validity. Why, for example, is the expression of one person’s attitudes normative for others in
situations which call for advice or where the justifiability of an action is under debate? Why
should people care about someone else’s moral judgments if they merely represent her attitudes
towards something? Second, ordinary talk about morality requires constancy in meaning. This
appears inconsistent with the view that moral statements are expressions of attitudes or feelings.
Examples include taking at face value statements like “it is true that murder is wrong,”
explaining the source of moral disagreement as a search for knowledge about moral truths, and
believing that moral argument takes the logical form of other kinds of argument. Finally, there is
the question of how to explain moral error. Cognitivists can account for a moral mistake as an
example of false belief. Expressivists require a different explanation, but finding one is difficult
if a moral judgment expresses an agent’s attitude.11

10

The criticisms here are taken from Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons, 53-68; and Shafer-Landau,
18-38.
11
Expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard espouse what they term quasi-realism, which is intended to
explain how the judgments expressed can also be true or false so that what is right or wrong is not simply
a reflection of the subjective feelings of each individual but is somehow independent of us and our
attitudes. As a result, we can still have meaningful dialogue about morality as if moral judgments were
beliefs about facts in the world. Nonetheless, critics still question whether this explanation resolves the
types of issues raised in the text.
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To summarize, non-naturalist realist theories that posit mind-independent moral
properties are appealing because they appear to be objective and authoritative. But they also
generate difficult questions about the nature of moral properties, how people come to learn about
them, and the motivational source of their authority. Naturalist theories address some of these
issues, but raise other questions about their ability to represent moral views consistent with
certain convictions. Expressivist theories explain morality as a projection of attitudes; thus, their
answers provide a better account of how morality is known and why moral judgments are
motivating. But they lose authority because of concerns about relativism and the difficulty of
accounting for the type of justification-based reasoning that underlies morality. Admittedly, this
review is too cursory to support specific conclusions about any of the issues raised. Nevertheless,
it highlights the types of misgivings which convinced me that neither realist nor expressivist
theories can provide a satisfying analysis of morality.
In the next sections, I review and comment on the constructivist theories of Rawls,
Korsgaard, and Scanlon. Each review is organized as follows: 1) the theory’s scope—the specific
domain to which the theory is being applied, 2) its conception of the individual including the
nature of reason, 3) the procedure used to determine moral principles, 4) the justification
argument for why the resulting principles are morally significant, and 5) my observations about
the theory.
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2. Rawls’s Justice as Fairness
In A Theory of Justice, first published in 1971, John Rawls presents a conception of
justice he terms justice as fairness that both generalizes and carries to a higher level of
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract found in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant. Rawls’s goal is to identify the set of principles that renders the basic structure of a
society just; the identification itself is the result of a process of agreement in which both the
nature of persons and the bargaining situation reflect values embedded in that society.12
2.1. Scope: According to Rawls, a conception of justice is a set of principles that
performs two functions. It provides a way to assign the rights and duties of citizens as specified
by the basic institutions of a liberal democratic society (e.g., the political constitution and the
principal economic and social arrangements), and it defines the distribution of the benefits and
burdens of the social cooperation upon which the society is based (TJ 4, 6). Rawls calls his
conception ‘justice as fairness’ in recognition of the emphasis it places on ensuring that each
citizen shares fairly the benefits and burdens in such a society.
2.2. The Nature of Agents: Rawls’s theory aims to determine the principles of justice that
free and equal persons in a well-ordered society would accept in defining the fundamental terms
of their association (TJ 10). Parties (representative citizens) come together to agree on these
principles under the constraints of the original position (described below). As rational, the
parties act in a self-interested way to further their own ends. They enact principles that allow
them to gain the largest amount of primary social goods (liberties, opportunities, positions of
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authority, wealth, and the social basis of self-respect). These goods, in turn, enable them to
pursue their conception of a good life most effectively. As capable of a sense of justice (later
renamed reasonableness), the parties can rely on each other to understand and act according to
whatever principles are agreed to. They will not enter agreements they know they cannot keep
(TJ 123-26). For Rawls, being reasonable implies a willingness to propose and honor fair terms
of cooperation, as well as accepting the need to understand and work through the disagreements
that occur among a diverse group of citizens (PL 48-58).
The parties to the agreement are members of a well-ordered society whose citizens
recognize certain rules of conduct and whose society is regulated by a public conception of
justice. The goal or ideal is that everyone accepts the same principles of justice; basic institutions
satisfy these principles; and everyone acts justly. Such citizens are interested in the principles of
justice because they not only want to further their vision of the good life, but they also want to do
what is right, and they recognize these principles will have a positive effect on the quality of
their lives (TJ 4-8).
2.3. The Constructivist Procedure: Rawls’s theory is based on what he calls pure
procedural justice, i.e., what is right is determined solely by the procedure and not by any preexisting independent criteria. For example, if several persons engage in a series of fair bets, the
distribution of cash after the last bet is considered fair, however lopsided that distribution may
be. This assumes the conditions of the procedure are fair, e.g., the bets are not coerced and do not
favor any party. Thus background circumstances dictate a fair procedure.
In justice as fairness, the original position, or initial bargaining situation, ensures the
agreements are fair by employing a veil of ignorance to eliminate any specific knowledge that
would allow the parties to select principles that are to their advantage. The parties do not know
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particulars: their place in society, their race, gender, the natural assets and abilities they possess,
their conception of the good and its associated life plan, and the specific circumstances of their
society. These, Rawls argues, are irrelevant to the moral task at hand. The parties do know
certain general truths so they are able to select a conception of justice that is appropriate for the
society in which they live (TJ 118-123).
The parties choose the best alternative from among a number of specified alternative
conceptions of justice which include the proposed principles of justice as fairness, a short list of
traditional conceptions of justice (such as the principle of average utility and the principle of
perfection), and several others (TJ 105-108). As is well known, Rawls argues that a rational
decision-maker facing the uncertainties embodied in the original position would follow the
“maximin” rule of choice. This rule avoids serious downside surprises by choosing the
alternative whose worst outcome still guarantees the decision-maker will be better off than the
worst outcome attached to the other alternatives: in other words, the best worst case. Following
this rule of choice leads to the adoption of Rawls’s two basic principles of justice:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b)
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity (TJ 266).
These principles are ranked in lexical order and therefore the basic liberties can be restricted only
for the sake of liberty. Also the principle of fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle.13
Rawls does not claim that the proposed principles of justice are necessary truths or that
they are derivable from such truths. Their justification is a matter of the mutual support of many
13
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considerations that fit into one coherent view. Nonetheless, he does consider these principles to
be sufficiently objective for the purpose at hand in that reasonable persons possessing
appropriate knowledge would reach the same (or similar) conclusions on the principles of justice,
and they would be willing to be guided by them (TJ 19, 453; PL 112).
2.4. Justification: The individual citizens of Rawls’s society must be able to justify the
principles of justice as fairness to themselves and each other because the goal, he argues, is a
society in which everyone accepts a single conception (or at least overlapping conceptions) of
justice. Both the conditions of the original position and the resulting principles are checked
against the citizens’ considered moral judgments using the process of reflective equilibrium.14
Considered judgments are ones made in circumstances that result in high confidence that the
moral conclusions drawn are correct; these judgments provide “data points” against which a
moral theory can be tested. Ideally the judgments made in specifying the original position (e.g.,
the importance of not knowing one’s position in society) and the principles generated by the
constructivist procedure (e.g., the difference principle and its various implications) should match
exactly the citizens’ considered judgments. If they do not, one needs to ask why and revise either
the theory or the considered judgments until they are aligned, at which point they are considered
to be in reflective equilibrium. In reaching equilibrium, one needs to test a wide range of
conceptions of justice and the associated arguments for each to permit the possibility of making a
radical shift in the original judgments. Reaching equilibrium under this type of challenge is
considered ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ (TJ 40-6). In this way, the conditions of the original
position are checked against individual’s conceptions of what constitutes a fair moral bargaining
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process. Moreover, the resulting principles and their implications are checked to see if they
match the considered convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way (TJ 15-19).
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls assumes that all the citizens of a well-ordered society use
this method to endorse justice as fairness as the sole political conception of justice for society
(PL xvi). However, several decades later in Political Liberalism, Rawls concludes that the idea
of a well-ordered society in which all citizens endorse justice as fairness is too demanding; it is
problematic because a modern democratic society is characterized by a plurality of different,
even incompatible, religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines (PL, xvi). Accordingly, Rawls
switches to a method he terms political constructivism to transform the doctrine of justice as
fairness into a freestanding political conception of justice in which ideas are expressed in terms
that are implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society (PL 11-14). The method of
political constructivism continues to use the framework of the original position to develop the
same principles of justice as those of justice as fairness; however, now the conception of a
person and the elements of the original positions are more explicitly derived from the nature of a
liberal political society rather than from any particular comprehensive doctrine (PL 19-20).
Such a society is marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism. Although its citizens hold a
diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral comprehensive doctrines, they are at least willing
to propose fair terms of cooperation and abide by them provided that others also do so—they are
capable, that is, of being what Rawls calls ‘reasonable.’ When fundamental political questions
are at stake, the parties ideally argue from publicly accepted facts and beliefs, and not from the
point of view of their own particular doctrine. The idea of a society governed by a political
conception of justice leads directly to Rawls’s idea of public reason, or the collective reason of
the citizens in a democratic society. Its use ensures that political issues will be debated and
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resolved on grounds that can be accepted by all citizens (PL 48-61, 212-219). A necessary
condition for stability in such a society is that all (or at least a sufficient portion of its) citizens
are part of an overlapping consensus that endorses a single conception of justice (ideally for
Rawls’s his justice as fairness), or at least a class of similar conceptions within a narrow range of
differences. In this way, the well-ordered society shares a more or less common vision of what
justice entails and does not reflect a modus vivendi where participants merely coexist in pursuing
their self-interest for lack of a better alternative (PL 38-39, Lecture IV).
2.5. Observations: Although the scope of Rawls’s justice as fairness is political, his
constructivist approach has had significant implications for moral philosophy in general. Simply
put, Rawls made constructivism a viable alternative to other forms of moral theories. Two key
characteristics that distinguish constructivist theories are their emphasis on the practical nature of
ethics and the use of hypothetical procedures.15 According to this view, philosophy as applied to
moral problems is not a matter of finding knowledge to apply in practice; rather, it involves
using reason to solve practical problems. In Rawls’s case, the problem is how to structure the
basic institutions of society, and the solution is to structure them according to the principles of
justice as fairness. Finding the solution requires identifying a procedure appropriate to the task at
hand. One cannot simply accept the way societies have evolved because today’s institutions
reflect various human weaknesses and past injustices; thus, there is a need to create a
hypothetical procedure for developing principles. Such a procedure must reflect intuitive notions
about the key elements that lead to a just solution, something Rawls does through his conception
of free and equal persons placed in a fairly-defined bargaining situation. The adoption of
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procedure-based principles promises sufficient objectivity, but only for the problem and the
persons on which the procedure is based. While Rawls focuses political problems, other
philosophers, like Scanlon, have applied this constructivist approach to broader moral domains,
as we will see shortly.
Considering specifically justice as fairness, its domain is the most focused of the three
theories. Rawls bases the nature of the theory’s agents and the justifications for the theory on
ideas he believes are already (to a large degree) inherent in the public reason of a liberal
democratic society. Thus the theory’s applicability is limited to both the political segment of
morality and societies that share liberal democratic beliefs.
I would argue, however, that even within a liberal democratic society, it is questionable
whether Rawls’s political constructivist approach will always lead to an overlapping consensus
that affirms a sufficiently common set of political principles. Simply put, the more diverse the
society is, the less likely it is that all factions will agree on a common-enough set of principles.
Exploring the validity of this concern is a complicated question that is beyond this review.
In summary, Rawls’s theory has had considerable impact on moral philosophy and is a
well-respected theory for the political domain. However, its scope is too limited for the purpose
of investigating whether a constructivist theory can provide a convincing account of general
morality.
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3. Korsgaard’s Procedural Realism
Christine Korsgaard proposes a form of Kantian constructivism which parallels Kant’s
view that humans are required by their nature to act according to self-legislated universal
principles. She accepts the Kantian categorical imperative as the basis for morality but grounds
acceptance in her interpretation of each person’s need to develop an identity and what is required
to do this successfully.
3.1. Scope: Korsgaard’s goal is to show that human rationality is the source of all
practical reasons for action, including moral reasons. In The Sources of Normativity, she argues
that we must value ourselves as human to have reasons for acting (SN 100-13) and that this
constitutes a moral identity because valuing humanity in one’s self rationally requires valuing it
in others (SN 121). Later, in Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Korsgaard argues
that, as rational agents, we must constitute our identities by acting according to Kant’s
categorical and hypothetical imperatives. That is, we must act autonomously by following
maxims we can will to be universal laws, and we must act effectively by trying to bring about the
means to the ends we choose (SC 1, 18). The categorical imperative is the source of morality
because, unlike the hypothetical imperative, it is binding regardless of the specific ends chosen
by individual agents (SC xii). In this review, I examine Korsgaard’s later claim that selfconstitution is the basis for complying with these imperatives.
3.2. The Nature of Agents: According to Korsgaard, rationality is the distinctive feature
of humans. This capacity requires people to take control of their beliefs and actions by
determining what count as reasons and finding normative principles to govern what they do.
When we choose an action, we constitute ourselves as the author of that action, and so decide
who we are. Thus the function of action is self-constitution because the agent’s identity is not
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determined except through her actions—something Korsgaard calls “the paradox of selfconstitution” (SC 20).
A successful person “unifies herself” by choosing actions that are an expression of her
whole self, rather than letting outside incentives (like impulses or desires) dictate her behavior.
Doing this requires choosing certain roles in life and integrating these roles into a single identity
that allows for a coherent and good life. This requires, in turn, that a person not only act
autonomously but also effectively to satisfy the roles she has chosen. According to Korsgaard,
acting autonomously and effectively requires acting according to the categorical and hypothetical
imperatives—these imperatives are constitutive principles of action (SC xi-xii, 18-19).
To act autonomously, an agent cannot blindly follow various desires or impulses. She
must select (or will) a maxim for her action: she must decide “I will do act-A in order to promote
end-E.” Furthermore, Korsgaard argues, an agent must will her maxim be a universal law which
means she is acting according to the categorical imperative. Universal willing is required because
it is not possible for an agent to will a maxim for one occasion only. The reflective choice
involved in a true act of willing implies that the agent would make the same choice if she again
faced the same circumstances ceteris paribus.16
To act effectively, an agent must achieve the end she has chosen—at least in most cases.
Thus if she wills an end, she must also will and pursue the means to that end; otherwise, she is
not really willing the end. This is, by definition, acting according to the hypothetical imperative:
if one wills an end, one must will the means to that end (SC 68-80, 82-3, 213). Hence, Korsgaard
argues that the hypothetical and categorical imperatives are normative because, having to act,
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individuals must constitute themselves as unified, and following these imperatives is necessary
for unification.
Finally, what is it that compels adherence to these principles of practical reason in the
face of conflicting demands? According to Korsgaard, the normativity of obligation is a
psychological force she calls necessitation (a term borrowed from Kant). Necessitation is the
direct result of the need to act and to constitute ourselves as unified agents. She compares this
explanation to Hume’s account of why the good person conforms to the standard of virtue and
the dogmatic rationalists’ account of why human reason conforms to the standards of reason. In
these cases, it is difficult to seek further explanation because acting in such a way is just part of
being a certain kind of person (SC 3-7).
3.3. The Constructivist Procedure: In procedural realism, moral obligations are
determined by people using Kant’s categorical imperative while considering themselves citizens
of the Kingdom of Ends. Korsgaard distinguishes “the categorical imperative” from what she
calls “the moral law.” The categorical imperative is the law of free will that requires acting only
on maxims the agent can will to be universal laws; whereas, the moral law is the law of acting
only on maxims that all rational beings could act on together to create a workable cooperative
system, the Kingdom of Ends (SN 98-100). The inclusion of all rational beings eliminates certain
maxims that might be acceptable from an individual perspective but that are objectionable when
all individuals are considered as a group.
The categorical imperative test asks whether the maxim of a particular action has the
form of a universal law; i.e., could the agent will that the maxim be a universal law without
contradiction (SC 11-16). According to Korsgaard, an unwillable maxim would become self-
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defeating if universalized: your maxim would fail in its purpose if everyone tried to use it.17
Kant’s case of false promising is an example of contradiction in conception in that the agent’s
end (getting money) cannot be achieved by her means (making a false promise) in a world of the
universalized maxim where everyone makes false promises and hence a promise has no value.
By contrast, a contradiction of the will occurs when some essential purpose of the will is
thwarted because the means of achieving this purpose is unavailable. For example, a maxim that
denies mutual aid or the refusal to accept help under any condition cannot be willed on the
grounds that the will’s effectiveness in pursuit of certain ends would be thwarted because human
agents often need and want help for survival.
The categorical imperative test works particularly well with respect to wrong actions that
are conventional (like breaking promises) because the effectiveness of the practice depends on
(most) everyone’s adherence. It is less effective in certain cases of natural violence (such as
wanting physical revenge when one has been wronged) because the universal practice of
selective acts of violence is unlikely to create the contradiction required to disallow the proposed
maxim.18 However, an additional requirement permitting only maxims all can adopt (as is the
case given the Kingdom of Ends stipulation) would forbid an action based on victimizing
others.19 For example, the practice of limited acts of revenge might pass a contradiction of the
will test, but it would certainly not meet the requirement that the practice be part of a universal
system of cooperation. Thus, the moral law as defined by Korsgaard will restrict actions even
more than the categorical imperative test alone. Nonetheless, considerable judgment is still
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required in determining which maxims contradict the will’s essential purposes, and the resulting
moral principles will be dependent on a particular agent’s views about human nature.
Korsgaard concludes that the categorical imperative test yields at least some moral
content, but that it does not completely determine the content of the moral law. Nonetheless, she
believes the requirement that maxims qualify as laws for the Kingdom of Ends is still a
substantive commitment as long as there are other ways to generate the missing laws, and she
refers to Rawls’s constructivist methodology as one of several ways this might be done (SN 99100). A reasonable conclusion is that the Korsgaard’s procedure will give some but not all the
laws required for a comprehensive moral system.
3.4. Justification: Korsgaard uses a two-part argument to justify her theory that the moral
law binds all rational beings. First, an agent’s rational nature requires that she conform to the
principles of the categorical and hypothetical imperatives in order to constitute herself as a
unified agent. Second, the laws each agent enacts for herself in following the categorical
imperative are also binding on all rational beings (SC 80).
The first part of Korsgaard’s argument has already been summarized in Section 3.2 on
the nature of agents. The second part of her argument is based on the idea that the reasons used
to legislate must be public reasons. According to the public conception of reasons, one commits
to the view that if I have reason to do action-A in circumstances-C, I must be able to will that
you should do action-A in circumstance-C because your reasons are normative for me.
Korsgaard provides two arguments for why all reasons must be public.
First, agents need to be able to share reasons in order to interact successfully; unless we
adopt each other’s reasons, we are unable to work out mutually beneficial agreements.
Admittedly, it is possible to have relationships based on negotiating and fencing rather than on
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sharing ends; but, according to Korsgaard, these relationships will be subject to force or trickery
when one party has the upper hand. Thus, compromises reached under such conditions are not
stable. Second, in response to critics who reject the argument that agents need to share reasons,
Korsgaard argues that in the process of constituting our identities and determining what reasons
we have for acting, we are quite literally interacting with ourselves. The law we made for
ourselves now must be a law that can be willed again later unless there’s a good reason to change
it. That a single person interacts with the same law for the same reasons at two different times
requires the same kind of sharing of reasons required to interact with others. Thus, for the laws
made to bind ourselves at all possible times and in all situations, our reasons must be public
ones.20 Based on either of these arguments, the laws we enact for ourselves are also laws for
every rational being, laws whose normative force can be shared (SC 191-94, 202-06, 212-14).
3.5. Observations: A frequent criticism of Kant’s categorical imperative is that it is an
empty formalism that identifies no substantive principles of duty.21 This is inaccurate because, as
discussed above, this imperative certainly identifies some duties. Accordingly, Korsgaard’s
moral law (which combines the categorical imperative with the Kingdom of Ends stipulation that
the law must be willed by all) will not completely determine the content of morality. Korsgaard
herself admits this when she concludes that the categorical imperative test yields at least some
moral content, but that it does not completely determine the content of the moral law (SN 99100). One can also construct situations where the imperative does not provide a way to make
tradeoffs in moral situations where maxims conflict. Consider a case where an agent can prevent
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the murder of someone by lying about the fact she is hiding in the next room. Although lying is
generally viewed as prohibited by the categorical imperative, in this case many would view the
practice as permissible, particularly if the lie does not cause some unspecified injury to others.
However, this conclusion cannot be justified using the categorical imperative. If a maxim that
required lying in such circumstances were universally adopted, then the lie would not be
convincing and its purpose would be defeated. So, the practice could not be willed to be a
universal law even though it is clearly the right thing to do. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the categorical imperative can determine some moral laws but that it will not be able to
prescribe moral principles in many situations.
Even more significant are concerns critics raise about whether the need for selfconstitution is sufficient to guarantee the normativity of the categorical imperative, as well as
whether all practical reasons must be public ones as required to extend the laws each person
adopts to others so that they form a moral code. Here I will focus on the question of selfconstitution which is the heart of Korsgaard’s argument.22
Critics make several arguments that the need for self-constitution is not sufficient to
require that persons always act according to the categorical imperative. First, although critics
agree that acting immorally at times is “defective” in the sense that a person’s agency will not be
functioning as well as possible, they still question whether this has a significant impact on the
agent’s identity. The agent may get what she wants by acting immorally on occasion, and she
could care more about this particular outcome than about “well-functioning agency.” Second,
critics also point out that such an agent acts badly only occasionally (when there is a great deal to
be gained) so it seems unlikely that such a pattern will truly make the agent’s identity “fall apart”
22
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as Korsgaard maintains. The agent is simply committed to constituting herself well enough to be
an agent but not well enough to be a truly good one. Finally, critics note that there is no clear
upper limit for the amount of evil a person can perpetrate while still being recognized as an
agent. We continue to hold someone responsible for her actions regardless of the magnitude or
number of immoral acts she commits—at least as long as we continue to deem her rational and
not insane. We regard persons as agents independently of their actions when, for instance, we
consider a lazy person who fails to achieve her goals as reproachable even though she fails to act
in a way that gives her “agent status” according to Korsgaard’s theory.23
On balance, I would argue that the critics have a point. According to Korsgaard, what
requires agents to act in harmony with the categorical imperative is the need to constitute
themselves as unified persons, ones who rise above their various impulses and select actions
according to universal principles. Indeed, not acting this way all the time results in a serious
“loss of identity.” However, it is hard to believe that a single failure represents such a significant
threat to a person’s identity that it ensures the imperative’s normativity for each incremental
action a person chooses. It does not seem reasonable to argue that an agent is a significantly
different person based on one (or even a small number) of non-compliant actions. And, if a
single action is not significant to a person’s unification, one cannot argue that the imperative is
normative for every individual action. Thus the need for personal unification does not seem
strong enough to support the normativity Korsgaard claims.
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4. Scanlon’s Contractualism
Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism gives an account of our obligations to other persons.
Although Scanlon refers to his theory as contractualist, the justification of principles is not based
on an agreement among parties. Rather, principles are generated by a reasons-based procedure
involving the concept of ‘reasonable rejection,’ so the theory can more properly be characterized
as constructivist in nature.
4.1. Scope: Scanlon’s theory provides an account of the domain of morality that
prescribes duties to other people including, for example, requirements to aid them and
prohibitions against harm and deception. He refers to this domain alternatively as “the morality
of right and wrong” or “what we owe to each other.” This domain is an important subset of
morality in general; but it does not include moral values like, for example, ideals of personal
honor, duties to one’s family, and ways of providing for children and the elderly. These broader
values may be constrained by “what we owe to each other,” but their complete content cannot be
derived from Scanlon’s theory (WWO 6-7, 342-49).
4.2. The Nature of Agents: In Scanlon’s view, the distinctiveness of humans is based on
their capacity to assess reasons and justifications, choose a life plan from the possible
alternatives, and actively govern their lives. Appreciating the value of human life requires
recognizing and respecting these distinctive capacities. The best way to do this, according to
Scanlon’s theory, is to live according to principles that others could not reasonably reject (WWO
105-6).
Scanlon argues that judgments about reasons alone are sufficient to explain actions. A
rational person who judges there is sufficient reason for believing something generally embraces
that belief, and this judgment is generally sufficient explanation. There is no need to appeal to
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some further source of motivation such as “wanting to believe.” Similarly, a rational person who
judges there is good reason to do something generally forms the intention to do it, and this
judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention and the subsequent action. No additional form
of motivation is needed beyond the judgment and the reasons it involves. Scanlon accepts that
there is a distinction between a person’s recognizing something as a reason and the effect on her
thoughts and actions—changes in circumstances can alter the effect. However, he does not agree
that some further motivating element, a desire, is needed for action.
On the contrary, when I examine these cases it seems to me that in all of them the only source of
motivation lies in my taking certain considerations—such as the pleasures of drinking, of eating, of
hearing from a friend—as reasons. The strength of this motivation varies depending on what
happens—for example, on the degree to which I attend to a given consideration, focus on it, and
ignore others—but these reasons remain the only motivating factors. Just as in the case of belief,
there is not need to appeal to a further source of motivation to explain how a rational creature can be
led to act (WWO 35).

Scanlon presents a comprehensive defense of this view, but my goal here is not to justify his
theory. Rather it is to introduce the reasons-based theory of action that underlies his position that
reasons-based moral principles are action determining.24
Scanlon interprets the rationality and reasonableness of agents as follows: Irrationality
involves holding conflicting judgments by making incompatible claims about the same subject;
however, it is not irrational to fail to accept certain considerations as reasons, and ‘irrational’
does not mean “open to rational criticism.” What we have most reason to do, or what we would
do if we were “ideally rational,” is a separate concept that refers to “the course of action that is
best supported by all the relevant reasons given a full and accurate account of the agent’s actual
situation” (WWO 26-32). What is reasonable in a certain situation is a judgment about what is
justified by the available information and the applicable reasons. In the context of collective
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decision-making, unreasonable usually means failing to take others’ interests into account given
the aim of reaching an agreement (WWO 32-33).
4.3 The Constructivist Procedure: According to Scanlon, an action is moral if, and only
if, the proposed principle that permits it is one that could not be reasonably rejected by those who
might be affected by the action. Thus judgments of right and wrong are claims about the
adequacy of reasons for accepting or rejecting principles under certain conditions (WWO 3).
To determine whether an action is wrong, one must consider whether any principle that
permitted the action could be reasonably rejected. This is done by comparing the reasons for
objecting to a principle that permits the action with the reasons for objecting to a principle that
prohibits the action. Relevant reasons for consideration involve the burdens on parties that would
be affected by the act. Scanlon calls these reasons “the objections to permission and prohibition.”
According to contractualism, if the objections to permission are more significant than the
objections to prohibition for every principle that permitted the action, then it would be
reasonable to reject each of these principles, and the action would be wrong (WWO 195).
The idea of reasonable rejectability provides a framework to consider the moral
significance of diverse considerations, including not only factors contributing to people’s
welfare, but also fairness, choice, and responsibility. According to Scanlon’s theory, reasons for
rejection need to be personal reasons having to do with the claims and status of individuals.
Because of the theory’s focus on interpersonal obligations, impersonal reasons—like the value of
preserving the environment—are not admissible in their own right; however, they can be relevant
through their role in the reasons ascribed to individuals (WWO 217-21). In addition, Scanlon
takes a broad view of the “others” to whom actions must be justifiable. An assessment of the
rejectability of a principle must take into account the implications of its acceptance in general,
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not just in the situation in question; thus it must rely on universal generic reasons that consist of
commonly available information about what people have reason to want (WWO 202-206).
Like Korsgaard, Scanlon denies the existence of independent moral facts. Whether
principles can be reasonably rejected is not determined by facts about right or wrong in a deeper,
independent sense. Rather, it is the other way around. Thinking about what is right and wrong
means thinking about what could be justified to others (WWO 5). In contrast to Korsgaard,
however, Scanlon does hold the idea of a reason as primitive and he is a realist about reasons.25
At the same time, Scanlon views the claims he is making about value and morality as being
“compatible with any deeper account of reasons which left the contours of our ordinary notions
of reasons and rationality undisturbed” (WWO 17).
4.4. Justification: Scanlon believes that “the special value of human, or rational, life lies
in our having reason to treat rational creatures only in ways that would be allowed by principles
that they could not reasonably reject.”26 Humans have the ability to identify reasons and make
choices about their beliefs and actions. They are able to consider different possibilities for how to
live, to choose a plan, and to govern their lives accordingly. Appreciating the value of human life
requires recognizing and respecting these capabilities; however, it is impossible to understand
directly and support the myriad reasons behind others’ actions because there are just too many
possibilities. Thus the best way to respect others is to treat them according to principles they
could not reasonably reject (WWO 105-6). Acting this way enables one to develop a relationship
that Scanlon refers to as “mutual recognition,” and achieving this relationship has great value
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because of the need to live in harmony with others (WWO 162, 168). This value also explains
why failure to be moved by moral considerations is viewed as an especially significant
shortcoming, one which is different from cases in which people simply do not share others’
interests. Lack of moral concern is a failure to see the need to justify one’s behavior to those
affected, and this is equivalent to a failure to recognize others’ value as persons (WWO 104-106,
158-59).
Scanlon further argues that when moral wrongness is characterized in this way, it bears
the appropriate relationship to people’s first-order moral beliefs because actions that they believe
to be intuitively wrong are also wrong according to this account. He points out that, at the same
time, this characterization of wrongness is sufficiently removed from these beliefs, thus allowing
the possibility that some of our beliefs are in error. Finally, this account describes judgments of
right and wrong as judgments about reasons that can be correct or incorrect and that can be
assessed through familiar forms of thought. In summary, Scanlon argues his account best
addresses questions about how moral judgments are made and why people respect them and act
accordingly (WWO 3-4).
4.5. Observations: My purpose in reviewing these three constructivist theories is both to
describe the nature of constructivism and to select a constructivist theory for a detailed
investigation to determine if such theories can deliver their promised effectiveness. Such a
project requires a theory that has broad scope, a strong justification story, and delivers credible
moral principles for its intended domain. I believe Scanlon’s theory best suits this purpose.
The attractiveness of Scanlon’s theory lies in its use of the concept of reasonable
rejection. The quality of human lives depends, in large part, on relationships with others; and a
central concern of morality is the nature of these relationships. The idea of reasonable rejection
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provides a way to recognize the importance of others by determining if proposed actions are
acceptable to them. At the same time, it provides an overarching reason to live according to
principles identified using this concept.
Scanlon’s theory also compares favorably with the other contractualist theories.
Regarding scope, it addresses morality as applied to our interactions with others. This scope lies
between those of Rawls’s and Korsgaard’s theories. On the narrow end, Rawls focuses on the
basic principles for a political society; on the wide end, Korsgaard intends to illuminate all
practical reasons. Although his scope is narrower than Korsgaard’s, Scanlon’s morality of “what
we owe each other” deals with an extremely important, large, and complex part of morality
which covers the interactions that lie at the core of morality. Investigating whether his theory
makes intelligible the nature of moral judgments, generates moral principles objective enough to
provide guidance, and explains the way moral judgments influence actions will confirm whether
a constructivist moral theory can be efficacious.
In the realm of justification, I contend that Scanlon’s arguments are more convincing
than those made by Korsgaard. A crucial part of Scanlon’s justification is that people have
reason to appreciate the value of human life and that they demonstrate that appreciation by being
aware of the interests of others in treating them in ways they could not reasonably reject. Basing
morality on this kind of value seems more in line with most people’s understanding about their
reasons for acting morally than does Korsgaard’s view that people need to constitute themselves
as unified individuals.
Finally, I believe that the procedure outlined by Scanlon can provide a more
comprehensive set of moral principles than Korsgaard’s theory that relies on Kant’s categorical
imperative procedure. According to Scanlon, moral judgments are based on multiple
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considerations including welfare, fairness, choice, and responsibility. The procedure of
reasonable rejection allows one to consider which of these reasons are applicable and their level
of importance to the interests of the relevant parties. Such a procedure mirrors the way moral
decisions are made, and it promises to provide a better way of making tradeoffs than does a
theory based on the categorical imperative.
At the same time, it must be recognized that critics have identified concerns about
Scanlon’s theory. The first is whether the criterion of reasonable rejection when used to provide
justification to others can specify moral principles as the theory intends. The most fundamental
criticism is that it is unnecessary because justifiability does not, in fact, represent the underlying
reason that certain actions are immoral. Rightness or wrongness is caused by certain properties
of the actions themselves; thus, the procedure adds nothing. Next, even if one grants that the
concept of justification to others is meaningful, one must still address criticisms that the
procedure cannot deliver substantive moral principles in all relevant situations. Two of these
situations involve the aggregation of benefits across individuals—the aggregation problem—and
certain cases in which different groups subjectively assess reasons—the relativism problem.
A second concern is whether contractualism provides the normativity expected from a
sound moral theory—whether everyone ought to act according to the principles the theory
determines. For contractualists, who are motivated to act morally, the issue is whether
contractualist principles provide strong enough reasons for action when the contractualist is
faced with conflicting demands from other important values such as one’s own welfare or the
welfare of one’s family. For those who are not motivated to act morally, the issue is what, if any,
standing contractualist principles have. And, finally, there are questions about the relationship
between contractualists and those who subscribe to different moral theories.
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Concerns about the effectiveness of Scanlon’s procedure are considered in Chapter 3
while concerns about normativity are covered in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 then provides a summary
assessment of the theory’s effectiveness.
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Chapter 3
The Contractualist Procedure for
Determining Moral Principles
The concept of ‘justifiability to others’ based on ‘reasonable rejection’ is critical to
Scanlon’s theory. It is responsible for both the content of moral principles and the reason why
agents should act according to these principles. Whether this concept can, in fact, fulfill both of
these roles is the key to contractualism’s success as a moral theory. In this chapter, I examine the
first of these roles in which moral principles are determined by agents making judgments about
whether a proposed principle could be reasonably rejected by the parties it affects.
This analysis will assess three major criticisms of Scanlon’s contractualist procedure. The
most general criticism is that basing principles on justifiability to others is redundant and adds
little or nothing to our understanding of morality. Certain properties of actions themselves such
as unfairness, cruelty, or dishonesty are what make actions moral or immoral; judgments about
which principles are reasonable merely rely on preexisting intuitions about these properties. My
argument is that the concept of justifiability is not redundant because it determines which
characteristics of an action are valid reasons for assessing its moral status; it plays a critical role
as a source of moral motivation; it provides a “back-stopping” reason for acting morally in
certain cases; and the procedure does not simply rely on previous moral intuitions. Thus, the
concept does determine moral principles in a meaningful way.
However, even if this general criticism can be countered, one must also respond to
charges that contractualism cannot generate the required moral principles in cases where the
aggregation of benefits or harms across individuals is important—the aggregation problem—and
cases in which reasons and the importance accorded to them vary by agent—the relativism
problem. I agree with many critics and argue that situations involving aggregation pose a
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dilemma for contractualism. The theory’s emphasis on an individual’s objections to principles
prevents inappropriate aggregation where small benefits to many should not outweigh major
harms to a few; however, contractualism is unable to specify acceptable principles in the kinds of
cases where aggregation is appropriate. I also argue that contractualism is susceptible to
objectionable relativism in certain complex situations. Here, contractualism still provides a
useful framework for identifying the reasons that are relevant and the conflicts among them that
must be considered in making moral judgments. However, conversely, agents will not
necessarily agree on the nature and weighting of the reasons involved, and thus the procedure
will not yield objective moral principles in certain situations where Scanlon argues that it does.
This chapter is divided into four sections: 1) The contractualist procedure for justifying
principles, 2) Is the concept of justifiability redundant? 3) The problem of aggregation, and 4)
The problem of relativism.
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1. The Contractualist Procedure for Justifying Principles
Scanlon’s goal for contractualism is to provide an account of one’s obligations to others,
a domain he refers to as “the morality of right and wrong” or “what we owe to each other”
(WWO 6-7). This domain includes, for example, requirements to aid others and prohibitions
against harming, killing, coercing, and deceiving. According to Scanlon, judgments about right
and wrong are “judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not
reasonably be rejected by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of
behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” (WWO 4).1
The contractualist procedure for making such judgments is involves many factors.
Understanding it requires examining Scanlon’s views on reasons, how judgments of reasonable
rejection are made, and several key characteristics of the system that shape and constrain these
judgments.
1.1. Reasons and judgments of reasonableness: According to Scanlon, a reason is “a
consideration that counts in favor of” a judgment-sensitive attitude. Examples of judgmentsensitive attitudes are beliefs, anger, admiration, respect, and other evaluative attitudes. The
judgment that there is (or is not) reason to reject a proposed moral principle is an example of a
judgment-sensitive attitude. When a person makes a conscious judgment that a certain attitude is
warranted, she generally comes to hold this attitude. When she judges that reasons count against
a certain attitude, she generally does not adopt that attitude. And, although persons can form
attitudes unreflectively, the attitudes they form this way are generally constrained by standing
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judgments about the adequacy of reasons. For example, if an individual holds that certain kinds
of evidence are not good grounds for forming beliefs, she generally does not unreflectively form
beliefs on the basis of that evidence (WWO 18-24).
Scanlon considers his idea of reasonableness to be aligned with common notions of this
concept. What is or is not reasonable is relative to a specified body of information and a
specified range of reasons, both of which may be incomplete. The reasonableness of a belief or
action is assessed relative to an agent’s beliefs at the time and the reasons she sees as relevant,
and Scanlon gives several familiar examples of ways in which an agent’s judgment that
something is reasonable can be challenged. For example, one may object that a careful person
would have noticed certain missing information or that it was obvious that she should have
searched more diligently for further data. One might also object to the way a person draws
conclusions from certain information or to the information she judges to be relevant. In the
context of collective decision-making, unreasonable usually means failing to take others’
interests into account given the aim of reaching an agreement, and this type of judgment is
particularly relevant to the moral judgments that define contractualism (WWO 32-33).
Scanlon believes judgments about what reasons are relevant to a given type of judgment
are consistent across different individuals. This uniformity depends on two factors: the existence
of an objective method for determining reasons and the fact that reasons judgments are universal.
He characterizes the process of identifying reasons as “one of bringing one’s particular
judgments about reasons and one’s general principles about when something is a reason into
reflective equilibrium.”2 Reflective equilibrium is a coherence method for justifying evaluative
principles and theories; it is the method Rawls uses in justice as fairness to validate the
2
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conditions of the original position and the resulting principles of justice (TJ 41-45). According to
Scanlon, one determines what reasons one has through a “process of careful reflection” that
includes thinking about what appear to be good reasons, identifying the general principles that
explain them, considering the implications of these principles, and assessing the plausibility of
these implications. This process is related to the type of judgment-sensitive attitude an agent is
considering making, and the content of that attitude provides a starting point in identifying the
kinds of considerations that could count in its favor.
Scanlon uses the example of a person who thinks the only reasons to preserve natural
objects such as forests and canyons are ones related to the enjoyment and benefits they bring to
people. In considering whether this position is correct, the person notes that many disagree with
this view and asks herself whether she is considering natural objects in the proper way. To do
this, she identifies the reasons others have and explores how these differ from her own and
whether the grounds for these reasons are sound. For example, she observes that some persons
value nature because it is God’s creation, but she rejects this as a valid reason because she cannot
justify the religious belief on which it rests. The person also investigates reasons associated with
specific cases. For instance, it seems objectionable to cut down a specimen tree for no other
reason than the enjoyment of using a chain saw. This kind of observation raises questions about
the specific considerations that count against defacing nature and whether these new
considerations can be reconciled with the person’s original views. If they cannot, the person
might then modify her original way of characterizing the value of natural objects. Ideally, these
kinds of explorations will result in the identification of the most coherent and complete account
of what reasons there are for the situation in question.
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Turning to cases involving moral judgments, contractualism’s goal of finding principles
that others could not reasonably reject brings into play reasons such as considering the interests
of those who might be affected by the resulting actions. One can then examine these reasons
from different perspectives. For example, if it seems a principle should be rejected because it
treats some people arbitrarily, one might consider the specific characteristics of the situation that
lead to this conclusion, how these conditions compare to those in other “arbitrary” situations,
one’s general views about what constitutes “arbitrariness,” and why it is an undesirable element
in a moral principle.
Scanlon admits that this account of how reasons are known lacks the precision and clarity
of mathematical reasoning. But he argues that, after diligently applying this process and
correcting perceived errors, the judgments that result are generally stable. He further notes that
there is also considerable consensus about what constitutes good reasons in different situations.
Thus, he claims that judgments about reasons can be correct or incorrect (WWO 67-8).
The second factor in the consistency of reasons judgments is what Scanlon terms “the
universality of reason judgments.” According to this principle, any judgment an agent makes
about her own reasons entails claims about the reasons that others have under relevantly similar
circumstances. Scanlon uses the example of Jane who sees her neighbor shoveling the snow from
his driveway. He is already tiring and has a lot more shoveling to do. Jane takes his need for
assistance as a reason for her to go out and help him. Even if they are not explicit to Jane, there
are certain features of her neighbor’s situation and her own that cause Jane to conclude she has a
reason to help. Let G be this set of factors. Because Jane accepts the judgment that, given G, she
has reason to help her neighbor, she is committed to the view that another person who stands in
relationship G to someone needing help has reason to provide it. This principle of universality is
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not a moral principle, and it leaves open which kinds of considerations count. For example, if
reasons are based on subjective conditions like desires (a claim that Scanlon denies), then these
conditions are simply part of G. “The universality of reason judgments is a formal consequence
of the fact that taking something to be a reason for acting is not a mere pro-attitude toward some
action, but rather a judgment that takes certain considerations as sufficient grounds for its
conclusion” (WWO 74).
Thus, according to Scanlon, there is a generally objective process for determining what
reasons an agent has and judgments that an agent makes about her own reasons apply to other
agents facing the same considerations. These two factors generally ensure that different agents
agree on the reasons that apply in a given situation. Agents can then use these reasons to make
judgments about which moral principles cannot be reasonably rejected, as will be described next.
1.2. Judgments of reasonable rejection: Under contractualism, valid moral principles are
ones that cannot be reasonably rejected. To determine whether it is “wrong to do act-X in
circumstance-C,” one must consider whether any principle that permitted X could be reasonably
rejected. This is done by comparing the objections to permission with the objections to
prohibition. Objections are based on the reasons that affected parties have for rejecting a
principle that permits X in C; and, conversely, the opposing principle that forbids X. If the
objections to permission are stronger than the objections to prohibition for any principle that
permitted X, then it would be reasonable to reject those principles permitting X, and the action X
would be wrong. Alternatively, if there were a principle that permitted X that it would not be
reasonable to reject, then doing X would not be wrong (WWO 195).
Scanlon’s “Rescue Principle” provides an example of how this process works. It states:
“if you are presented with a situation in which you can prevent something very bad from
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happening, or alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate)
sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so” (WWO 224). This principle cannot be reasonably
rejected because the burden on the rescuer of the principle requiring rescue is lighter than the
burden on the person being rescued if one considers an opposing principle under which rescue is
optional. In order to make the respective burdens align in this way, the Rescue Principle must
assume that the threshold of sacrifice considers previous contributions to avoid requiring
unlimited sacrifice that occurs in small increments. In contrast, a principle requiring rescue could
be reasonably rejected if it were less narrowly drawn so that the sacrifices required were
unlimited. For example, someone reasonably has an obligation to help a driver who accidentally
crashes into a tree on her property. However, if that person lives next to a dangerous blind curve
and crashes occurred every day, she cannot be expected to assume total responsibility for rescue
efforts. The state should assume some of the responsibility, and it has an obligation to warn
drivers and install safety rails to prevent recurring crashes.
Along the same lines, it would also be reasonable to reject a principle that required an
agent, in every decision she makes, to give no more consideration to her own interests than to
others’ interests because such a principle would be intolerably intrusive from the agent’s
standpoint. This conclusion is not reached by giving special weight to a single agent’s interests;
rather, it is based on the generic reason that no one in the position of an agent should be bound,
in general, by such a strict requirement. Thus, impartial reasoning about the rejectability of
principles leads to the conclusion that agents are not required to be impartial in each actual
decision they make (WWO 224-25).
These examples illustrate Scanlon’s view that principles are general conclusions about
the status of various kinds of reasons for action. Sometimes principles rule out certain actions
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directly, but they often leave wide room for interpretation (WWO 199). In applying the Rescue
Principle, judgment is needed to determine whether the sacrifice required is, in fact, moderate
relative to the harm avoided by the rescue. Just how much sacrifice is reasonable to expect is a
controversial issue. For example, Elizabeth Ashford argues that under contractualism it would be
reasonable to make a great sacrifice to prevent something very bad from happening to someone.
She points to the number of destitute people in the world as evidence that this sacrifice could
include “giving most of our income to aid agencies and spending a lot of our spare time on
campaigning and fund raising.”3 Clearly, Ashford believes a much higher level of sacrifice can
be warranted than Scanlon does; nonetheless, both are making judgments that they consider
reasonable. Also, both of these judgments appear to comply with Scanlon’s definition of a
reasonable judgment; both philosophers presumably have similar views of the burdens involved
for the various parties and neither’s judgment is “unreasonable” in the sense that it is irrational or
based on obviously incomplete information. This kind of situation raises questions about whether
different agents do, in fact, reach similar conclusions about what principles are justified, a topic
that is examined in Section 4 of this chapter.
Despite what is “reasonable” being open to some interpretation and the fact that the idea
of “reasonableness” seems more obscure than the idea of “rationality,” Scanlon argues that
reasonableness is a more appropriate criterion for moral judgments based on the implications of
these two terms. He notes that “the (most) rational thing to do” is commonly taken to mean
“what most conduces to the fulfillment of the agent’s aims.” In contrast, what is reasonable for a
person to do presupposes an overall context for the judgment, certain information, and certain
relevant reasons in order to make a claim about what these reasons support. For example, the
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goal of Scanlon’s theory is to find principles that others could not reasonably reject. This goal
brings further reasons into play, such as considering the interests of those who might be affected
by one’s actions, which finally leads to questions about the best way to respond these varying
interests (WWO 192).
Scanlon maintains that the difference between what is reasonable and what is rational is a
familiar distinction in ordinary language. He illustrates this with an example involving a
negotiation about water rights in an area where one large landowner already controls most of the
water. The landowner does not need to cooperate and what he does will largely determine the
outcome of the negotiation. It would not be unreasonable to maintain that each person is entitled
to at least a minimum supply of water and to reject any principle of allocation that does not
provide this. However, it might not be rational to propose this allocation if the landowner is
irritable and one knows such a demand will cause him to act negatively. Similarly, it is common
to say that the landowner would be unreasonable to reject the request for the guarantee of a
minimum water supply to the other parties. However, what it would be rational for him to do
depends on what his aims are. Given this distinction, Scanlon believes it is appropriate to base
contractualist moral principles on whether objections would be reasonable rather than on whether
they are rational. In the water case, this is a judgment about the merits of the claims of the small
landowners for a minimum amount of water, which is a judgment about the suitability of certain
principles to serve as the basis of mutual recognition and accommodation. It is not a judgment
about what would advance their interests or produce an agreement in either an actual or idealized
situation (WWO 192-94).
1.3. Other key characteristics of contractualism: Finally, it is important to consider
several other characteristics of contractualism that guide the way moral judgments are made. It
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has already been noted that principles are general conclusions about various kinds of reasons for
actions that may rule out some actions directly but often leave wide room for interpretation and
judgment. In determining principles, Scanlon takes a broad view of the “others” to whom actions
must be justifiable. One must consider not only the impact of the specific action in question but
also the consequences of the general adoption of the principle being considered. Thus, an agent
needs to consider possible objections to principles of all parties potentially affected by the type
of action in question. Because the specific individuals who may be affected are not known, these
objections must be based on generic reasons which consist of commonly available information
about what people have reason to want (WWO 202-4). Identifying all the affected parties and
their reasons may appear to be a daunting task; however, because reasonable rejection is
determined by comparing only the parties who have the strongest objections, there is usually
little difficulty in identifying which objections need to be considered.
Unlike many consequentialist theories, the types of reasons on which principles are based
go beyond well-being and include reasons like not wanting to be treated arbitrarily or the
responsibility that a person has for the outcome. An individual can object to a process that makes
distinctions for which no justification can be given because she does not want to be subject to
arbitrary treatment.4 For example, it would be arbitrary to grant financial benefits based solely on
personal relationships. By contrast, it is not arbitrary to aid someone with special needs or to ask
a person to perform a dangerous but necessary task because she has the unique skills required.
Or, considering responsibility, someone who has been warned not to perform a dangerous action
but does so anyway may lose her standing to object to the harm she suffers, assuming the nature
of the warning was appropriate to the danger involved.
4
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Finally, because contractualism is based on the idea of justifying one’s actions to other
individuals, Scanlon specifies that the reasons involved in objecting to principles must be
personal and non-aggregative. The reasons must be personal because they reflect the claims of
individuals in certain positions. These claims cannot be based on impersonal reasons alone, like
the general value of preserving nature. Scanlon argues for this restriction because contractualism
is focused on the domain of morality that involves “what we owe to each other,” and impersonal
reasons do not represent a concern about other people. Nonetheless, these kinds of reasons can
provide grounds for reasonable rejection based on, for example, the benefits enjoying nature
provides to specific individuals (WWO 219). Similarly, because contractualism focuses on
relationships among individuals, the grounds for reasonable rejection are limited to objections
that can be made by single individuals, and benefits or harms accruing to multiple individuals
cannot be aggregated to increase the weight of an objection. Because there are situations where
common moral intuitions support the aggregation of benefits, this is a controversial topic which
is analyzed later in this chapter.
At this point, having examined how moral principles are determined under
contractualism, I next consider the critics’ main objections about the effectiveness of the
contractualist procedure.
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2. Is the Concept of Justifiability Redundant?
A central objection to Scanlon’s use of justifiability to others to determine moral
principles is that the concept is redundant. Critics claim that the properties of actions used to
argue for and against proposed principles determine whether an action is right or wrong
independent of the concept of justifiability. Further, in making judgments about which principles
it is reasonable to reject, agents must rely on previously-held moral intuitions of right and wrong.
After elaborating these objections, I will argue that, when understood correctly, Scanlon’s use of
justifiability to others to determine moral principles is not redundant.
2.1. Objections elaborated: According to critics, a fundamental weakness of Scanlon’s
contractualism is that justifiability to others does not, in fact, represent the underlying reason that
certain actions are immoral. Rather, rightness or wrongness is determined by certain properties
of actions themselves. For instance, Philip Pettit writes:
He [Scanlon] starts from the assumption that we can and often do identify right actions by
identifying actions that we can justify in his sense to others. He moves then to the claim that
rightness is nothing more or less than justifiability of this kind. But in making this claim, he neglects
the fact that when we try to justify certain actions to others we do not try to establish that they are
…well, actions that we can justify to others. We try to establish that the actions are right in some
independent sense of right and that, for precisely that reason, they are justifiable. Specifically, we try
to establish that they are right by showing that they are fair or kind or for the general good, or
whatever. The very linkage between justifiability and rightness suggests…that rightness must be
characterized in a justifiability-independent manner.5

In effect, Pettit’s critique holds that using moral properties like cruelty or unfairness to determine
what principles can be justified adds little to an understanding of morality. Thus, the concept of
justifiability is unnecessary or redundant.6
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Additionally, some critics charge that Scanlon does not provide sufficient guidance on
how to make a judgment of reasonable rejection. Scanlon’s notion of reasonableness is not based
on any type of non-moral criterion; rather, the reasonableness of a principle is a judgment about
the moral relevance and importance of the reasons for and against that principle. According to
these critics, what is moral should depend on a non-moral judgment—such as the utilitarian
criterion of maximizing overall welfare. In the absence of non-moral criteria, an agent’s
judgment will depend upon or be influenced by previous moral intuitions. According to Brad
Hooker,
At least in Rawls’s system, it was clear that the parties in the original position do not themselves
appeal to moral intuitions when choosing principles. The charge against Scanlon is that we can make
his contractualist principle come out with the intuitively right conclusion only if, when we try to
operate his contractualist test, we fall back on moral intuitions that have not yet been validated by
that test. Scanlon’s views about reasonable rejection must not presume the very thing they are being
invoked to explain (namely, conclusions about right and wrong).7

Here Scanlon’s test is viewed as presupposing what it tries to explain.
In response to these kinds of objections, I believe Scanlon’s procedure can be defended
on three grounds: 1) The procedure shapes moral thinking and picks out the properties that make
actions wrong; 2) justifiability can explain why the contractualist is motivated to act morally and
also acts as a “backstop” reason in certain situations; and 3) the procedure for making a judgment
of reasonable rejection adds to moral understanding and does not simply rely on previous moral
intuitions.
2.2. Ground One: Shapes moral thinking: Scanlon can acknowledge that agents often
determine the morality of actions from first-order properties while still arguing that the notion of
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wrongness, defined as justifiability to others, plays an important role in moral thinking.8 In many
complicated cases, the idea of wrongness described by justifiability often shapes the way an
agent thinks about morality and determines which considerations should be taken as valid
reasons for accepting or rejecting principles.
Scanlon uses as an example the moral principle “if I could easily prevent someone
standing nearby from being injured, I should do so,” and the case of a guard who has been hired
for protection. While guarding his client, he sees a third person in danger of being injured by a
criminal. Normally, the right thing to do would be to help the person who is being attacked; but,
in this case, it might be wrong for the guard to aid the third person because he would be leaving
his own client exposed. The idea of “justifiability to the client” makes it the case that injury to
the other person is not a conclusive reason for action in the way it would be absent the client’s
presence. At the same time, the guard must still consider “justifiability to the third person” to
determine what is, in fact, the right action given the risk of harm to each. The consideration of
how his action would be justifiable to each of the affected parties and which party would have a
stronger reason to reject his proposed action provides a way for the guard to determine the
correct action. Many moral situations involve this kind of assessment of competing reasons, and
the concept of justifiability provides a way to make such judgments.
Furthermore, characteristics like ‘harm’ do not automatically make actions wrong; they
must be put in the context justifiability provides. For example, everyone agrees that avoiding
death and injury is a good thing; however, not every action that leads to someone’s death or
injury is wrong. What is often at issue is the right way to act and the amount of care required to
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avoid injury in situations that inherently involve risk. Consider the example of an individual who
needs to remove hazardous material from her property. Working with the authorities, she fences
off the property, installs warning signs, and mails notifications to nearby residents about the
timing and danger of the removal process.9 If someone is still unaware of these precautions,
wanders onto the property, and is injured, the owner has done nothing wrong if the precautions
are appropriate for the situation. The greater the danger, the more comprehensive the precautions
need to be. The test of justifiability to others can be used to determine what level of care is
appropriate. It provides a framework to compare the potential harms to different parties and to
determine what level of risk is reasonable for the various parties to bear.10
Consistent with this role, contractualism provides a two-level account of wrongness. On
the surface, there are the observed properties of specific actions that count for or against their
moral permissibility, such as the harm or benefit the action causes others. But contractualism
then offers another, deeper level explanation of why these properties count in favor of, or against,
moral rightness based on the various reasons for which the action can, or cannot, be reasonably
rejected.11 Furthermore, in cases where the morality of an action is not obvious from its
characteristics, the contractualist procedure can be used to determine the action’s moral status.
The concept of justification is also what gives actions their moral character. The reasons
used in making judgments of reasonable rejection are generally based on an action’s effects
which, by themselves, do not necessarily have moral force. This force is explained rather by the
fact that someone affected negatively has the strongest reason to object to the action. For
example, cruel acts cause physical or psychological damage, and this harm provides the reason
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for people to object. The success of this objection is what gives the action its moral character,
rendering it a ‘cruel’ one. In contrast, amputating someone’s leg causes considerable physical
damage, but one cannot object if its aim is to save the person’s life. Because the reason for
objection (harm) is not intrinsically moral, the procedure is not redundantly using moral inputs.12
One might make a rough analogy to Hume’s view that it is an observer’s response of approval or
disapproval to an action that gives the action a virtuous or vicious character. Lacking the
observer’s reaction, it is impossible to determine the moral status of the action. In
contractualism, it is the fact that an action can be reasonably rejected that makes it wrong—the
concrete properties of the action alone are not sufficient. Hume points to a subjective factor to
explain moral status whereas contractualism points to a person’s reasons for objecting, a more
objective criterion.
2.3. Ground Two: Better explains normativity and provides backstop reason:
Justifiability is also needed to explain normativity because first-order properties alone cannot
account for why morality is accorded such a high priority in determining actions. Christine
Korsgaard makes this point when she writes:
For even if we know what makes an action good, so long as that is just a piece of knowledge, that
knowledge has to be applied in action by way of another sort of norm of action, something like an
obligation to do those actions which we know to be good. And there is no way to derive such an
obligation from a piece of knowledge that a certain action is good. A utilitarian thinks an action is
good because it maximizes good consequences…. But how is it supposed to follow that it is to be
done?13

Said differently, just knowing that an action is ‘good’ does not explain why we have a duty to
perform it. Justifiability, however, can explain the source of this obligation. Scanlon argues that
living according to principles that could not be reasonably rejected is the best way to respect the
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value of human life. Appreciating this value involves recognizing the human’s capacity to assess
reasons and to govern her own life. Since it is impossible to respond to all the choices people
make, the best way to deal with this problem is to treat others according to principles they could
not reasonably reject. Acting in this manner allows people to develop relationships of “mutual
recognition”—relationships that are worth seeking because people need and receive value from
social interactions (WWO 104-6, 162). (This is a brief summary of Scanlon’s argument for the
normativity of contractualism; it is examined in detail in Chapter 4.)
The desire to develop relationships of mutual recognition also enables justifiability to
play a “backstop role” by providing a direct reason not to perform an action when the individual
characteristics of that action are insufficient to provide reason to act morally. For example, Susan
can hire either Ann, a talented and well-recommended stranger, or her friend who is an
acceptable but less qualified candidate. Susan believes that the right thing to do is to hire Ann
because friendship is not relevant to performing the job and a decision to hire her friend could
not be justified to Ann. Nonetheless, the desire to help her friend is a strong personal reason for
Susan to act against this judgment. In this case, the idea that hiring her friend would be wrong
provides Susan an additional reason to hire Ann because she wants to live up to the ideal of
acting morally.14 In cases like this, an agent has reached the conclusion that an action would be
wrong but is tempted to pursue it anyway. The agent must ask how much weight should be given
to the fact that this action would be wrong, and this question itself becomes a reason that counts
against the action (WWO 157).15
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Finally, justifiability is sometimes needed to make another person’s reasons the agent’s
own reason for acting or not acting. Michael Ridge makes this point using the example of a
person whose project is to be a world-class chess player and an agent who is considering taking
the chess player out for drinks even though she knows the player is a recovering alcoholic. The
chess player has an agent-relative reason to object to this action on the grounds that it would
frustrate her efforts to excel at chess. However, without some further linkage, this reason is not a
reason for the agent because it has no effect on the agent’s own projects. This link is provided by
the agent’s need to justify her actions to others which makes the chess player’s reason for
objecting one that the agent must consider. The reason by itself (the fact that going drinking will
block the chess player’s project) does not explain why the agent’s action is immoral. It is the
combination of this reason plus the agent’s need to justify her actions that leads to the moral
judgment that this action would be wrong. Thus, justifiability provides a way to consider other
people’s agent-relative reasons when making moral judgments.16
2.4. Ground Three: Does not merely rely on previous intuitions: Critics, as we have seen,
are also concerned that contractualism does not provide enough practical guidance on how
judgments of reasonable rejection should be made. Thus, these judgments are overly reliant on
previously formed moral intuitions which makes contractualism a form of intuitionism. In
responding to this concern, Scanlon argues that moral judgments are too diverse and complex to
identify a small number of moral criteria and specify how they should be applied in a way that
would cover all cases. He recognizes that a judgment of what is reasonably rejectable is a moral
judgment because it presupposes certain reasons and their weightings are morally relevant.
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However, he argues that contractualism provides sufficient guidance while respecting the
complexity of moral judgments.17
This guidance is provided in several ways. First, the contractualist procedure places
certain limits on the types of considerations permitted as grounds for reasonable rejection. As
discussed in Section 1 of this chapter, Scanlon specifies that reasons must be personal, generic,
and non-aggregative. They must be personal because the contractualist idea of justification
implies that relevant reasons depend on how principles directly affect other people. They must be
generic because conclusions about principles apply to a class of situations rather than a single
case. And they must be non-aggregative because contractualism is designed to protect the rights
of individuals. Scanlon does this by specifying that judgments of reasonable rejection must made
by comparing the objections of the various individuals affected by the proposed principle;
objections cannot include the aggregation of benefits or harms across multiple individuals.18
Additionally, relevant considerations are not limited to well-being but include such factors as the
desire for outcomes to depend on one’s choices, the objection to being treated arbitrarily, and the
feeling that one’s central interests are being taken into account. These types of considerations
shape our moral judgments and place limits on the role of mere intuition.
In replying to the charge that judgments of reasonable rejection rely too much on
intuition, it is important to appreciate the distinction between the judgments Scanlon makes in
specifying how the overall contractualist procedure is to be applied and the judgments agents
make within the theory about whether proposed principles can be reasonably rejected. The
acceptance of theory-level specifications like the requirements that relevant reasons are not
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limited to welfare-related ones and that reasons cannot be aggregated is based an agent’s
judgment that contractualism, as a whole, is the most best moral theory for her purposes. This
judgment clearly has moral content as does the judgment to accept any moral theory. The key
question is how much intuition is subsequently involved in making moral judgments within the
theory once these theory-level judgments are accepted. Here Scanlon argues that the theory
provides a sufficient level of guidance to distinguish judgments within the theory from
previously held intuitions even though these judgments admittedly involve some moral content.
Second, it can be argued that the contractualist procedure for selecting and comparing
reasons provides meaningful standards for making moral judgments because comparisons among
reasons are criticizable and thus are not simply based on intuitions.19 An agent must have
sufficient information about the effect of proposed principles. Reflection is required to identify
all who will be affected and what harms or benefits will result if the principle is approved. Such
judgments are not based on intuition and thus they can be criticized on an informational basis.
For example, under the Rescue Principle described previously, consider a situation where
frequent high-cost rescues are required due to irresponsible behavior of the persons needing
rescue. The burdens on the rescuer may be so intrusive that they would conflict with her ability
to make decisions about her own life, and this would permit her to make a reasonable objection
to a version of the Rescue Principle that allowed this to happen. An agent who did not consider
these kinds of consequences in making a judgment about a principle could be criticized. Simply
put, there are standards that an agent must meet in making a valid judgment of reasonable
rejection.

19

Suikkanen, 47-50.

59

Furthermore, the framework of Scanlon’s theory of practical reason is more complicated
than many critics acknowledge. The process of comparing reasons is not simply a matter of
applying weights to each reason and generating a psychological weighting among the given
objections. Rather, in certain situations, one reason may “silence” others to the point where they
are no longer relevant. Consider Scanlon’s case of someone thinking of throwing a party for her
friends to “have fun,” but just before the party one of the friends is injured in a serious accident.
Determining the right thing to do here is not simply a matter of weighing the fun of having the
party against the hurt of the accident. Having fun may no longer be a relevant reason. The
accident has “silenced” it to the point where it carries no weight at all. This example illustrates
that moral reasons can come in holistic frameworks that are by their nature hierarchical. In
considering reasonable rejection, one must justify why each party’s objections should count as
reasons, and consider whether what at first might appear to be good reasons are in fact silenced
or modified by other considerations. Once this picture of reasons and objections is constructed, it
is still subject to criticism. For instance, one might challenge the strength of the grounds for
certain objections or compare them to objections that are raised similar situations. Like the
previous requirement for correct and sufficient information, this requirement for consistency in
the framework demonstrates that the contractualist procedure is not simply a matter of applying
intuitions about what is right or wrong. Proper application involves a disciplined process that
improves the quality of moral judgments (WWO 50-55).
Finally, consider a judgment based on the intuition of ‘fairness,’ which is often cited as
the culprit in bringing prior moral intuitions into the contractualist procedure. Scanlon believes
this criticism is unwarranted because unfair procedures make distinctions for which no
justification can be given. For example, favoring one person simply because of her relationship
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to the agent is arbitrary without further grounds. By contrast, giving medicine to a person whose
need is greater than another’s or assigning someone to a dangerous mission because of her
unique capabilities are choices that can be justified. People have reason to object to principles
that are unfair not because unfairness is intuitively wrong, but because they do not want to be
subject to arbitrary treatment.20 This explanation provides a non-moral criterion for
distinguishing what kinds of procedures are unfair, and thus allows Scanlon to argue that the
charge of circularity or redundancy in the case of ‘fairness’ is mistaken.
In summary, this section has argued that judgments about moral principles made by
contractualism provide a reasons-based justification for adopting or rejecting principles which
goes beyond previous intuitions about what is right and wrong, regardless of whether the
judgments align with those intuitions in many situations. The concept of justifiability to others is
a substantive one even though the specific properties of actions play a key role in determining
what is right or wrong. The concept can thus be said to determine moral principles and it is not
redundant. This is an important conclusion in favor of Scanlon’s contractualism. However, it is
still necessary to investigate the procedure’s limits. I will do this by analyzing two problematic
situations: the aggregation of harms and agent-based relativism.
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3. The Problem of Aggregation
The aggregation of benefits or harms across individuals poses a dilemma for
contractualism. On the one hand, the theory is designed to reflect the importance of individual
rights, and those rights can take precedence over the greater good. Scanlon protects these rights
with his Individualist Restriction. This restriction limits the grounds for rejecting a principle to
its effects on individuals, thus ignoring benefits or harms summed across groups of people. On
the other hand, there are situations where moral intuitions strongly place the overall welfare
above that of an individual. A favorite philosophical example is a rescue situation in which one
must choose between saving one or several persons. The question is whether contractualism can
justify saving the many without giving up its basic emphasis on the individual, and whether it
can deal with other cases involving similar tradeoffs between group and individual welfare.
Scanlon argues that contractualism can resolve this dilemma to a large extent. But critics
doubt that it can, and I argue they are right.21 My contention is that a consistent application of
Scanlon’s contractualist procedure rules out principles that allow for the aggregation of benefits
or harms, even in cases where aggregation is needed to match generally held moral intuitions.
This is not a debate about when the aggregation of benefits is appropriate; rather, it is one about
what principles can be justified under the procedure that Scanlon has specified for
contractualism.
3.1. The Individualist Restriction: One of contractualism’s most attractive characteristics
is that it disallows forms of aggregation in which small benefits accruing to many people are
claimed to outweigh significant harms suffered by a smaller number by restricting relevant
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reasons for accepting or rejecting moral principles to the personal reasons of single individuals.
This feature distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism and other forms of
consequentialism. These theories are appealing because they promote attractive values like
overall happiness or welfare; however, they sometimes have highly unattractive implications
given their goal of maximizing the values they support. In such theories, significant harms to a
few can be justified if the total benefits to others are great enough. When the number of others is
very large, the benefits to each can be quite small; thus, one individual might face death in return
for many others avoiding minor inconveniences.
Scanlon describes how contractualism eliminates this problem:
All the grounds for rejecting a principle that I have so far considered arise from generic reasons that
an individual would have who occupied a certain position in the situations to which that principle
applies. This suggests what Parfit has called the Complaint Model. On this interpretation of
contractualism, a person’s complaint against a principle must have to do with its effects on him or
her, and someone can reasonably reject a principle if there is some alternative to which no other
person has a complaint that is as strong (WWO 229). [Italics added]

Scanlon notes that he deviates from the Complaint Model in two ways: (1) by allowing a person
to reject a principle for reasons beyond well-being22 and (2) by maintaining that grounds for
rejection are also shaped by background principles that must be held constant during the
evaluation of a new principle. He continues:
These departures aside, the Complaint Model calls attention to a central feature of contractualism
that I would not want to give up: its insistence that the justifiability of a moral principle depend only
on various individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives to it. This feature is
central to the guiding idea of contractualism, and is also what enables it to provide a clear alternative
to utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism (WWO 229).

Thus, contractualism distinguishes itself from consequentialist theories by focusing on
the dignity and importance of the individual rather than the overall welfare of society.
Individuals cannot be used as the means to others’ ends, and harms to individuals cannot be
22

Calling this a “deviation” assumes that one interprets the Complaint Model as being limited to
objections affecting well-being which may not be Parfit’s intent.
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offset by the aggregation of benefits to many. Scanlon accomplishes this goal by restricting the
grounds for rejecting a principle to the effects the principle has on particular individuals;
aggregated benefits across individuals do not count as grounds for rejection. Derek Parfit calls
this constraint the Individualist Restriction because, “we must appeal to this principle’s
implications only for ourselves, or for any other single person.”23 Scanlon characterizes its effect
as “allowing the intuitively compelling complaints of those who are severely burdened to be
heard, while…the sum of the smaller benefits to others has no justificatory weight, since there is
no individual who enjoys these benefits…” (WWO 230) [italics added].
Consider the case of Jones offered by Scanlon. Jones has an accident in the transmitter
room of a television station and is consequently receiving extremely painful electric shocks. A
World Cup match is in progress with an audience of millions of people. Should one rescue Jones
causing millions of viewers to lose the pleasure of watching the match? Not surprisingly,
Scanlon concludes that Jones should be saved, and he proposes what might be called the ‘Minor
Harms Principle.’
If one can save a person from serious pain and injury at the cost of inconveniencing others
or interfering with their amusement, then one must do so no matter how numerous these
others may be (WWO 235).
In determining whether this principle can be reasonably rejected, the Individualist Restriction
requires a comparison of the harm that Jones suffers with the potential harm incurred by any
single member of the larger group. Clearly, this principle cannot be reasonably rejected because
no one person in the larger group can claim that the harm of his or her inconvenience outweighs
(or even comes close to) the harm that Jones is suffering. In this kind of case, the Individualist
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Restriction prevents aggregation—and rightly so. The resulting principle, which requires one to
save Jones, also seems to match common moral intuitions.
3.2. The Tiebreaker Principle: The issue for contractualism, however, is how to maintain
the Individualist Restriction while still allowing aggregation in cases where it appears to be fully
appropriate. To do this Scanlon proposes the Tiebreaker Principle:
Where one has a duty to provide aid and has a choice of preventing harms of comparable
moral importance to a larger or smaller group of people, one should provide aid to the larger
number (WWO 238). [Italics added]
Suppose that a rescuer has a choice of saving either one person (referred to as A) or a group of
two persons (referred to as B plus C), but cannot save everyone. Also, the fates of B and C are
linked; both are saved or lost together. It seems obvious to most24 that the morally correct action
is to save B plus C, which is what the Tiebreaker Principle requires. But the question is whether
such a principle involving aggregation can be justified in a way that is consistent with the
Individualist Restriction. Scanlon agrees that this is a serious challenge and that contractualism
“appears to go too far in the opposite direction” (WWO 230). But he believes it is still possible to
make a case for the Tiebreaker Principle.
The argument leading to the conclusion that aggregation presents an acute problem for
contractualism relies on the assumption that the strength of individuals’ complaints against a
principle are a function solely of the cost to them of that principle’s being accepted. But, as indicated
at the outset of this section, I have already departed from the Complaint Model in this respect, by
allowing that individuals’ reasons for rejecting a principle can depend on factors other than effects
on their well-being. We should see, then, whether this divergence provides room for an explanation
of how what is right can sometimes depend on aggregative considerations (WWO 231).

Here, Scanlon points out that the argument against aggregation is based on comparing the costs
of adopting a principle to the various individuals who are affected. However, it is also
appropriate under contractualism to consider factors other than a principle’s effect on well-being,
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and Scanlon argues that consideration of these other factors allows for aggregation in certain
situations.
Returning to the question of a rescuer’s dilemma to save either the single individual (A)
or the group (B plus C), Scanlon argues that a member of the group (say C) could reasonably
object to a principle that opposes the Tiebreaker Principle because it would allow the rescuer to
choose between saving either A or the group (B plus C). That is, C could complain that this
principle, by giving the rescuer a choice, does not take account of the value of saving C’s life
because the principle permits the agent to act as if C were not present, in which case the rescuer
has a choice to save either A or B. Put another way, the fate of A is obviously given positive
weight because the rescuer has a choice of whether to save A or the group (B plus C). The fact
that there is one other person, B, who can be saved if and only if A is not saved, is also given
positive weight to balance the saving of A. The presence of C, however, makes no difference to
what the agent should do.
Scanlon points out that C might object “since his life should be given the same moral
significance as anyone else’s in this situation” [italics added] (WWO 232). He goes on to argue,
“A principle that did not recognize the presence of the second person [C]…as making a moral
difference…could reasonably be rejected” (WWO 234). In contrast, A could not make a similar
objection to the Tiebreaker Principle which requires that both B plus C be saved. He cannot
claim that his life is not taken equally into account because the harm he would incur is offset by
the same harm incurred by B. Thus, Scanlon argues that the lives of A and B balance out in the
Tiebreaker Principle. And, he concludes that the fact that the life of C has “the same moral
significance as anyone else’s” makes it reasonable to reject the opposing principle which allows
the rescuer to make a choice (WWO 233).
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In summarizing why he finds this argument for the Tiebreaker Principle compelling,
Scanlon writes:
…any principle dealing with cases of this kind would be reasonably rejectable if it did not
require agents to treat the claims of each person who could be saved as having the same
moral force. Since there is, we are supposing, a positive duty to save in cases in which only
one person is present, this means that any nonrejectable principle must direct an agent to
recognize a positive reason for saving each person. Since a second reason of this kind can
balance the first—turning a situation in which one must save one into one in which it is
permissible to save either of two people—the reason presented by the needs of a second
person in one of these two groups must at least have the power to break this tie. The
principle stated above [which permits the rescuer to choose between saving either the
smaller or larger group] fails to meet these requirements and is reasonably rejectable (232).
[Italics added]
Let us step back to consider the key elements of the situation: The harm faced by the
single person (A) is equal to the harm faced by either of the other two persons (B or C).
According to the Individualist Restriction, this comparison results in a tie because only the harms
done to single individuals are relevant—the harms of the two persons in the group (B plus C)
cannot be added together. At the same time, the “moral significance” or the “positive reason for
saving each person’s life” is the same for the single individual as it is for each of the two persons
in the group. But from Scanlon’s perspective, the moral significance associated with the second
person in the group (C) breaks the tie because “an agent must recognize a positive reason for
saving each person.” On this basis, the Tiebreaker Principle cannot be reasonably rejected. Thus,
it appears that Scanlon has two contradictory interpretations of how the contractualist procedure
should be applied: according to the Individualist Restriction, the harms incurred by B and C
cannot be considered at the same time; whereas, for an agent to recognize a reason for saving the
second person (C), the moral significance of both B and C must be considered in some way.
Which is the correct interpretation?
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My view is that Scanlon violates the contractualist procedure and the Individualist
Restriction in making his argument for the Tiebreaker. First, his argument requires that one
consider the moral significance of the lives of B and C as a “non-welfare-related reason”
separate from the harms they would suffer from the loss of their lives. The separate moral
significance of C’s life is needed because Scanlon argues that this significance requires the agent
to consider the claims of both B and C at the same time. I would argue that the moral
significance of a life and the harm caused by the loss of that life are linked together in a way that
other non-welfare-related reasons (like arbitrariness or unfairness) and harm are not. To consider
the loss of life as a reason for rejecting a principle, there must already be a judgment that the life
has some moral significance (as does the loss); otherwise harm would not qualify as a reason that
affects a moral judgment. Thus, my first point is that the harm done by the loss of life and the
moral significance of the life cannot be separated and should be considered together. If this is
right, then Scanlon cannot justify the Tiebreaker Principle by considering moral significance as a
separate non-welfare-related reason.
Second, I would argue that even if one agrees that moral significance and harm are
separate reasons relevant to the comparison of the various party’s objections, these objections
should be considered according to the general contractualist procedure that Scanlon has already
prescribed.25 As noted at the beginning of this section, Scanlon points to “generic reasons that an
individual would have” in considering grounds for rejection. Moral significance and harm are
simply two types of generic reasons. One should compare A’s reasons to object to the Tiebreaker
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Principle (the harm done to A plus the moral significance of A’s life) to B’s reasons to object to
the opposing principle (the harm done to B plus the moral significance of B’s life). This results
in a tie. One then compares A’s reasons to C’s, resulting in another tie. Because no single
individual has a stronger reason to reject under these individual-to-individual comparisons, the
agent can choose to save either A or the group (B plus C). In following this approach, the agent
is certainly giving moral significance to C’s life by comparing it with A’s, just as she is giving
moral significance to B’s life. As discussed, Scanlon rejects this approach by concluding that C’s
life is not being given equal significance if the result is a tie. But C’s life is, in fact, being given
significance if one considers the procedure used for comparison rather than the result. C’s life is
being given significance because it is being compared to A’s life in the same way as B’s life is.
Finally, I would argue that using the moral significance of C’s life as a tiebreaker is a
form of aggregation even if Scanlon does not explicitly add together the moral significances of
B’s and C’s lives. To make his objection, C must point to the existence of B, and C’s claim could
not break the tie unless one considered B’s claim at the same time. Such a claim certainly seems
to be a “group” claim as opposed to an individual one because it is a case in which “the claims of
individuals are considered together or in combination rather than one by one.”26 Scanlon’s
approach in arguing for the Tiebreaker Principle implicitly aggregates across individuals,
something that he agrees is prohibited by the Individualist Restriction. Parfit supports the
conclusion that there is a conflict when he writes, “As Scanlon’s Tiebreaker View implies, we
ought to save the [larger number]. To defend this view, I believe, Scanlon must give up his
Individualist Restriction.”27

26
27

Otsuka makes this argument in Otsuka. Quotation is from Otsuka, 292.
Parfit, 378.

69

A defender of contractualism might respond that the tiebreaker argument does not
actually require aggregation of benefits. Rather, one should view the claims of A and B as
neutralizing each other as they would in the case where C is not present. Then, when C is
present, her claim is the only one available to consider, and it is obvious that she must be saved.
Saving B is merely a by-product of saving C so the claims of B and C are not, in fact, added
together, and the Individualist Restriction is not violated.28 This is unpersuasive. The procedure it
uses deviates from comparing the reasons each of the individuals involved has for objecting to
the proposed principles. More importantly, from a commonsense perspective, if only A and B are
present, the rescuer can choose which one to save because there is an absence of reasons pointing
in either direction. If C joins B, the rescuer must save B plus C, and abandon A. Clearly the
combined objections of both B and C are being considered in some way in justifying this result,
and the principle that is being applied no longer rests on the principle’s implications for “any
other single person” as the Individualist Restriction requires.
Another possible response is that the justification for aggregation precedes the theory.
Saving two instead of one is consistent with what agents have reason to do regardless of their
preferred moral theory.29 While this is probably true, the problem for contractualism is that the
Individualist Restriction was included in the theory specifically to counter pre-theoretical
thinking involving the aggregation of harms or benefits across groups of individuals. In the
absence of the Individualist Restriction, there would be no need for the Tiebreaker Principle, but
Scanlon’s specification that principles should be determined based solely on a comparison of the
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burdens placed on individuals requires a way to reconcile these two types of intuitions within the
same theory. I agree with the critics that this cannot be done.
Finally, for greater completeness, it is worth considering the argument that the rescuer
should use a lottery procedure that gives each of A, B, and C at least some chance to be saved.30
The idea is that A would have less reason to reject such a principle than she would a Tiebreaker
Principle that guarantees her death. Moreover, if the odds are properly adjusted, B and C could
not reject a principle that gives each person the appropriate chance of being saved.31 Scanlon
argues that it is improper to introduce a lottery because the Tiebreaker Principle already
considers the importance of saving A (WWO 234). Also, he argues it is not right to consider the
“chance of being saved” as a benefit when the situation is one where the person either will or
won’t be saved depending on the rescuer’s decision.32 From my perspective this is an interesting
but unimportant debate as neither solution resolves the aggregation problem. I have already
argued why the Tiebreaker Principle cannot be justified under Scanlon’s contractualism. And,
even if one assumes the lottery principle is the best contractualist principle, it still leaves the
theory with the problem that using a lottery to determine whom to save is intuitively wrong when
one could with certainty save both B plus C.
In summary, I agree with Scanlon that the Tiebreaker Principle should be valid, but I do
not see how it can be justified in a way that is consistent with the Individualist Restriction. The
argument for the Tiebreaker Principle seems more designed to produce the desired result (save
the many) of prior moral intuitions than to be faithful to the theory’s claim that only an
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individual’s generic reasons should determine which principles to adopt. And, moving on,
aggregation becomes even more difficult when one considers unequal but morally relevant
harms.
3.3. Unequal but morally relevant harms: There are certainly cases in which it would be
wrong to save a small number of people from very serious harm instead of saving a larger
number of people from less serious—but still significant—harm. As Scanlon observes, “it could
be wrong to save one person’s life when we could have prevented a million people from going
blind or becoming paralyzed” (WWO 240). To address these types of cases, he proposes a
principle that considers the “moral relevance” of the harms involved.
If one harm, though not as serious as another, is nonetheless serious enough to be morally “relevant”
to it, then it is appropriate, in deciding whether to prevent more serious harms at the cost of not being
able to prevent a greater number of less serious ones, to take into account the number of harms
involved on each side. But if one harm is not only less serious than, but not even “relevant to,” some
greater one, then we do not need to take the number of people who would suffer these two harms
into account (WWO 239-40).

But can such a principle be justified within contractualism? The harms are certainly not equal,
even though the less serious harm is still very bad, so the Tiebreaker principle for equal harms
does not apply (assuming it is sound in the first place). Scanlon suggests that an Extended
Tiebreaker Principle might include relevance.
It might be claimed that…a principle requiring (or perhaps even permitting) one always to prevent
the more serious harms in such a case could reasonably be rejected from the point of view of
someone in the other group on the ground that it did not give proper consideration to his admittedly
less serious, but still morally relevant, loss. One might then argue that such an individual’s claim to
have his or her harm taken into account can be met only by a principle that is sensitive to the number
of people involved on each side. I am not certain how such an argument would go, but it does not
seem to me to be excluded in advance by the general idea of contractualism (WWO 240-41).

I have argued that it is not possible to justify such a principle when the harms are equal and still
respect a reasonable interpretation of the Individualist Restriction. The unequal nature of the
harms makes it even less likely that such a principle could be justified. Scanlon seems to agree
when he says he is uncertain how to make the argument. If such a principle could be justified, it
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would be under a contractualism that is not equivalent to the one currently being examined, and
Scanlon concurs when he writes that “a less tightly constrained version of contractualism…might
yield aggregative principles that would apply to a wider range of cases, in which the harms on
each side were not equally serious” (WWO 241).
From a different perspective, Joseph Raz also argues that contractualism will not help in
resolving cases involving unequal but morally relevant harms. He notes that when considering a
principle dealing with unequal harms, a person can object to the principle if it does not give her
harm the significance it deserves because it disallows the needed aggregation. But to make such
an objection, the problem of aggregation must be solved first so that the person knows her
objection is sound. Contractualism itself, Raz argues, adds nothing to the solution.33 Thus, the
previous set of observations makes it unlikely that contractualism can deal with unequal but
morally relevant harms.
Furthermore, even if an Extended Tiebreaker Principle could be developed to address the
kinds of cases just discussed, there is an additional and serious concern that a principle based on
moral relevance would unintentionally allow aggregation in situations that cannot be justified.
For example, under the reasonable assumption that the relationship of “relevant harm” is a
transitive one, consider Scanlon’s transmitter case where the harms in question are the painful
electric shocks Jones receives and the annoyance of the interruption of the World Cup for
millions of viewers. One could construct a ladder of finitely many harms of descending severity
between the electric shocks and the loss of viewing where the difference in seriousness between
any two adjacent harms is small enough that the lesser harm can be considered morally relevant
to the greater one. For each pair of adjacent harms, some number of persons suffering the lesser
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harm is considered equivalent to one person suffering the greater one. One can then calculate
how many persons missing the World Cup are equivalent to Jones’s painful shocks by
multiplying the ratio of persons in each step of the chain. The Extended Tiebreaker Principle
applied to morally relevant harms would require that Jones’s shocks be allowed to continue if the
affected World Cup audience is greater than that number. Thus, this principle could be used to
justify the consequentialist outcome that contractualism is designed to avoid.34
The contractualist could prevent this problem by arguing that there is not a continuum of
harms; rather, there are clear cutoff points that determine which harms are considered morally
relevant. But the cutoff points would be arbitrary, and there is no sound rationale for adding this
feature to contractualism. Alternatively, one could argue that the only relevant points are the
actual harms being considered so that the only comparison possible is between the shocks and
the disappointed audience. But this solution is also ad hoc because it is fair to ask what would
happen if some intermediate harm occurred.35 So, even if an Extended Tiebreaker Principle for
morally relevant harms could be justified, it would most likely undermine contractualism’s goal
of avoiding inappropriate aggregation.
Stepping back, it may unreasonable to expect a procedure, like the one used by
contractualism, to specify principles that cover all possible cases involving tradeoffs between the
rights of individuals and groups. As the cases increase in complexity, some appeal to moral
intuitions may be needed. Perhaps, the most one should expect is that the theory helps clarify the
competing reasons that need to be assessed. To this end, contractualism is still valuable as a
framework. For example, asking whether someone in either group could reasonably reject
whatever conclusion is reached gives rise to the question of whether there are circumstances
34
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other than the specific harms that must be considered, such as whether the age and current health
of the persons in question are relevant considerations, or whether they bear some responsibility
for having placed themselves in the situation leading to the potential harm. Also, the seriousness
of contractualism’s problems with aggregation should be considered in light of the fact that
consequentialist theories cannot address certain types of harm prevention problems due to their
inability to avoid unwarranted aggregation, the mirror image of the issue for contractualism. For
example, a utilitarian theory easily explains why it is right to save the group of two rather than
the single individual, but struggles to explain why it is wrong to cause one person to suffer
serious harm to alleviate or prevent many minor harms. Nonetheless, even if it is unreasonable to
expect contractualism to specify principles for all the various kinds of aggregative cases, I
believe it is reasonable to expect theory to address the most basic type such as the decision to
rescue one or several persons—something which it cannot do.
In summary, this section argues that contractualism is unable to deal with situations
involving aggregation because the theory is caught in a dilemma between the way the
Individualist Restriction protects individual’s rights and the fact that it is sometimes morally
acceptable for these rights to be superseded by the welfare of the group. In my view, Scanlon’s
justification for the Tiebreaker Principle fails because it is not faithful to the contractualist
procedure and is based on implied aggregation. Also, even if the Tiebreaker were valid, one
needs a principle dealing with morally relevant but unequal harms. Such a principle is unlikely to
be justifiable; and, even if it could, its application leads to unwanted consequentialist
conclusions. Thus, I consider determining principles for cases involving aggregation to be a
significant weakness in Scanlon’s theory.
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4. The Problem of Relativism
Scanlon believes that contractualism is not vulnerable to the objection of moral
relativism. He argues that the theory can address concerns raised by the existence of dissimilar—
even contradictory—moral principles held by different groups without itself being relativistic. I
argue that he is right only up to a point; relativism does pose a significant problem. Given the
constructivist nature of contractualism, the objectivity of moral principles is dependent on the
convergence of different agents’ judgments due to the fact that there is no agent-independent
notion of right and wrong.36 When distinct groups of agents reach different, but stable,
judgments about principles, this can lead to a form of relativism that is at odds with Scanlon’s
view of his theory. My argument is based on the idea that variations in experiences, interests and
sensibilities can lead agents—who are not intended to be idealized under contractualism—to
reach conflicting moral judgments when comparisons of the strength of competing reasons are
difficult, even if one accepts the view that agents in morally identical circumstances have the
same reasons. To examine these issues, this section describes why relativism is considered a
problem, explains why contractualism appears to be subject to relativism, and then supports this
claim with two kinds of examples.
4.1. Moral relativism: Moral relativism is the thesis that there is no single ultimate moral
standard for the appraisal of actions that is appropriate for all agents in all circumstances; rather,
there are multiple standards which can conflict. This discussion focuses on what Scanlon terms
‘benign relativism,’ in which the standards of morality vary in a way that does not detract from
morality’s seriousness. Benign relativists are distinguished from skeptics who use relativism to
argue that morality is a “mere” social convention that lacks any real authority.
36
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According to relativism, appraisals must be understood as judgments about what is right
or wrong given standards applicable to a particular context; such standards are usually viewed as
the traditions, convictions or practices of a group of people. Scanlon contrasts relativism with
what he calls “parametric universalism” in which a fixed set of substantive moral principles
remain valid but are applied to the particular circumstances at hand. These universal principles
allow an action to be right in one situation and wrong in another by focusing on the differences
in the circumstances to which the principles are applied rather than on the ultimate standards. For
example, the applicability of the previously described Rescue Principle varies depending on the
potential harm to the rescuee and the potential burden placed on the rescuer. If the harm is too
small or the burden too great, the obligation to rescue does not apply (WWO 329).
In Scanlon’s estimation, there are three reasons to view relativism as a threat to morality.
First, the claim that generally accepted moral standards might not apply in some cases
undermines the potential motivating power of judgments because it suggests that some agents
may lack sufficient reason to accept even the most basic moral principles. Second, he argues that
the existence of multiple standards can undermine confidence in a judgment of “wrongness”
which, in turn, limits both the ability to condemn agents and the belief that the targets of these
actions have been mistreated. Finally, relativism can detract from the authority of moral
judgments to provide guidance because the existence of multiple standards supports the idea that
morality is merely a matter of social convention rather than a serious obligation (WWO 329-332).
Scanlon views these three reasons as a challenge for relativists who defend a form of
benign relativism. A key question for benign relativists is how people could have good reason to
regard different standards in a way that allows each standard to possess the special kind of
significance enjoyed by morality. One proposed solution is what may be called “way of life”
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relativism: people have reason to accept a standard as having overriding importance if it has a
special status in their shared way of life, assuming it is a way of life they value and want to
continue. This solution can account for the motivating force of morality in a more compelling
way than the idea of universal abstract moral principles. It also allows for the existence of a
wider range of values and principles with moral force than is recognized by strict “universalists.”
At the same time, those espousing way of life relativism do not claim that just any set of widely
accepted norms has the force of morality. They exclude social practices that treat people in
unacceptable ways. Here, supporters argue that any moral view likely to command wide
acceptance over a long period must, in some way, recognize the basic interests of all members of
a society (WWO 335-38).
4.2. Scanlon’s views on contractualism and relativism: According to Scanlon,
contractualism allows moral standards to vary in content in many of the ways that relativists
favor without itself being a relativistic account. His explanation includes three main points: 1)
The idea of justifiability to others and its associated procedure provide a unified method for
determining moral principles that allows for a wider range of moral standards than might be
expected. 2) While allowing for these variations, the method is still able to prevent the adoption
of principles that permit objectionable practices. And, 3) disagreement among contractualists
about a moral issue does not mean that there is not a correct moral choice.
The contractualist procedure allows for a wide range of moral standards because people
facing different social conditions have different reasons for rejecting proposed principles.
Scanlon describes two classes of cases in which an action that would be wrong in one context
might be morally acceptable in another. The first, which I’ll call Cases of Multiple Applicable
Principles, involves situations in which multiple principles govern the activity in question. Here,
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none of the principles can be reasonably rejected and one of the principles is generally (though
not necessarily unanimously) accepted by a society. In such situations, Scanlon appeals to a
Principle of Established Practices which states that it is wrong to violate the accepted practice
“simply because it suits one’s convenience” (WWO 339-40).
Scanlon uses the example of the need for personal privacy. People want to be protected
from the observation of others in some parts of their lives, and they also need ways to
communicate privately. In any society, there are many possible ways to differentiate what is
private from what is public and to define what forms of communications should be protected
from others unless consent has been given. When a society generally accepts certain rules of
privacy that could not be reasonably rejected, it becomes wrong to intrude on people’s lives in
ways these rules forbid. These rules are binding even if there are dissenters who believe that
other rules would be better or who, perhaps, reject the idea of privacy in general. In Scanlon’s
account, the Principle of Established Practices explains how a practice that is not universally
accepted can be morally binding and how different societies could adopt different practices for
the same purpose. These kinds of cases are not examples of relativism; rather, they are examples
of parametric universalism because the moral force of these practices is explained by appeal to
the single Principle of Established Practices.
Scanlon argues that no one could reasonably reject the Principle of Established Practices
given the need for some principle to govern the activities in question. Conversely, it would be
reasonable to reject a principle that permitted people to violate one of these established practices
whenever they wished because, using the example of privacy above, people need assurance that
certain aspects of their lives will be protected except under extraordinary circumstances. This
argument seems sound, but Thomas Pogge asks whether there might be nonrejectable alternative
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principles that allow for a violation of this principle for reasons other than “simply suiting one’s
convenience.”37 Pogge does not provide examples, but one can assume he is referring to reasons
that would be harder to reject than “convenience.” While one cannot consider all possible
principles of this type, it seems plausible to conclude that such a principle would be
nonrejectable only if the reasons for violating the established practices were stronger than the
reasons for following them. Such a principle would not undermine Scanlon’s position because
the thrust of his argument is that one should not violate established practices for trivial reasons,
not that there will never be a justifiable reason to do so. Thus, the Principle of Established
Practices explains the existence of differing standards in Cases of Multiple Applicable
Principles.
The second class, Cases of Societal Variations, occurs when reasons for rejection vary
because of social conditions. Again, considering privacy, different societies can have conflicting
ideas of personal dignity, and these variations supply good reasons to want certain societyspecific forms of protection. Thus, some societies will adopt different moral principles. For
example, variations in ideas about personal dignity lead to differences in the type of clothing one
is permitted to wear in public places. These disparities in practices might be considered a form
of relativism because they involve dissimilar practices adopted for similar moral purposes, but
Scanlon disagrees. Reasons based on social factors do not alone determine what is right and
wrong. Instead, the moral force of principles comes from placing these reasons in the
contractualist framework to assess which principles cannot be reasonably rejected. Scanlon
argues that this is not a relativist view; rather, people in positions that the principle describes
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have good reason to want a certain form of protection, but these generic reasons—and thus the
protections they justify—differ by society (WWO 340).
Scanlon’s second main point about relativism is that, although contractualism is
“responsive” to local reasons, it nonetheless limits what can be considered a valid reason and
thus avoids supporting practices Scanlon considers objectionable but which might be accepted as
normal by certain societies.
This emphasis on the reasons people have differentiates the view I am defending from objectionable
forms of relativism, which claim that it is permissible for people in other societies to be treated in
ways that we would not accept because they do not value privacy, or individual liberty, or even life,
in the way that we do. […] Whatever “they,” or some of them, may actually think (they may have
become accustomed to harsh treatment, for example, and think it inevitable), they in fact have the
same reason that we do for wanting not to be treated in these ways. […] The view I am defending
[…] takes as fundamental not what people actually think or want, but what they have reason to want
(WWO 340-41).

Scanlon recognizes that what people have reason to want depends on the conditions around them
which include what other people want, believe, and expect. For example, differences in methods
of commerce and ideas of personal dignity lead to the adoption of different, but valid, moral
principles as discussed above. At the same time, certain beliefs or wants do not constitute valid
reasons for justifying moral principles. For example, a person might believe that a certain class
of people is not entitled to equal rights because this view has historically been accepted by her
society. However, this kind of belief goes against generally accepted views about how people
should be treated and should not be used to justify moral principles. Thus, to avoid accepting
“objectionable practices,” it is important to be able to distinguish situations where what people
“actually think or want” is different from what they have “reason to want.” Whether this can
actually be done is considered later in this chapter.
The third main point in Scanlon’s explanation is that disagreement does not imply there is
not a correct moral principle. He recognizes that agents who accept the contractualist theory

81

could still disagree on moral principles. Some disagreements on issues may, in part, reflect a
difference of opinion about the range of cases for which one should be constrained by
justifiability to others. For example, considering abortion, one who regards the fetus as having
the rights of a person could argue that abortion falls into the domain of justifiability; therefore,
an objection to a principle permitting abortion can be made on behalf of the fetus. Conversely,
one who disagrees the fetus has rights could argue that the morality of abortion is not covered by
the idea of justifiability so that a decision about abortion rests entirely with the woman; no one
can object to her choice.
Other disagreements may reflect differing assessments about the strength of various
generic reasons for and against the relevant principles. For instance, considering abortion again,
two persons who agree that abortion falls into the domain of justifiability could still disagree
whether the objections to a principle allowing abortion are stronger than those to a principle
forbidding the practice. In general, such disagreements may be due to the difficulty of sorting out
which reasons are morally significant and assessing the relative strength of this significance.
They can also be caused by a lack of clarity about how people in different positions are affected
by the actions allowed by various moral principles; in some cases, this is the result of the agent’s
tendency to exaggerate her burdens and underestimate those of others. Whatever their cause,
Scanlon does not view such moral disagreements among contractualists as support for the
conclusion there is no objective right answer to difficult moral problems.
So, for example, contractualists may disagree about the relative force of different reasons for
rejection and hence about which principles it is reasonable to reject, and which actions are morally
wrong. Again, it does not follow from the fact that people disagree in this way that there is no answer
to the question which of them is correct. If we were to conclude in some case that there was no single
correct answer, the result would be an instance of moral indeterminacy, not relativism.38

38

T. M. Scanlon, "Replies," Social Theory and Practice 28, no. 2 (2002): 439. See also WWO 354-60.

82

Thus, from the characteristics of contractualism just reviewed, Scanlon’s argument can be
interpreted to mean that there is some “right way” to assess the relevant reasons and their
respective significance so that agents who are making informed and well-reasoned judgments
should converge on the single correct answer when considering which principles are valid.
Admittedly, this common assessment might not be possible at a given point in time, but
Scanlon’s assumption seems to be that more knowledge about the effects of proposed principles,
or about other missing factors, will eventually cause agents’ judgments to converge on one
answer.
4.3. Why Contractualism is Subject to Relativism: In contrast to Scanlon’s view, I believe
that contractualism’s constructivist nature exposes it to problems of relativism because moral
principles are determined solely by agents’ judgments as opposed to being dependent, for
example, on realist moral properties or on ontological grounds. As a result, there is no agentindependent way to identify the “correct” principle when there are conflicting judgments because
principles do not exist separately from these judgments. When considering agreement among
agents, it is important to note that under contractualism moral principles are determined in the
end by an individual agent, not by a group consensus or negotiation. Scanlon writes:
In my view, while interaction with others plays a crucial role in arriving at well-founded moral
opinions […], reaching a conclusion about right and wrong requires making a judgment about what
others could or could not reasonably reject. This is a judgment that each of us must make for him- or
herself. The agreement of others, reached through actual discourse, is not required, and when it
occurs does not settle the matter (WWO 393-94, fn 5).

Group agreement is neither necessary nor sufficient. Individual agents determine principles for
themselves. Also, under contractualism, these agents are real individuals, not hypothetical ideal
observers. Thus, the objectivity of principles depends on whether real agents do, in fact, make
the same judgment about what principles can be reasonably rejected.
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Scanlon believes that agents facing identical situations will generally make the same
judgment about what moral principles can be rejected; and he relies, in large part, on the
universality of reason judgments to support this conclusion. According to this claim, what is a
reason for one person is also a reason for someone else in the same situation. For example, if
Kathy judges correctly that she has a reason to aid a child who appears lost, the universality of
reason judgments implies that anyone else in the identical situation also has a reason to help. The
specific considerations that give Kathy a reason also give anyone facing the same circumstances
a reason. This claim is not based on any particular view of what the relevant considerations are,
and it leaves open the question of what constitutes “the same situation.” For example, if one
believes reasons have subjective conditions, the existence of these subjective conditions is
required for two situations to be deemed identical. Thus, reason judgments, properly interpreted,
are applicable to others in the same situation, and this fact is an important part of Scanlon’s view
that judgments can be consistent across agents (WWO 73-4).39
However, even if one accepts the universality of reason judgments, the possibility that
agents disagree on judgments about principles still exists when one further considers how agents’
sensibilities affect their assessments about the importance and weight of the competing reasons
involved. According to Steven Ross, sensibility refers to “caring more about some things rather
than others…where this caring, this preference, this weighting, is simply not the one some other
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moral culture prefers to have.”40 For example, some groups are gripped strongly by “what a
fetus could become,” while what “animals raised for food must endure” grip others. A somewhat
different portrayal of sensibility involves a situation described by Mark Timmons in which two
philosophers disagree on the morality of welfare spending.
Here we have a case in which two philosophers have thought through the various implications of
their own moral outlooks, have gotten clear about the morally relevant details of the case, and have,
on the basis of reflecting about the relevance and weight of generic personal reasons representing
various individual standpoints, come to conflicting moral judgments over the issue of welfare
spending.41

Clearly, moral sensibilities affect how agents determine whether they could reasonably reject
proposed moral principles. Furthermore, the nature of these judgments is such that Scanlon is
unable to give a detailed roadmap on how to assess competing reasons, and this increases the
likelihood of variability in judgments among agents.42
These considerations lead me to conclude that it is likely that agents will make different
judgments about reasons in difficult moral situations. Furthermore, it is not inevitable that these
judgments will converge at some point in time. Convergence requires that the moral sensibilities
of agents become sufficiently aligned so that agents from different backgrounds and experiences
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make the same judgments. Convergence of these kinds of moral judgments can be contrasted
with the convergence of scientific views that involve independent facts about the world. In the
case of contractualist judgments, there are no independent moral facts about correct principles.
While the views of different societies about moral topics can converge over time, there is no
guarantee that they will do so.
Thus, there are cases in which groups of agents reach different judgments on morally
similar situations, all based on sincerely held beliefs that are strong enough to motivate behavior.
Such judgments are stable over long periods of time, and, in many cases at least, it seems
unlikely that all groups will converge on one common judgment. My argument is that such
judgments represent a form of relativism that is at odds with Scanlon’s view that there is one
correct answer to most moral problems.
There are two kinds of examples that support my view. The first, which I call “excluding
objectionable practices,” consists of instances where Scanlon argues that contractualism can
prohibit objectionable practices by distinguishing valid reasons from impermissible ones, or as
Scanlon says, what people “have reason to want” from what they “actually think or want.” I will
use the case of slavery in the antebellum South to argue that the contractualist procedure, when
applied at the time in question, cannot distinguish that slavery is objectionable. By analogy,
contractualism faces the same problem with many of today’s objectionable practices, such as the
way certain societies treat women and minorities.
The second kind of case, which I call “susceptibility to differing sensibilities,” involves
difficult moral problems where different societies or groups hold stable judgments that justify
conflicting principles in morally identical situations. Examples include voluntary euthanasia, the
legalization of certain drugs, and abortion. In these cases, agents in different societies generally

86

have similar reasons but make conflicting judgments about what is moral due to variations in
their moral sensibilities. Given this background, we can now turn to an examination of these two
types of cases.
4.4. Excluding “Objectionable” Practices: Scanlon believes contractualism can be
distinguished from forms of relativism that include practices Scanlon considers objectionable by
way of the notion that what is relevant to morality is not what people actually think or want, but
what they have reason to want. Beliefs or wants must be translatable into reasons that stand up to
questioning, and reasons that do not stand up cannot be used to determine valid principles. This
restriction raises obvious concerns about how to determine which reasons are, indeed, sound.
Antebellum slavery in the U.S. provides an example of this problem by demonstrating
how an objectionable practice could be justified by an agent having the knowledge and
sensibilities of the time in question. While slavery is generally viewed as immoral today, it was
morally acceptable at certain times and certain places such as ancient Greece, medieval Europe,
and early America; and it is still viewed as acceptable in certain societies. My analysis examines
how today’s contractualist assesses slavery, how such an assessment would have been made
during the antebellum period, and why the antebellum assessment is valid for its time. I then
consider the implications of this result for contractualism’s ability to eliminate today’s
objectionable practices.
To determine whether antebellum slavery would be moral under today’s contractualism,
one compares the principle “slavery is permitted” with the opposing principle “slavery is
forbidden.” The Individualist Restriction requires a comparison of reasons among single
individuals. This guides the assessment of slavery by focusing attention on those with the
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strongest reasons for and against the practice, such as mistreated slaves, slave owners and nonslave owning members of Southern society.43
The person who is most affected by, and has the strongest reason to object to slavery, is a
slave who is being mistreated. Under contractualism, her reasons include not only suffering, but
the fact that she has been robbed of her self-determination. Her position as a slave involves an
arbitrary loss of freedom, and there is no good reason for her to be placed in this position. The
person who is most affected by, and has the strongest reason to object to abolition is a slave
owner. Her reasons include unfair seizure of property and the risk to her person from bloodshed
and chaos during the transition period away from slavery. One might also argue that a slave who
is well-treated has reason to object because abolition will deprive him of a secure, comfortable
position and, if he lacks requisite skills, will arbitrarily place him in poverty.
The harm done to a mistreated slave, both physically and to her self-determination, is
clearly greater than the harm that the slave-owner would suffer under abolition because the
slave’s life will be significantly better than it was under slavery.44 Thus, after comparing and
weighing reasons, it’s reasonable to conclude that the slave’s reasons to reject a principle
permitting slavery are stronger than the slave owner’s reasons to reject an opposing principle
forbidding slavery. Thus, slavery is forbidden.
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Sources that summarize ante-bellum reasons for and against slavery include Robert Higgs, “Ten
Reasons Not to Abolish Slavery,” Foundation for Economic Education, https://fee.org/articles/tenreasons-not-to-abolish-slavery; “Arguments and Justifications: The Abolition of Slavery Project,”
http://abolition.e2bn.org/slavery_112.html; U.S. History, “The Southern Argument for Slavery,”
www.ushistory.org?us/27f.asp; The Inkwell Musings, “Five Arguments Against Slavery,”
http://inkwellmusings.blogspot.com/2009/11/five-arguments-against-slavery.html. A House Divided,
edited by Mason I. Lowance, Jr, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2003.)
44
Note the relevant comparison is the burdens on the slave under slavery against the burdens a slave
owner faces in a counterfactual world without slavery. The difference between the slave owners old and
new lives in not part of the comparison.
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Next, consider how this assessment would be done during the antebellum period. This
period encompassed two distinct cultures: The South was rural, its economy was based on slave
labor, and its perspective was anti-modern. The North was industrial, its economy was based on
free labor, and its perspective was forward-looking. In this circumstance, the contractualist
procedure would be applied differently by Southerners and Northerners. A Southern slave owner
who holds the contractualist view about moral principles can still reasonably reject the slave’s
objections to slavery. Given the available information at the time, a condition that meets
Scanlon’s terms for making a judgment of reasonableness, a slave was thought to be an inferior
type of human, one who lacked the full capacity to reason.45 Thus, the slave owner could argue
that a slave is not entitled to self-determination, and placing a slave in a command-and-control
environment is not arbitrary oppression but a way to give that slave an opportunity to live a life
suitable to his or her capabilities.46
As discussed, a judgment about a moral principle is one that each agent must make for
herself. The slave owner must make her best judgment based on the information available to her
at that time. The slave owner’s reasons for rejection of a principle forbidding slavery fit
Scanlon’s requirements that reasons be “generic, personal and non-aggregative.” The slave
owner considers these reasons as generally applying to slaves given her knowledge of the
situation. These reasons are also in harmony with Scanlon’s idea that what is relevant to morality
is not what people actually think they want but what they have reason to want. The slave owner’s
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Scanlon recognizes that an agent may not have perfect information in making a moral judgment;
however, the agent can be faulted for not seeking readily available information. Information that is not
available at the time of the agent’s judgment is clearly not in this category.
46
Thomas Jefferson, who believed in emancipation, also believed that “nature has been less bountiful to
them [slaves] in endowments of the head” and that slaves “were inferior in reason.” (Notes of the State of
Virginia p 137.) Moreover, in the 1840s, a group of highly respected scientists published research studies
demonstrating the intellectual superiority of whites. The most prominent scientists were Josiah Clark
Nott, George Gliddon, and George Morton. (House Divided, 311-326.)
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reasons are not simply due to habituation but can be justified with the best reasons available—
such as the scientific evidence of the 1840s. Although this evidence has been proven wrong, it
could stand up to questioning at the time.
Thus, a slave owner could consider the reasons for rejection of all the parties involved
(slaves, slave owners, and non-slave-owning people) and, based on reasons that are valid
according to Scanlon’s procedure, conscientiously conclude that the reasons for rejecting a
principle forbidding slavery are stronger than those for rejecting one permitting the practice.
Other Southerners who share the slave owner’s views could make the same judgment. A
Northern abolitionist could apply the same procedure and conclude conversely that a principle
permitting slavery should be rejected.47 In this situation, then, contractualism does not avoid
relativism because there was no principled way at the time to choose between two conflicting
views. Both judgments are made by agents who use the information available to them to make
what can be considered reasonable judgments given the agents’ differing perspectives.
A contractualist today and an antebellum slave owner both make valid, but conflicting,
moral judgments using the contractualist procedure. To eliminate this objectionable practice, one
must accept the judgment of today’s contractualist. This raises the question whether it is
appropriate to apply all of the liberal values of Scanlon’s contractualism to moral problems in
societies where the context is different. One who accepts the view that contractualism only
supports this set of values could object that the slave owners are not properly using the
contractualist procedure. The counter would be that an agent making a judgment can only use the
reasons and moral sensibilities that apply at the time and place of her judgment, and that the
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I will not go through the details of the abolitionist’s reasoning. A key difference is that he would not
accept the slave owner’s assessment of a slave’s nature and capabilities.
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reasons and sensibilities applying to an antebellum contractualist are simply not the same as
those of today’s contractualist.
One might object that the example of slavery is too extreme because slavery is such an
offensive practice and, over time, most societies have accepted this judgment. I would counter
that the example is still important because it demonstrates how application of the contractualist
procedure in different societies can lead to the acceptance of practices that are considered
objectionable by liberal contractualists, and it shows that eliminating such practices depends on
adopting a liberal perspective. The example highlights a dilemma contractualism faces involving
a conflict between the goal of ruling out objectionable practices and the recognition that agents
and their reasons can vary by society.
On the one hand, Scanlon distinguishes contractualism from forms of relativism by
insisting that the contractualist procedure rules out objectionable practices in other societies.
However, the perspective from which Scanlon identifies objectionable practices appears to be
that of an “enlightened liberal Western democratic.” Accepting this view privileges these liberal
values and leaves contractualism open to the charge that it cannot be applied in a way that
properly reflects the values of other societies. One is effectively limiting the scope of
contractualism to societies whose values are those of liberal democracies.
On the other hand, Scanlon accepts that what people have reason to want can depend on
the society in which they live and on what other people in that society believe and want. Moral
judgments are made by agents whose experiences and sensibilities are shaped by their society.
Some societies have very different attitudes about the proper role and conduct for certain groups,
such as women and minorities; the role of religion in daily life; and appropriate sexual behavior.
Agents in those societies have reasons that support their moral views, but these reasons will
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differ from those supported by liberal contractualists societies. Acceptance of this perspective
leads to objectionable relativism because contractualism cannot eliminate all objectionable
practices.
Regarding convergence over time, assessments of slavery have converged to a great
extent; however, that does not mean that views on all practices that might be deemed
objectionable will converge. The experiences and sensibilities of societies vary greatly and are
difficult to change. These differences have led to the moral acceptance of many practices for
long periods of time. When such judgments can be justified under the contractualist procedure,
they must be recognized as valid moral judgments. In summary, the fact that the contractualist
procedure can, in some cases, justify objectionable practices represents a problem of relativism
that is counter to Scanlon’s position.
4.5. Susceptibility to Differing Sensibilities: The second problematic type of situation
involves the fact that the way agents weigh reasons plays a significant role in assessing which
principles can be reasonably rejected. Consider the case of voluntary, active euthanasia in which
a competent patient requests euthanasia and a physician aids in the patient’s death.48 According
to current medical ethicists, the strongest argument for active voluntary euthanasia derives from
the widely accepted principle of autonomy—the notion that people have the right of selfdetermination.49 People have intrinsic worth or dignity because they have the power to make
rational decisions and moral choices: they must thus be treated with respect and allowed to make
their own choices on important issues facing them. This includes the choice to end their lives,
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Ethicists distinguish between active euthanasia, which involves performing an action that directly
causes someone to die, and passive euthanasia, which allows someone to die by not doing something to
prolong life. Many believe that deliberately and directly killing a patient is always wrong whereas letting
someone die can be morally acceptable.
49
The reasons for and against euthanasia expressed here are based on Lewis Vaughn, Contemporary
Moral Arguments : Readings in Ethical Issues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Chapter 5.
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particularly in cases where there is little or no chance of recovery and in cases that involve a
great deal of suffering. These persons and their families may also have economic concerns (as
may other members of society) because the cost of medical care can have a significantly adverse
effect on family members’ lives.
Opponents argue that deliberately killing a person is wrong because it is inconsistent with
the goal of preserving life. Further, a person’s right of self-determination does not morally justify
someone else killing that person, even for mercy’s sake, because the right to kill oneself cannot
be transferred. Opponents charge that acceptance of euthanasia could ultimately lead to
dangerous extensions such as involuntary forms of killing, pushing families towards accepting
euthanasia, and discrimination against elderly, mentally ill, uninsured, or other disadvantaged
groups. Finally, opponents are wary of potential negative consequences for the physician/patient
relationship, arguing that permission will undermine the trust patients must have in the
physician’s motives.
Applying the contractualist procedure, one considers two opposing principles: euthanasia
is permissible and the practice is forbidden. The parties most affected by these principles are the
person requesting euthanasia, her immediate family, and members of society like physicians,
who are affected in various ways by the practice. A person facing a long painful death has the
strongest reasons to object to a principle forbidding euthanasia, either due to the suffering she
will incur or the violation of her right of self-determination. A person with the strongest reasons
against allowing euthanasia include an elderly, disabled, mentally ill, or sick uninsured person.
They can point to the concern that once the practice of euthanasia is established it could be
extended in a way that undermines respect for the value of their own lives and their right to selfdetermination.
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In determining which principle can be reasonably rejected, it is difficult to weigh such
diverse factors. The relevant comparison of the strongest personal reasons for allowing or
forbidding euthanasia is between the suffering and loss of self-determination of the person
desiring euthanasia and the potential harm and lack of respect for an individual who might be
coerced into ending his life because the practice of euthanasia has expanded over time. In
considering these two sets of reasons, some agents will be drawn to the immediate suffering of
the patient and her right to self-determination. They will place little or no weight on the
possibility that allowing voluntary euthanasia could have unintended consequences. Other agents
will be drawn to the fears of the elderly, disabled, mentally ill, or uninsured and the importance
of protecting human life, even if the circumstances of concern may exist only in the future. These
two groups will reach different conclusions about which reasons are stronger—those of the
current patient or the potentially coerced individual. Thus, the contractualist procedure can again
lead to relativism because different groups adopt opposing principles and do so in a way that is
strongly held and stable over time. They do this because, although they consider the same
reasons relevant, the level of significance they accord to the individual reasons varies. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that certain countries and states accept euthanasia as a legal
practice while others do not.
My view, in general, is that agents’ judgments are sometimes unable to converge on a
single principle because the objections of the affected parties are based on different types of
reasons, uncertain outcomes, and lengthy time frames. These factors make it difficult to compare
the strength of the various parties’ objections. For example, when the acceptance or rejection of a
principle depends on immediate physical harms, the possibility of convergence is high. As the
comparison becomes less straightforward, the possibility of convergence decreases because there
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is greater opportunity for agents to make different judgments about the way the parties are
affected and for the agents’ sensibilities to influence judgments about the weight that the reasons
for each party’s objections should be given. Euthanasia is complicated because it compares
reasons of immediate physical harm and the value of a specific person’s self-determination with
the more abstract notion of the human need to live and possible harm done to unknown parties at
a future date. Thus, I consider the likelihood that agents’ judgments will converge to be low.50
My hypothesis regarding relativism is that in moral situations where the reasons to be
considered are not directly comparable or where difficult estimates of probability and different
time frames are relevant, a judgment will often be dependent on the moral sensibilities of the
agent. Other examples include the permissibility of drug usage where different assessments of
the potential harms caused by drugs and the agent’s sensibility to these harms conflicts with the
user’s rights to live as she wants, or the practice of abortion where the sensibility of some agents
to what the fetus could become (ignoring the debate of what it is now) conflicts with the
pregnant woman’s right to self-determination. In these types of situations, the contractualist
procedure can lead to the adoption of contradictory principles due to differences in agents’
estimates of the effect of practices and their sensibilities to these effects. These are not cases, like
the questions of privacy discussed previously, where reasons vary by society. Reasons to accept
or reject principles are similar across societies, but the way these reasons are assessed differs.
Thus, the judgment to permit or forbid euthanasia is not analogous to adopting different views on
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Nonetheless, societies might converge on a common principle if sensibilities gradually change, say, as
the practice of voluntary euthanasia spreads and a new generation finds it more acceptable. This does not
mean, however, that there was always a “correct” moral answer under contractualism. The correct answer
is undetermined until convergence occurs. Alternatively, a number of well publicized cases where the
practice is abused could prevent this convergence. At this point, it is difficult to know whether different
societies’ views will, in fact, converge and, if so, for what reasons.
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the appropriate dress to maintain one’s dignity; it is comparable to judgments about the kinds of
principles that Scanlon maintains should be universally objective.
In summary, I have argued that, contrary to Scanlon’s view, contractualism’s procedure
for determining moral principles appears to lead to relativism in certain circumstances. Under
contractualism, each agent determines which principles can be justified, and the objectivity of
those principles depends on the convergence of agents’ judgments. The experiences and
sensibilities of different agents, who are not idealized under contractualism, can cause them to
make different estimates of the importance and strength of the reasons involved, and thus to end
with different moral judgments. When different groups of agents maintain different, but stable,
moral judgments based on strongly held beliefs in the same kinds of cases, this is a form of
relativism.
Scanlon argues that contractualism can eliminate “objectionable” practices that are
accepted by certain societies. This claim creates a dilemma. Contractualism can only reject these
practices by appealing to reasons that are based on the values of secular liberal societies; but, at
the same time, Scanlon recognizes that values and reasons can vary by society. Applying
contractualism in a way that recognizes these societal differences leaves it open to relativism.
Scanlon also recognizes that contractualists can disagree about principles in difficult
moral situations, but he argues that these disagreements do not indicate there is no correct moral
answer. This conclusion implies that agents’ judgments must converge at some point because
there are no agent-independent moral principles in a constructivist theory like Scanlon’s. Here, I
argue that this convergence is not certain given the complexity of certain moral problems and the
difficulty of eliminating differences in agents’ experiences and moral sensibilities. While I
recognize that it is not reasonable to require contractualism to provide a single answer for every
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moral situation, it is also not reasonable to expect that every disagreement will resolve itself over
time. Thus, contractualism faces a problem with relativism.
***
In this chapter, I have examined how the concept of “reasonable rejection” as used to
provide “justification to others” specifies moral principles. I have argued that this contractualist
procedure meets the fundamental test of providing a meaningful way to determine moral
principles in many situations; however, I have also argued that there are situations where the
concept fails.
It is difficult to describe precise boundaries that delineate contractualism’s effectiveness,
but some generalizations are possible. Contractualism provides objective principles for a large
part of interpersonal morality where there is generally agreement about what is moral. These
include actions like murder, deliberately harming others, deceiving others, stealing, and so on. At
the same time, there are two non-controversial moral situations where the procedure fails: cases
where the aggregation of harms is appropriate, like the choice to rescue one or many, and cases
of “objectionable” practices that are accepted by certain societies.
When one considers more controversial cases where there is disagreement about what is
right or wrong, contractualism continues to provide a useful framework for identifying reasons
that are morally relevant and the conflicts among these reasons. But, in difficult situations where
reasons are not easily comparable, agents can fail to agree on principles due to differences in
their experiences and moral sensibilities. This leaves contractualism open to the charge of
relativism because agents in different societies can justify conflicting principles, and there is no
independent way to assess which principle is correct. These are instances of genuine relativism
that Scanlon would find unacceptable in a moral theory.
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Chapter 4
The Normativity of Contractualist Principles
In contractualism, the concept of justifiability to others based on ‘reasonable rejection’
plays a two-part role: it is responsible for both the content of moral principles and for the reasons
why agents should act according to these principles. This tight relationship between principles
and their normativity is a distinctive aspect of contractualism. In previous chapters, I argued that
Scanlon’s contractualist procedure based on reasonable rejection can determine the content of
moral principles. More specifically, the procedure is not redundant because it enables an agent to
assess how an action’s specific characteristics affect its moral status. However, the procedure
does not yield a complete set of principles because it fails to provide guidance in cases where the
aggregation of benefits or harms across individuals is appropriate, as well as in those cases where
differing experiences and sensibilities cause agents’ judgments to vary about what principles can
be reasonably rejected. In this chapter, I examine justifiability’s second role and argue that it
provides sufficient reason for agents to be bound by moral principles in many—but not all—
cases.
In considering the normativity of contractualist principles, by far the most important
question is whether reasons based on justifiability are sufficiently strong to cause agents to act
morally (the “priority” issue). Scanlon’s case for the priority of morality is based on the high
value he places on the relationship of mutual recognition which results from living by principles
that others could not reasonably reject. In contrast to Scanlon, I argue that mutual recognition is
not a sufficient reason to ensure that agents will act morally in situations of extreme personal
conflict. A second question to consider is whether those who are not motivated to act morally
have reason to abide by contractualist principles. Here I explain why they have reason to do so
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because acting in a way that supports good relationships has value independently of its moral
implications. Finally, given Scanlon’s conclusion that contractualist reasons apply to everyone,
whether motivated or not, I consider the relationship of contractualism to those who have chosen
to act morally but who follow a different form of morality, such as utilitarianism or a religiously
based one. Here I argue that contractualism can coexist with other doctrines without significant
conflict if these doctrines respect others’ beliefs. I also propose that contractualism should
respond to certain reasons based on religious or cultural beliefs in determining which principles
can be reasonably rejected—even if the doctrines maintaining these beliefs also support
principles that are incompatible with contractualism.

1. The Priority of Moral Reasons
The question of priority asks if reasons for acting morally take precedence when there are
conflicts with other values. I will argue that Scanlon successfully explains why agents are bound
by morality in many cases; however, his argument fails in cases where the agent has strong
personal reasons to act immorally. I go on to point out, however, that this condition appears to be
a limit for any moral theory and suggest that Scanlon’s theory could be reconciled with this limit
by modifying its views on the nature of personal relationships.
1.1. The problem of priority: Scanlon describes the problem of priority as follows:
The fact that an action would be wrong constitutes sufficient reason not to do it (almost?) no matter
what other considerations there might be in its favor. If there are circumstances in which an agent
could have sufficient reason to do something that he or she knew to be wrong, these are at best very
rare. But if right and wrong always or even almost always take precedence over other values, this is
something that requires explanation. How can it make sense, if we recognize values other than right
and wrong and take them seriously, to claim that reasons of this one kind have priority over all the
rest? I will refer to this as the problem of the priority of right and wrong over other values (WWO
148).
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In discussing the potential conflict between moral and other non-moral values, Scanlon refers to
the well-known objection raised by Bernard Williams about impartialist moralities. Williams
asks whether considerations of impartiality mean that it would be wrong to favor someone
because of a special tie (like marriage or friendship), even in the extreme situation where an
agent must make a choice between saving a loved one and a stranger. If the answer is yes, moral
impartiality would rule out love and friendship because such relationships require favoring
certain persons over others. Williams observes that morality must find a way to accommodate
such relationships to avoid being unacceptable to most people.1
Susan Wolf describes the conflict between moral and personal values as follows:
Recently, however, many have called attention to the fact that relationships of friendship and love
seem to call for the very opposite of an impartial perspective. Since such relationships
unquestionably rank among the greatest goods of life, a conception of morality that is in tension with
their maintenance and promotion is unacceptable. Thus a debate has arisen between…the
impartialists and partialists…. Rather than allow our personal affections to compromise our
commitments to justice and equality, [impartialists] argue, we must shape our ideals of friendship
and love to fit the demands of impartial morality. The partialists reply that this denigrates the value
of special relationships to friends and loved ones, at best according them the status of acceptable
extracurricular activities and at worst regarding them as a consequence of human nature to be warily
tolerated.2

So, the problem for contractualism—or any moral theory—is to demonstrate how it can allow
and respect values related to personal needs while still ensuring that acting morally has priority.
1.2. Contractualism’s approach to the priority of moral values: In order to understand
Scanlon’s approach to priority, one first must recognize the value associated with acting morally.
As discussed in Section 1 of Chapter 3, contractualist judgments about right and wrong are
“judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected,
by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others,

1

Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," in Moral luck : philosophical papers, 1973-1980
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 15-19, as referred to in Scanlon, WWO 160.
2
Susan Wolf, Morality and Partiality (Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.
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similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” (WWO 4). Scanlon argues that living according
to such principles is the proper way to respect the value of human life. What is distinctive about
humans is their capacity to assess reasons and justifications and govern their lives by choosing a
particular path from many potentially justifiable ones. Appreciating the value of human life
involves recognizing these capacities; nevertheless, it is impossible to respond to all the reasons
each human has for choosing how to live. Scanlon argues that the best way to deal with this
problem is to treat others according to principles they could not reasonably reject (WWO 104-6).
This allows people to develop relationships of “mutual recognition,” and this is something worth
seeking because humans need and receive substantial value from social interactions (WWO 162).
Thus, according to contractualism, the primary reason for acting morally is the great value
inherent in the relationships people have with others when they live this way.
Scanlon offers three reasons for accepting the contractualist account of morality. First, it
is phenomenologically accurate. The best description of the reason for avoiding immoral acts
involves their impact on others and the idea that others could reasonably object to such actions.
Second, this account describes an ideal of relations that is closely connected to the content of
morality while still possessing a strong appeal when viewed apart from moral requirements. The
contractualist ideal of acting according to principles that others could not reasonably reject
defines morality because it is the right way to respect other humans. At the same time, living this
way supports relationships with others that are appealing and worth seeking for their own sake,
independent of their relationship to morality. And finally, the ideal of justifiability accounts for
the fact that people are generally motivated to be moral both to avoid “doing wrong” and for
direct reasons like “she needs my help” or “doing that would hurt someone.” Justifiability is a
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higher-order reason that shapes practical thinking and identifies the other reasons that are
relevant for guiding an agent’s actions (WWO 155, 161-62).3
According to Scanlon, the priority of morality is based in large part on the special
importance contractualists ascribe to acting morally. They view the failure to see the reasongiving force of moral judgments as a special type of fault. This can be appreciated by
considering their views on amoralists who understand the difference between right and wrong
but do not feel they have any reason to care about it. Contractualists believe the moral reasons
that apply to them also apply to amoralists unless their situation differs in morally relevant
ways.4 In general, the reasons another person recognizes are important because they indicate
whether that person respects others and thus affect her relationships. The amoralist’s indifference
to morality reflects her attitude towards other people. This attitude implies a failure to see why
the justifiability of her actions to others should be of any importance, and it demonstrates that
she places little or no value on others. This creates a significant alienation between the amoralist
and others, thus explaining why contractualists attach special importance to recognizing the force
of moral considerations (WWO 158-60).
The importance of morality explains why there are good reasons to act morally. But it
does not yet explain how morality accommodates personal values while maintaining priority.
Scanlon addresses this question of priority with a two-part strategy. First, he argues that morality
does not require abandoning personal values because there are other, non-moral, aspects of our
lives we have reason to pursue. Reasons associated with these aspects can be used to reject
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A more detailed discussion of how justifiability plays this higher-order shaping role is considered in
Section 2 of Chapter 3.
4
Per Scanlon, this is required by the universality of reason judgments, which is discussed in Section 3 of
Chapter 2. Certain philosophers disagree about what constitutes a “morally relevant” difference in
circumstances, and this disagreement is considered in Section 2 of this chapter.
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principles that would restrict personal relationships and other personal projects inappropriately.
For example, under a Rescue Principle, it would be unreasonable not to give aid to someone
facing significant distress as long as the rescuer faces only slight or moderate sacrifice. However,
such a principle must consider the rescuer’s past efforts so that it does not, in effect, demand
unlimited sacrifice and thus prevent the rescuer from having the opportunity to pursue her own
goals. Similarly, it would be reasonable to reject a principle that required an agent to give no
more weight to her own interests than she does to those of others in every decision she makes.
This rejection is based on impartial reasoning about generic reasons that all agents have for not
wanting to be bound by such a strict requirement. Thus, there is room within morality for
personal values. This reduces, but does not eliminate, the potential for conflict between the
personal and the moral.
The second part of Scanlon’s strategy explains why morality takes precedence when its
demands conflict with the pursuit of personal goals. When properly understood, the demands of
personal relationships and other personal projects have a built-in sensitivity to the demands of
right and wrong so there are limits to the way that these relationships and activities should be
pursued. As a result, one can generally act morally without compromising one’s personal
relationships. However, when there is a conflict, morality has priority over the personal based on
the importance of justifiability to others and the value of relationships of mutual recognition.
Thus, when the demands of morality place limits on our personal relationships or projects, there
is good reason to give priority to these demands (WWO 161, 166, 224-25).
Scanlon uses an illustration dealing with friendship. Friendship may conflict with the
demands of impartial morality because friends owe more to each other than they do to strangers.
Successful friendships require loyalty and the support of each other’s needs and projects, and this
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support can clash with morality’s demand for impartiality. Yet, according to Scanlon, friendship
also involves recognizing the friend as a separate person—one with moral standing in her own
right. Moral standing based solely on the contingent fact of friendship would not reflect proper
recognition of the friend’s status as a person. Furthermore, if one accords moral standing to
friends based on their status as persons, one must accord the same moral standing to strangers
who are also, by definition, persons. This standing places limits on treating strangers immorally
to help friends. Scanlon acknowledges there may be other, less “moralized,” forms of friendship,
but he argues that the existence of this moralized form addresses the objection that an impartial
morality does not leave room for special relationships. Because people must recognize the moral
claims of both friends and strangers, there is no sacrifice of friendship involved in refusing to
violate the rights of strangers to help a friend. Simply put, compatibility with the demands of
impersonal morality should be built into the value of friendship itself—at least if one is to
practice the form of friendship Scanlon espouses (WWO 164-65).
Scanlon believes this argument holds for other personal relationships such as marriage
and that similar arguments can be made for other personal values that might conflict with the
demands of morality, for example, the value involved in pursuing excellence in scientific work.
Since these kinds of pursuits generally involve working with others, they are sensitive to the
requirements of justifiability to others, and the reasons for pursuing them will not take priority
over what is owed to other people (WWO 166-67). Based on these kinds of arguments, Scanlon
believes moral demands can be shown to have the required priority in conflict situations.
Commenting on Scanlon’s strategy, R. Jay Wallace acknowledges that contractualism
makes room for the importance of friends and individual projects; however, he doubts whether
the importance of moral values can stand up to competing reasons and values from the point of
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view of an agent who must determine what she has most reason to do in a conflict situation.
Wallace raises concerns that the value of mutual recognition may not be strong enough to cause
the agent to accord it the kind of deliberative priority that Scanlon’s strategy requires. He argues:
The problem is not to explain how morality can be valuable in its own terms, but whether and how it
can attain the kind of importance exhibited by friendships, professional ambitions, and other personal
projects. Only if morality is important in something like this way, it may be thought, will it be
capable of standing up rationally in competition with our projects (when, for instance, the demands
of honesty or fairness place constraints on our relationships and pursuits).5

Thus, when faced with the challenge of the tangible benefits of friendship and other personal
needs, the idealized value of mutual recognition might be outweighed by these considerations.
However, Wallace goes on to suggest that the priority problem might be resolved by
looking more closely at two different aspects of the idea of justifiability to others, one outwardfocused and the other inward-focused. First, one must look outward and consider the effects
one’s actions have on others. Reflecting on, for example, an action’s cruelty is a justifiable
reason to object and provides a concrete reason for acting morally. Additionally, the inwardfocused aspect of justifiability to others concentrates attention on the positive value of being a
person who is able to relate to others on terms of mutual recognition. This is a specific, and
positive, way in which acting morally can make one’s own life better. Wallace argues that this
two-part explanation of the value of acting in concert with others provides a more concrete
reason to act morally when morality conflicts with the goals of one’s own relationships and
projects.6
Scanlon’s account of the reasons for acting morally, when augmented by Wallace’s
comments, provides a sound argument in favor of people having reason to act according to
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contractualist moral principles. And it explains why agents are bound by principles based on the
concept of justifiability to others in many situations. However, I believe contractualist reasons
can still be insufficient to motivate an agent who has strong personal reasons to act differently. I
examine this objection by reviewing how a contractualist interprets several examples in favor of
acting morally and then demonstrating how this interpretation can fail.
1.3. The contractualist interpretation of two examples: In his examination of the
relationship between contractualist morality and other values, Changwon Sung provides a
contractualist interpretation of the priority of the moral by considering two examples.7 Sung’s
interpretation provides a good baseline to argue how personal, rather than moral, reasons can
have priority in certain situations. His first example comes from Scanlon:
There would be something unnerving about a “friend” who would steal a kidney for you if you
needed one. This is not just because you would feel guilty toward the person whose kidney was
stolen, but because of what it implies about the “friend’s” view of your right to your own body parts:
he wouldn’t steal them, but that is only because he happens to like you (WWO 164-5).

Scanlon uses this extreme example to argue that friendship requires us to recognize our friends’
independent standing as moral persons and that this recognition places limits on acceptable
behavior towards a friend. A friend who is willing to steal a kidney has no respect for people in
general and would also have no respect for our own rights if he ceased liking us. Thus, there is
no conflict between morality and friendship in this case because one would not be expected to
steal a kidney (or perform other such actions) to help a friend. Sung agrees with Scanlon that this
example supports the conclusion that a form of friendship which recognizes a friend (and hence,
strangers) as having independent moral standing is more plausible than one in which someone
would violate the rights of others in the name of friendship. This moralized form of friendship
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builds moral compatibility, with its demands of interpersonal morality, into the nature of
friendship. Sung adds that by adopting moralized friendship, the friend avoids feeling either
resentful about being asked to harm someone or guilty for having harmed another in the name of
friendship.8
Sung’s second example comes from Marcia Baron:
Among the many people who live in countries where there are very long waiting periods for medical
attention, some may be able to pull strings to schedule (e.g.) surgery the very next week for a son
with cancer rather than wait two or three months until his turn comes up. What should we say about
the ethics of pulling strings in such a situation? (Let us imagine that very few people would be in a
position to pull strings.) On the one hand, it seems patently unfair to pull strings: if the others are in
more or less equally dire straits, why should one’s son be treated as somehow more special? Yet how
can one, in such a situation, weight the considerations and decide, “Yes; it will greatly decrease his
chances of survival if he isn’t operated on for two or three months, but although I could arrange to
get him surgery much sooner, that would be wrong. He has to wait his turn—even if it costs him his
life.”9

Baron points out that one can rationalize pulling strings by noting that although the son’s surgery
will be advanced by several months, a significant amount of time for the son, it will probably
delay the next person’s surgery by only a day, and is unlikely to make a difference. But, she
notes, this response is clearly unsatisfactory to anyone concerned about fairness. Baron goes on
to observe that we expect people to want to pull strings in such a situation and think well of them
for this desire. We would disapprove of a mother who was not tempted and immediately ruled
out providing her son with extra help. At the same time, we see the unfairness, and that is why
we want rules to prevent people from acting this way. So, we want people to be partial to their
loved ones even though we believe they should not be allowed to act on that feeling.
In comparing Baron’s example to Scanlon’s, Sung notes that the action of pulling strings
might be considered less offensive than “stealing a kidney.” First, whatever indirect harm is

8

Ibid., 126-28.
Marcia Baron, "Impartiality and Friendship," Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991): 855-56. Sung changes the
protagonist in Baron's example, but this does not affect my later comparison with his interpretation.
9

107

caused by pulling strings is less significant than the direct harm caused by stealing a kidney.
Second, the act of pulling strings is not “unnerving” in the way that stealing a kidney would be,
although it still might call into question the mother’s view of the value of others. However, Sung
goes on to argue that pulling strings is clearly wrong according to contractualism (it cannot be
justified to others) and it therefore amounts to disregarding the wronged person as a human
being. Thus, it is not clear why harming someone (in the kidney example) is a particularly grave
moral failure but treating someone less fairly (in the pulling strings example) is not. Once this
difference is removed, it is also no longer clear why the mother who pulls strings should not be
regarded in the same “unnerving” way as the friend who steals a kidney. And, if one considers a
modified scenario in which the operation in question is a kidney transplant, the mother would
effectively be “stealing” a kidney from another patient. Thus, while the actual actions involved
in the two cases are different, Sung observes that “the difference…does not constitute a
significant moral difference.”10 He concludes that Scanlon’s strategy for priority based on a
moralized conception of friendship (or other personal values) still works in less extreme cases
than stealing a kidney.
As these examples illustrate, Sung summarizes Scanlon’s strategy for a conflict situation
as first involving an appeal to the extent to which personal values have a built-in sensitivity to
the demands of morality. Then, if this does not resolve the conflict, one can appeal to the great
importance of the value associated with living in a way that can be justified to others. These two
parts of the strategy are treated as unified. When there appears to be a conflict, contractualists
should ask whether their conception of friendship (or whatever value is at stake) properly reflects
the importance of morality, with the implicit understanding that adopting the proper conception
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will eliminate the potential conflict. This strategy will be successful, in large part, because it
appeals to the fact that the agent is already inclined to act morally by virtue of her acceptance of
contractualism and the ideal of justifiability.11
I agree that Sung’s approach demonstrates that the proposed actions in both cases would
be considered wrong under contractualism; however, I do not agree it also demonstrates that the
agent has sufficient reason to act morally.
1.4. How contractualist moral priority can fail: In examining how the priority of the
moral can fail, I will be using Scanlon’s view that a person is generally motivated to do what she
judges she has most reason to do.
A rational person who judges there to be compelling reason to do A normally forms the intention to
do A, and this judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention and the agent’s acting on it (since
this action is part of what such an intention involves). There is no need to invoke an additional form
of motivation beyond the judgment and the reason it recognizes, some further force to, as it were, get
the limbs in motion (WWO 33-34).

Consistent with this view, I will focus on what an agent has most reason to do and assume that
she will be motivated to act accordingly. Scanlon argues that an agent has more reason to act
according to contractualist morality in conflicts with personal demands while I argue that there
are cases in which she has more reason to act in a way that contractualism considers immoral.
The contractualist interpretation of moral priority can fail for two reasons: First, the
judgment of whether a proposed moral principle can be reasonably rejected and the agent’s
judgment of which action she has most reason to do are two different types even though both
involve determining what an agent has most reason to do. Second, the contractualist strategy
relies on an overly moralized version of personal relationships and projects that understates the
conflict between moral and personal values.
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An agent can agree a proposed action is wrong but still believe she has sufficient reason
to perform it anyway. This means that the agent must hold two different judgments about reasons
for action at the same time. Under contractualism, she must judge that the reasons for rejecting
principles allowing the action are more robust than reasons for permitting it. And, she must judge
that her personal reasons for performing the action are stronger than her reasons for acting
morally.12
On the one hand, according to Scanlon, moral principles are general conclusions about
the status of various kinds of reasons for action. An assessment of rejectability must consider the
consequences for all affected people of acceptance in general, not simply for a particular case.
Since we cannot know which individuals will be affected, an assessment cannot be based on the
aims, preferences, or characteristics of specific individuals. Instead the assessment relies on
“generic reasons” which are based on commonly available information about what people have
reason to want and are not attributed to specific individuals (WWO 204-5). Whether to reject a
proposed principle is a judgment about a general situation based on an assessment of the reasons
that people typically have. It should be made from an impartial viewpoint because the agent is
charged with considering and weighing the reasons of all affected individuals, including herself.
Thus, in making an impartial judgment, the mother should reject a principle that permitted a
“generic” person to pull strings at the expense of another.
On the other hand, I argue that the mother’s judgment of whether to pull strings to
advance her son’s surgery is a personal judgment made from the perspective of an agent who
must weigh her reasons for acting morally against her reasons for protecting her son. This change
in perspective makes the judgment personal rather than impartial, and the mother’s sensibilities
12
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come into play as she determines how to value and weigh the competing reasons.13 Thus the
mother could judge she has more reason to pull strings than to act morally because her child’s
importance to her and her love for him are stronger reasons than the recognition that doing so is
wrong and thus affects her standing with strangers. In making this judgment, she would be acting
according to what she has most reason to do because the generic reasons in the judgment about
morality do not include her personal reasons in the judgment about what action to take.
The observation that two different kinds of judgments are involved is somewhat
analogous to the “two level” solution to the problem of impartiality in morality which argues that
there are two distinct questions that need to be addressed: “What morality ought there to be?”
and “What ought I to do?”14 Impartialism is an appropriate answer to the first question but not
necessarily to the second. It is possible to insist that moral principles be impartial without being
committed to the idea that every decision must be governed by completely impartialist
considerations. This approach allows the principles of morality to be impartial while denying
those principles should be so strict that they remove room for personal values and commitments.
Similarly, my argument points to the difference between determining moral principles and
determining what an agent has most reason to do in a specific—and granted extreme—situation.
At the same time, it should be noted that contractualist principles are not completely impartialist
because contractualism does allow for some consideration of personal reasons in determining
principles as discussed in Section 1.2 of this chapter.
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The second reason Scanlon’s argument can fail is that his version of personal
relationships appears to be overly moralized to the degree that there cannot be any true conflict
with morality. He downplays certain aspects of personal relationships and ignores the
phenomenology of conflicts that can exist between morality and these relationships. Support for
this observation is found in Susan Mendus’s critique of Scanlon’s notion of friendship and in
Wolf’s writings on partiality.
Mendus argues that Scanlon ultimately misrepresents the relationship between values,
such as love and friendship, and impartial morality. She characterizes Scanlon’s account as a
“reductivist response” which argues that although there may appear to be conflict between the
reasons of morality and the reasons offered by other values, the appearance is illusory because
the reasons offered by other values are themselves grounded in reasons of morality.15 As
evidence, she points to Scanlon’s observation:
The conception of friendship that we understand and have reason to value involves recognizing the
moral value of friends qua persons, hence the moral claims of nonfriends as well. No sacrifice of
friendship is involved when I refuse to violate the rights of strangers in order to help my friend.
Compatibility with the demands of interpersonal morality is built into the value of friendship itself
(WWO 165).

Thus, according to this passage, Scanlon’s view of friendship is, by definition, compatible with
reasons of morality because it is grounded in morality; however, Mendus plausibly argues that
this is not the only account of friendship deserving consideration. Competing accounts that are
not grounded in morality undermine a significant part of Scanlon’s strategy for resolving the
priority conflict because he depends, in large part, on the avoidance of actual conflicts between
morality and values like friendship. Under such accounts, conflicts will be more frequent, and
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their resolution will depend on the agent’s assessment of the strength of her reasons for acting
morally against legitimate reasons for supporting her friends or loved ones.
Mendus also argues that the dissolution of conflict required by Scanlon’s version of
friendship is not phenomenologically accurate. When she considers cases like the one described
by Baron, she concludes what is owed to strangers may have far less motivational force than
what is owed to friends. Thus, in difficult cases, Scanlon’s approach cannot show that the
reasons for acting morally are stronger than the reasons for acting according to friendship in a
way that addresses the agent’s own position. The agent may concede that genuine friendship
must acknowledge the claims of impartial morality, yet still question whether these claims
should matter more than those of a particular friendship. Accordingly, it begs the question to
hold that a person stops being a real friend if she refuses to do what is required by morality.
Looking at moral conflict from a different perspective, Wolf uses the following example
to argue that friendship is not completely constrained by considerations of morality:
Consider the case of a woman whose son has committed a crime and who must decide whether to
hide him from the police. He will suffer gravely should he be caught, but unless he is caught, another
innocent man will be wrongly convicted for the crime and imprisoned. I shall take it as needing no
argument that impartial morality forbids protecting one’s son at the expense of another innocent
man’s suffering. Impartial morality forbids it—but we are talking about a woman and her son.16

Wolf recognizes that for many people this case is problematic: They feel enormous sympathy for
the woman but believe she should turn in her son. But, Wolf continues, others view the woman
who protects her son positively. There is something “positively reasonable (and not just
understandable)” about the woman who wonders if she should act morally at the expense of her
son. Thus, Wolf asks, “why should the dictates of impartial morality be regarded as decisive?”17
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Wolf maintains that the mother has good reasons for acting to protect her son. At the
same time, she is not claiming that the “reasonableness” of the woman’s position makes it a
moral one. Rather, this case demonstrates the conflict between the demands of morality and love.
According to Wolf, the mother is not weighing different moral concerns. She faces a problem of
whether “to attend ultimately to moral concerns at all. In this sense, it is a problem of radical
choice.”18 Wolf argues that, in certain special situations, a willingness to act immorally is
compatible with the possession of a character worthy of respect and admiration. Thus, it is
possible for people to deliberately act immorally in these kinds of cases based on a judgment that
they have good reasons to do so.
Based on the kinds of considerations just discussed, I believe Scanlon fails to prove that
friendship or other interpersonal values are such that there is no conflict between them when
understood properly and morality. There are personal relationships that recognize morality and,
at the same time, situations that create conflicts that cannot be resolved by appeal to the
fundamental importance of morality. Going beyond relationships, Scanlon makes an analogy
between the nature of friendship and personal pursuits like scientific and artistic excellence. He
maintains that these pursuits involve interactions with others and are thus subject to the same
strategy for demonstrating moral priority. Using an example from business, I would counter that
these types of cases present the identical problem for contractualist priority.
Assume Jane is running a small public technology business. She has reason to try to
increase sales and earnings each quarter because it’s good for both her shareholders and her
employees. The shareholders make money as the stock price increases; and, if the company
continues to grow, there is the possibility that it will be purchased by a larger company at a
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significant premium. The employees are treated well and thus want the company to continue to
prosper. Also, they have been given stock in the company so they too benefit from good financial
performance. Jane is a large shareholder so she is committed to grow the company both as a
point of personal pride and for financial gain. Jane is known for setting and achieving difficult
goals; and, when she does, it increases the value of the company and her reputation as a leader in
her industry.
Although the company is managed effectively, it has difficulty meeting quarterly sales
and earnings targets. Thus, at the end of each quarter, the company often takes aggressive steps
to reach its targets. For example, sales reps ask customers to buy products they don’t yet need;
some orders are shipped a few days early; expenditures are delayed; and certain favorable
accounting judgments are made. These actions allow the company to report higher sales and
earnings. The company is thus able to meet its targets, and its stock price continues to increase.
Jane approves these actions and could stop them if she chose to. Is Jane acting immorally, and
does she have reason to do so?19
Jane’s actions are not moral because the company owes its shareholders and others a true
picture of its performance. In contractualist terms, one would reject a principle that permits a
company’s president to misstate results based on actions that are not part of normal business
practices. Jane would agree, no doubt, with this conclusion based on an impartial assessment.
However, when faced with the actual decision of whether to approve the required actions, Jane
has strong reasons to do so based on the positive impact good performance has for her
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shareholders, her employees, and herself. It is also difficult to identify which, if any, individuals
are hurt by her actions. It may be argued that Jane is short-sighted because she is making it more
difficult to perform well in the next quarter, but maybe she is aware of several partially
completed projects that should improve next quarter’s results or maybe she is optimistic for other
reasons. In any case, the contractualist value of living in the right relationship with others does
not have sufficient immediacy or importance for Jane to overcome her pragmatic reasons to go
ahead. Thus, it seems appropriate to conclude that Jane has stronger reasons to take these actions
to protect her shareholders and employees than she does to be moral, even though she recognizes
she is doing something wrong.
In summary, the purpose of this exercise is to investigate whether contractualist moral
reasons are always sufficient to have priority over competing reasons based on personal
relationships and projects. One viewpoint, represented by Sung’s argument, is that they always
do; however, I have described specific situations in which contractualist reasons can fail to have
priority. Thus, I am arguing the examples above demonstrate that contractualist reasons for
acting morally are not always sufficient for an agent to have greater reason to act morally than
she does to aid a friend or pursue a personal project. The specific contractualist reasons for
acting morally (the value of being in a relationship of mutual recognition with others plus the
specific reasons for not taking the action in question) are not sufficient in situations like the ones
just discussed to overcome the specific reasons in favor of the immoral action when considered
from the agent’s point of view.
It is also important to note that the situations described differ from typical cases of
akrasia in which someone acts against her better judgment due to weakness of the will. In such
cases, the agent acts counter to the way she judges she has most reason to act. For example, one
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might decide to do something because it would be fun, even though one knows there are
compelling reasons not to do it. In other words, a person fails to give these reasons the normative
force she believes they should have.20 In the cases I have explored, however, the agents sincerely
considered all the competing reasons and judged that they had most reason to act immorally;
thus, they are not exhibiting a weakness of the will. Therefore, these insights demonstrate the
limits of contractualism’s normativity and show that these limits are reached more frequently
than Scanlon maintains.
1.5. Significance and possible resolution: A good case can be made that the limits just
described for contractualism are, in fact, limits for all moral theories.21 If so, the real problem lies
not in the limitations just described on the normativity of contractualism’s principles but rather in
its moralized view of personal relationships and projects which leads to the mistaken claim that
such limits do not exist. Adopting a less restrictive view of these relationships could better align
the theory’s claims about normativity with the types of views about the nature of personal
relationships just examined without unintentionally weakening the theory in other ways.
The previous section highlighted the difference between an agent’s judgment of what is
morally acceptable and her judgment about what she has most reason to do in specific situations,
and it showed that these judgments can diverge under contractualism. A similar divergence can
be found in most (and perhaps all) moral theories. Wolf’s views about the conflict between the
demands of morality and those of personal relationships are theory neutral and support this
conclusion, as does an examination of the specifics of common moral theories. For example, a
utilitarian’s reason to act morally is based on her reasons to help “achieve the greatest good” or
some similar state. In conflict situations like the ones just discussed, a utilitarian could make a
20
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judgment that achieving the greatest good requires impartiality while still judging that she has
stronger reasons to help a friend or loved one. Thus, utilitarianism is here similar to
contractualism. Likewise, a proponent of virtue ethics could consider Wolf’s example and
conclude that a virtuous person would turn in her son while also judging that, when faced with
the same situation, she (the proponent) has more reason not to act virtuously. A divine command
theory of morality differs somewhat in that God determines what is moral, and many followers
of such theories believe that their purpose in life is to abide by these commands. However, it is
still likely that there are situations in which the follower makes a conscious judgment that she
has good reason not to act morally.
While contractualism cannot be criticized for a limitation that is common to moral
theories in general, it can be faulted for claiming it is able to avoid these limits. A primary
element of this claim is Scanlon’s moralized version of personal relationships and projects
which, it has been argued, understates potential conflicts with the demands of morality. Adopting
a less moralized view of these relationships would better align the theory with actual experiences
without altering the effectiveness of the theory. Judgments about moral principles in the conflict
situations under discussion would not be affected because the analysis just presented recognizes
that agents can make judgments upholding the impartiality of morality. And the normativity of
these principles will more accurately reflect experience because the adoption of a less moralized
version of personal relationships more clearly recognizes the tension between the demands of
morality and the demands of these relationships.
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2. Do Contractualist Principles Apply to the Unmotivated?
According to Scanlon, everyone is subject to moral reasons whether or not she is moved
by morality. As discussed in Section 1.2, he argues that being “left cold” by moral reasons is a
much more significant fault than failing to see the force of other kinds of reasons. Someone who
fails to be moved by moral considerations is declaring that she values herself (and perhaps those
with whom she has special relationships) above all others. This perspective creates a significant
distance from others and explains why contractualists attach special importance to recognizing
the force of moral considerations.22 Critics like Gerald Dworkin, however, question whether
contractualist moral reasons obtain for all persons.23 I argue that Scanlon’s position is correct.
2.1. The contractualist argument: Scanlon defines judgments about right and wrong to be
“judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected,
by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others,
similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” (WWO 4, my italics). Amoralists (and many
others) can understand the difference between right and wrong but do not see this difference as
something they have reason to care about. Similarly, the “disaffected” can accept moral
principles but apply them to a narrow range of persons like friends and relatives.24 Both groups
are clearly not interested in principles for the general regulation of behavior that others could not
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reasonably reject. The question is whether this lack of actual motivation undermines the
applicability of moral reasons to these groups.
As discussed in Section 1.4 of this chapter, Scanlon argues that actions can be motivated
by reasons without relying on pre-existing desires. Thus, the task of explaining the importance of
morality depends on the reasons people have for pursuing the value that justifiability to others
represents. The challenge for contractualism is to show that the reasons for acting morally apply
to the amoralist even if she does not recognize or is not motivated by them. It is not to convince
the amoralist that she is wrong—a goal that would be unattainable given her nature.25
The argument that moral reasons apply to everyone is based on the universality of reason
judgments and the conclusion that the amoralist’s lack of motivation to seek general agreement is
not a condition that affects the applicability of this principle. Scanlon writes:
Unless their situation differs from ours in ways that are morally relevant, we must say that
the moral reasons that apply to us apply to these people as well. This much is required by
what I called…the generality of reason judgments…. Their case is quite different from that
of people who “have different tastes.” … In these cases, the main point of the activities in
question is a certain kind of enjoyment; so people who do not get this enjoyment from the
activities lack reasons to engage in them. But morality is not aimed at enjoyment, so the
reasons to give it a place in one’s life are not conditional in this way (WWO 158).
In response to the concern that his argument is too narrow because it does not examine whether
reasons for acting morally are conditional on “wanting to live in a certain relationship with
others,” Scanlon broadens his discussion.26 He notes that reasons for acting morally are usually
based on objective facts, like the harm done to others, and these reasons are not dependent on
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subjective facts about the agent. He also argues that the reasons for accepting the overall
contractualist view of morality are also independent of a specific agent.
But it seems to me just as clear that our reasons for being concerned with morality at all (for
caring about the justifiability of our actions to others) are not conditional on our happening
to care about this and to be moved by it. These reasons are not themselves moral reasons
(that is to say, it is not that we have reason to care about the justifiability of our actions
because it would be morally wrong, or morally bad, not to do so).27
In other words, Scanlon argues that the reason for caring about the justifiability of actions to
others is not conditional on happening to care about the justifiability of actions (or, said
differently, caring about the morality of these actions). Rather, caring about justifiability is based
on the value of developing a relationship of “mutual recognition” with others. He writes:
Standing in this relation to others is appealing in itself—worth seeking for its own sake. A
moral person will refrain from lying to others, cheating, harming, or exploiting them,
“because these things are wrong.” But for such a person these requirements are not just
formal imperatives; they are aspects of the positive value of a way of living with others
(WWO 162).
Given human nature, people cannot live in isolation, and thus contractualists find great value in
behavior that fosters a positive relation with others. Because caring about justifiability and
morality per se is not a subjective condition for the reasons anyone has to be moral, it is not a
subjective condition for others’ reasons; thus, reasons to be moral apply to the amoralist as well.
I find this argument convincing because it rests on the fact that one cannot live without
establishing relationships with others, and that the nature of these relationships has a meaningful
impact on the quality of one’s life. I also recognize it assumes one accepts Scanlon’s externalist
view about reasons. Internalists do not accept this view, and I discuss their position next.
2.2 A note on internalism: Internalists do not agree that moral reasons apply to the
amoralist. My goal in this section is to highlight how the externalist and internalist views differ
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rather than to resolve their disagreement. In his own assessment of the issue, Scanlon concludes
“… I do not think that there is any argument that would force a person who was drawn to one of
these alternatives to accept the other instead.”28
Many internalists echo Bernard Williams who claims all reasons for action have
subjective conditions and “all external reasons claims are false.”29 He holds that a claim that an
agent has reason to do X can be true only if there is a “sound deliberative route” leading from
elements in the agent’s subjective motivational set to the conclusion that she has some reason to
do X. The subjective motivational set refers to a person’s desires in a broad sense including such
things as “dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and
various projects…embodying commitments of the agent.”30 Further, a sound deliberative route
can go beyond purely causal instrumental reasoning and may include such things as recognizing
ways an action would be related to something one already cares about, thinking about how to
combine the pursuit of multiple concerns, considering which of several conflicting aims to
pursue, and so forth. A lack of a deliberative route could be due to the absence of some critical
element in the agent’s motivational set or something about the way the agent deliberates that
prevents certain connections from being made.
Consider someone who has always regarded the idea of personal honor as silly and oldfashioned.31 Nonetheless she comes to admire someone who takes this idea seriously. Over time,
she sees how this person values acting in certain ways and comes to believe that honor is
something worth caring about. An externalist would explain the change in her perspective by
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saying she came to believe something that was true all along—she had reason to esteem honor
and to avoid dishonorable conduct. An internalist, however, would argue that the agent must
have deliberated in some rational way and that the deliberation started from her original
motivational set. The new motivation is appropriately connected to her original motivational set;
otherwise, she could not have acquired it.
The internalist is comfortable with the fact that the account of what deliberation might
involve is somewhat vague and, despite this vagueness, finds a clear distinction between the two
positions. The internalist adopts the perspective of the agent and argues that what might be
reasons for others are not reasons for that agent unless she is appropriately connected to them. It
is pointless to maintain an agent has a reason if she is incapable of acting on it or even
recognizing it. Accordingly, the internalist argues that contractualist moral principles do not
apply to the amoralist who is not moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior.
The externalist, on the other hand, focuses on reasons and the justification story for an action
from the perspective of a third party regardless of the agent’s ability to recognize or be motivated
by these considerations. Given Scanlon’s views on reasons, he makes a convincing case that
contractualist moral reasons apply to the amoralist. However, one must note that his argument
will not convince the dedicated internalist, and also that this is irrelevant from the point of view
of his theory.

3. Contractualism and Other Moral Systems
So far, I have examined the reasons moral principles have priority for contractualists
along with some limitations on this priority. I’ve also argued that contractualists are justified in
believing their moral principles apply to those who do not care about morality. If contractualist
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reasons apply to amoralists, they also apply to those who care about morality but choose to
follow a different doctrine than contractualism. How, then, should contractualists view and
interact with these latter people, and how should they take others’ reasons into account in
determining moral principles? This is an important question that is not explicitly addressed by
Scanlon. I maintain that contractualism and other doctrines can coexist without significant
conflict if the other doctrines are reasonable ones. In such cases, contractualists should consider
certain religious or cultural reasons as grounds for the reasonable rejection of proposed
principles if the reasons are part of the non-contractualist’s core values and considering them
does not infringe on other contractualist principles.
3.1. Relationship to other moral systems: As discussed, both the content and the authority
of contractualism are based on a recognition of the capacity for rational self-governance. Living
by principles that others cannot reasonably reject recognizes their value as independent and equal
individuals by acting in ways that respect this unique capability. Abiding by contractualist
principles says little about the “right kind” of life to live because this is not at issue.
Contractualists accept others’ life choices if they too follow a similar path of non-interference.
Thus, the underlying tenets of contractualism are a recognition of each person’s value and a
willingness to allow each person to choose how she lives if she also respects others.
Contractualism’s relationship to other moral systems varies depending on the extent to
which the other beliefs are consistent with contractualism’s basic tenets regarding human
equality and self-determination. When these basic views are shared, contractualists should be
able to live in harmony with those who ascribe to other moral theories. This seems likely for
followers of other secular moralities, like various forms of consequentialism and virtue ethics,
because these theories view persons as equal individuals and generally respect their rights as
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such.32 This will also be true for those who recognize a morality based on religion or culture if
their beliefs form what Rawls terms a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine.” Rawls uses this
term when considering what kinds of doctrines people in a liberal democratic society can affirm
while still being able to tolerate and interact with others. A comprehensive doctrine covers major
religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of life in a consistent and coherent manner.
According to Rawls, doctrines are distinguished by the primacy and weight they give to certain
values; and, in doing this, they provide specific guidance to their adherents on how to live.
Reasonable persons recognize that others may affirm different comprehensive doctrines and that
there is nothing wrong in doing so. Thus, they do not propose the use of political power or other
means to repress views that differ from their own (PL 58-66).
In considering relationships between contractualism and other moral systems, it is useful
to remember that contractualism focuses on the domain of “what we owe to each other.” This
domain contains judgments of right and wrong based on principles that cannot be reasonably
rejected. Some of these principles are universal (like judgments that it is wrong to murder or
torture) while others depend on reasons that people have only under certain social conditions
(like principles about what constitutes an invasion of privacy), but both universal and sociallydependent principles are based on the same type of contractualist reasoning. There are, of course,
other moral values outside the domain of contractualism. Scanlon believes there are a plurality of
values within this broader domain that are worthy of respect even though they may be mutually
incompatible in the demands they place on their adherents. Examples here include different
conceptions of patriotism, honor, and family loyalty. For instance, someone might view an ideal
of patriotism as a moral standard that goes beyond contractualism’s narrower requirements of
32
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what one owes to her fellow citizens. Such a person might believe that patriotism requires an
extreme level of sacrifice for one’s country and view herself as failing morally if she does not
respond to this demand. Alternatively, some conceptions of honor require that a person keeps her
word even when unexpected circumstances provide good reasons to release her. Or, different
conceptions of family ties may require varying degrees of sacrifice of one’s personal goals to
help family members and conflicting views on how close a relative must be to deserve such
considerations (WWO 342-49).
Doctrines that recognize the value of individuals are likely to agree on many of the
principles within contractualism’s domain of what we owe each other. This is not surprising
given that the idea of “treating others according to principles that cannot be reasonably rejected”
is not all that different from the Golden Rule of doing unto others as you would have them do
unto you. It seems difficult for a doctrine to proclaim the value of individuals if its view of
morality is not roughly in line with these concepts. Variations in values among doctrines are
more likely to exist in the broader domain of morality which is outside of what we owe to each
other strictly speaking. However, if adherents of these doctrines are reasonable in the sense that
they respect other doctrines and do not try to force their values on others, there will likely be
little conflict among doctrines. Of course, there are also “unreasonable” doctrines that do not
recognize individual equality, treat others in ways that ignore their personal rights, or hold it is
right to force non-believers to adopt their beliefs. In these cases, contractualists cannot avoid
conflict.
Even if there is considerable agreement on principles among doctrines, it is important to
recognize that the source of morality is different for each. For example, in contractualism,
morality is based on the value of living in a relationship of mutual recognition with others. In
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utilitarianism, it is based on pursuing actions that achieve the greatest good. In many religions,
morality is based on following divinely-given principles that guide people in living the right kind
of lives. These differences are ultimately the source of disagreements when contractualism and
other moral systems come into conflict.
3.2. The impact of other doctrines on contractualist principles: Finally, an important
question from the contractualist perspective is whether the process of reasonable rejection should
consider non-contractualist reasons based on religious or cultural beliefs. The problem arises
from contractualism’s basis in principles that cannot be rejected by others “who are similarly
motivated to find principles for the general regulation of behavior.” Because other moralists do
not share this motivation, a strict interpretation of contractualism would mean these other
moralists do not have standing to reject proposed principles.33 But this interpretation seems too
restrictive given the fact that contractualist morality is designed to establish meaningful
relationships. Contractualists live in heterogeneous societies which encompass people with
different moral motivations, so it is incumbent upon them to see if they can incorporate (at least
some) religious or culturally-related reasons into the process of determining moral principles.
Scanlon gives no specific guidance on how one might do this. On the one hand, he states
that principles should be based on generic reasons that represent commonly available
information about what people generally have reason to want. This formulation could be used to
argue against religious or cultural reasons if they do not fit this general criterion. On the other
hand, Scanlon recognizes that reasons related to personal relationships and projects can be used
in a limited way to reject principles. An example of this is Scanlon’s Rescue Principle, which
includes a qualification that limits the obligation to rescue in order to prevent inappropriate
33
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intrusions into the rescuer’s life.34 The recognition of personal projects as relevant reasons could
also be used to include religious and culturally-based reasons in determining moral principles.
One way to decide on which reasons are acceptable is to rely on the contractualist’s goal
of mutual recognition to argue a reason should be deemed morally relevant if it meets the
following criterion: “Can this kind of consideration be considered to be important for being able
to live a rationally self-governed, meaningful life?”35 Such a criterion requires religious and
culturally based (and all other) reasons which involve matters of importance to be included in
determining principles. At the same time, the proposed reasons could not conflict with the nonreligious contractualist’s ability to live a self-governed, meaningful life. Thus, if the above view
is correct, a contractualist should recognize religious or cultural reasons if they are sufficiently
significant to the religious moralist’s way of life and, at the same time, do not prevent the
recognition of other contractualists’ similarly significant reasons.
I conclude this section with a somewhat simplified example. Consider the case of a
religious moralist who is potentially barred from serving in the police force or military because
of dress or grooming restrictions.36 Perhaps he believes that a certain style of facial hair is a sign
of respect for God, or she covers her hair for the same reason. These beliefs are sincerely held
convictions about living according to God’s will rather than mere conformance to group fashion.
The religious moralist also believes that being a member of one of these services is an attractive
way to pursue a career that serves the community while providing compensation to support a
comfortable life. With equal conviction, leaders in the police and military believe that a
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common dress code is crucial to establishing a sense of unity and equality among officers who
must be ready to support each other under difficult and often life-threatening circumstances.
They maintain that the code also ensures a professional image to the outside community, thus
supporting the organization’s mission.
Should a contractualist support prohibitions on non-conformist persons from serving in
the police or military? The key question is whether this person’s belief about dress or grooming
qualifies as a moral reason that should be considered in determining the rejectability of such a
principle. I would argue it does given these beliefs are sincerely held expressions of a faith that is
central to the religious moralist’s life. As such, this reason needs to be weighed against the
objector’s reasons (like the risk of harm to fellow officers caused by dissension or reduced unity)
to determine if the religious moralist’s objection to being excluded is a reasonable one. Although
I believe the moralist’s objection is reasonable in this case, one could undoubtedly create
scenarios in which it is not. For example, suppose a religion prohibited its members from
speaking with non-related members of the opposite sex. Such a person could reasonably be
prohibited from serving in a police force because observing this restriction would clearly affect
his or her job performance. In considering various situations, then, one must recognize that not
all religious or culturally-related reasons will qualify as moral reasons; and, even if they do, they
could still be outweighed by other reasons. While this solution is unlikely to meet all the
religious moralist’s perceived needs, it is the best contractualism can do within its system.
Moreover, this approach would allow the contractualist to respond to the person’s way of life and
to her status as a person, thus enhancing the contractualist’s ability to support the other members
of a heterogeneous society.
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Conversely, there is no parallel question asking how the religious moralist should
incorporate contractualist reasons into her deliberations because her moral beliefs are dictated by
her religion rather than through a contractualist-like procedure. However, it is worth considering
whether the contractualist procedure might still be useful to the non-contractualist as a
framework for analyzing complicated moral situations. As previously noted, the parallels
between contractualism and the Golden Rule make it likely that contractualist principles will be
consistent with those of any doctrine that recognizes the value of all persons. And the procedure
itself forces an agent to consider in detail how her actions impact others. In such a case, the
contractualist procedure would help illuminate moral principles or positions that already exist as
prescribed by the doctrine, rather than the procedure being the basis of the principles (as is the
case for contractualism).
In summary, although contractualism and comprehensive religious or cultural moral
systems are clearly incompatible, the contractualist can and should respond to reasons based on
the religious or cultural moralist’s beliefs when determining moral principles, even though these
beliefs prevent this moralist from recognizing the authority of contractualism. Given the
heterogeneous nature of democratic societies, including these reasons would close a significant
gap created by the contractualist procedure. Moreover, it would fill that gap without requiring the
contractualist to affirm any reasons in ways that conflict with contractualism’s own principles.
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Chapter 5
An Assessment of Contractualism
Contractualism focuses on two key issues that a moral theory must address: how moral
judgments are made and why agents are motivated to act on these judgments. Scanlon proposes a
theory based on the ideas of “justifiability to others” and “reasonable rejection” that insightfully
links moral judgments and agents’ motivation using a reasons-based constructivist approach.
However, as I’ve come to understand contractualism and analyze the way it works, my initial
enthusiasm has been tempered by a realization that the theory is simply incapable of specifying
principles for its entire target domain of interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, an examination
of the underlying causes of these failures indicates the theory cannot be modified to resolve these
issues. Thus, while contractualism provides many useful insights into the nature of morality, it
ultimately disappoints potential proponents. This chapter summarizes my assessment.

1. An Insightful Account of Morality
Most people would agree that a primary purpose of morality is to provide guidance on
how to treat other people and that these relationships should be based on respect for others and
an understanding of the way they would like to be treated. These thoughts are at the heart of
contractualism’s premise that acting morally is to act in ways that others could not reasonably
reject. Scanlon successfully demonstrates how the idea of justifying one’s actions to others can
be used to explain both the way moral judgments are made and why agents are motivated to act
according to these judgments.
1.1. Making moral judgments: According to contractualism, moral principles are
determined by agents who judge whether the persons most affected by a proposed action could
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reasonably reject a principle that permitted it. To do this, the agent must identify opposite
principles that permit and prohibit the action in question. She must then consider who has
significant objections to each, compare these objections, and judge which complaints are
stronger—those that permit the action or those that forbid it. Judgments like these determine
what is right and wrong in a way that respects others’ needs, and treating others properly is a key
aspect of morality according to most people.
Contractualism is well aligned with common views in another way because many people
also believe morality should be based on reasons and justifications. In moral disagreements, one
generally identifies the reasons that support one’s preferred moral position and then argues why
these reasons are relevant and why they should be given greater weight than those which support
the opposing position. Contractualism formalizes this process by specifying what kinds of
reasons are relevant and providing guidance on the way these reasons should be evaluated. It is
easy to understand the theory’s account of what makes an action right or wrong—at least in a
general way. No difficult philosophical interpretations are needed. Interactions should be based
on principles that cannot be rejected after considering the reasons for and against adopting
individual principles. This is a simple, but powerful, explanation of what constitutes a moral
judgment.
A common objection to contractualism is based on the fact that determining moral
principles requires assessing the validity and strength of reasons, and such judgments admittedly
have moral content. They are not like a utilitarian assessment of which action produces the
greatest welfare—a judgment about a non-moral attribute that is claimed to create a moral
imperative. Nonetheless, contractualism does withstand the criticism that its judgments depend
entirely on already held moral intuitions about the rightness of actions, and thus, that they add
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nothing to our understanding of morality. As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of justifiability
is not redundant because it determines which characteristics of an action are valid reasons for
assessing its moral status, and the judgment that an action is wrong provides a “back-stopping”
reason for not performing it. The contractualist procedure also gives considerable guidance on
how to make judgments, thus going beyond unrestricted intuitions. And, finally, justification
plays a critical role in moral motivation by providing the link between knowing an action is good
and having a reason to perform that action.
1.2. Link to moral motivation: Providing the link to moral motivation is the second role
that justifiability to others plays, and it does this in a way that is also consistent with common
views about morality. In Scanlon’s account, acting according to reasons that cannot be rejected
shows respect for others and supports relationships of mutual recognition. These relationships
are important independently of their moral implications because people need the help of others
simply to survive and, more positively, to lead fulfilling lives. In line with this view, most people
act morally because they want to be able to defend their actions to those affected. If someone is
asked why she made a difficult choice that disappointed a friend, she will generally cite the
reasons behind the choice to make it clear why her action better balances the various
considerations than the one she avoided. Similarly, when someone acts immorally, she feels bad
because she has let someone (including herself) down, and she cannot provide good reason why
she acted that way. Thus, justifiability to others provides an account of why agents have reason
to act morally in a way that matches familiar attitudes about morality.
One concern, as discussed in Chapter 4, is that Scanlon’s account exaggerates the
motivational pull of morality by proposing an overly moralized view of friendship and other
personal relationships. This view minimizes the potential conflict between the demands of
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morality and those of personal needs, and does not recognize that there are situations of intense
personal conflict where agents have greater reason to act immorally even though they recognize
what they are doing is wrong. However, this inconsistency is not a significant weakness because
it is a problem for most, if not all, moral theories. A less restrictive view of the nature of personal
relationships could be adopted without weakening contractualism’s other elements.
1.3. Importance of individuals: Finally, most people think of morality as a subject that
involves individuals, who make judgments about what is required to act morally and, in doing so,
take into account the needs and rights of other individuals. Contractualism is clearly designed
with the individual in mind. From the agent’s point of view, a judgment of reasonable rejection is
made by a single person—the agreement of others is not required. These individuals are not
idealized agents; they are persons whose capabilities and experiences are not limited in any way.
The fact that moral principles are developed under the unaltered conditions real people face helps
validate the theory’s authenticity.
From the viewpoint of the parties affected by an agent’s actions, the contractualist
procedure is designed to ensure that principles respect the rights of individuals and that
individuals cannot be used as a means for others’ ends. To do this, Scanlon requires that
judgments be based on a principle’s effects on single individuals rather than groups. This
requirement forces agents to reject, for example, principles that would allow someone to suffer
significant harm to shield many people from lesser sufferings. This emphasis of individual rights
is one of Scanlon’s main goals in designing contractualism. It distinguishes his theory from
consequentialist ones and does so in a way that matches many moral intuitions.
If this were the entire story, contractualism would be a strongly convincing moral theory.
Its core tenet of justification to others explains how moral judgments are made and why agents
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are motivated to follow them in a way that matches most people’s ideas about morality. And, it
focuses on the individual’s role in morality, both as an agent and as the potential victim of
immoral actions. But this is not the end of the story. Although the theory claims to specify moral
principles that cover the entire domain of interpersonal interactions, it leaves two important gaps:
the problem of aggregation and the problem of relativism.

2. Incapable of Specifying Principles in Certain Cases
Contractualism has two serious problems in the way it determines moral principles.
Ironically, the sources of the theory’s strength, its emphasis on ‘reasonable rejection’ and the role
of individuals in morality, are also the cause of its weaknesses. These problems are reviewed in
this section.
2.1. Problem of aggregation: Contractualism’s focus on the individual and the
corresponding Individualist Restriction, which requires that judgments be based on a principle’s
effects on single individuals rather than groups, create a dilemma for contractualism in cases
involving aggregation. On the one hand, this constraint correctly prevents the aggregation of
small benefits for many from outweighing large harms to a few. On the other hand, it also
prevents aggregation in situations where it seems right to do so; for example, where harms to
individuals are equal and many can be helped at the expense of a few, like the choice to rescue
several people or one.1 Furthermore, there are cases in which harms are unequal but still close
enough to be relevant and where it is clearly moral to allow a smaller number of individuals to
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suffer the greater harm so that many can avoid the lesser one. (Scanlon uses the example of
saving one person’s life to prevent a large number from going blind or becoming paralyzed.)
Such a judgment is also contrary to the Individualist Restriction.
Thus, aggregation is a dilemma caused by contractualism’s emphasis on individuals. One
cannot eliminate the issue by arguing that contractualism shows why generally accepted views
about aggregative morality are mistaken—intuitions about saving multiple people instead of a
single individual are quite strong. However, there are two somewhat mitigating factors. First,
contractualism’s framework is still useful for analyzing these kinds of situations because it helps
clarify what reasons are relevant beyond the specific harms involved. For example, if one of the
persons needing rescue is responsible for creating the rescue situation through her own
carelessness, that factor could legitimately affect the rescuer’s choice of whom to save, and the
idea of reasonable rejection provides a way to assess the factor’s significance. Second,
consequentialist theories have the opposite problem in that they cannot avoid inappropriate
aggregation that leads to the conclusion that one should allow an individual to suffer serious
harm to avoid small harms to many. Nonetheless, despite these extenuating circumstances,
aggregation is a serious problem for the theory.
2.2. Problem of relativism: Contractualism’s practice of basing principles on the
judgments of an individual agent combined with its standard of reasonable rejection leads to
undesirable relativism. As discussed in Chapter 3, the objectivity of moral principles as
determined by the Scanlon’s theory depends on the convergence of many individuals’ moral
judgments. However, because these are non-ideal agents with different experiences, interests and
sensibilities, and because what can be reasonably rejected is therefore somewhat dependent on
the person making the judgment, there is no guarantee that the judgments of various agents will
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converge. When the judgments of persons in different groups converge on conflicting moral
principles in a way that is stable, there is a relativism because principles depend on the context in
which each group is making its judgment and there is no principled way to choose between the
two views. Sometimes this is benign and sometimes problematic. Scanlon, however, does not
believe that contractualism is vulnerable to a charge of relativism. He argues that the theory
explains how societies can support different principles, say for protecting people’s privacy, by
pointing to differences in reasons based on variations in social practices. At the same time, he
argues that judgments will converge in cases like those involving killing, enslavement, or
harming others.
I have identified two problematic situations. First, Scanlon argues that contractualism can
exclude morally objectionable practices by distinguishing what people “have reason to want”
from what people “actually think or want” due to cultural acclimation. However, in practice,
there is no neutral way to make this distinction as shown by the example of antebellum slavery in
the U.S. The same problem of distinguishing objectionable practices exists when considering
differences in moral codes across cultures regarding, for example, treatment of women and
minorities. While it is easy from a liberal perspective to conclude that discriminatory practices
are wrong, it is impossible to justify this conclusion using the contractualist procedure. When
other cultures’ perspectives are based on reasons they find defensible given the information
available to them, one cannot step back from both points of view to identify the more valid one.
Thus, in situations having relevantly similar characteristics, contractualism supports conflicting
actions.
Second, agents are unlikely to converge on a single moral judgment in difficult cases
where reasons are hard to compare, outcomes are affected by uncertainty, different time frames
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are involved, and so on, as was illustrated by the analysis of voluntary euthanasia.
Determinations about the morality in other cases like abortion and drug usage are subject to
similar issues. In cases such as these, different groups or societies can and do converge on
different moral principles as evidenced by the acceptance of voluntary euthanasia by certain
countries and states. In these situations, the relevant reasons for determining principles do not
vary; rather, it is the way agents evaluate these reasons that differs. Thus, contractualism cannot
avoid justifying conflicting actions in situations with morally similar characteristics.
In making the charge of relativism, I recognize it is unreasonable to expect any theory to
provide a single answer for every moral situation. A good counter, for example, is to claim that
the cases in question are simply examples of moral disagreement or moral indeterminism.
However, raising these possibilities does not eliminate concerns that relativism is a significant
problem for contractualism.
Consider moral disagreement. Because contractualism is a constructivist theory, there is
no right answer to be discovered that is independent of the judgments of the various agents. To
say that there is a “right answer” or that “the answer” will be discovered over time is to say that
the judgments of all the agents will converge. This certainly could happen in some cases, but one
cannot count on this outcome. Next, consider indeterminacy. This term refers to cases where the
outcomes are equally bad or where it is impossible to make a valid comparison among choices.2
While there are undoubtedly some indeterminate situations of the “Sophie’s choice” variety,
these are relatively rare, and the criterion of reasonable rejection is broad enough to allow
comparison among different kinds of reasons. The problem is not one of indeterminacy in that
agents cannot make judgments; rather, it is that they reach different judgments due to their
2
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culture, experiences, and sensibilities. Furthermore, in such situations, the opposing sides are
often quite certain that their judgments are correct.
Considerations about disagreement and indeterminacy notwithstanding, I recognize that
there will be differences of opinion on whether to consider certain difficult cases as evidence of
undesirable relativism. However, my argument is that, whatever one thinks about specific
examples, the structure of contractualism is such that individuals’ moral judgments will not
always converge in a way that supports Scanlon’s claims about the objectivity of principles.
2.3. Significance of these problems: So far, I’ve argued that contractualism provides an
attractive explanation of how moral judgments are made and why that are motivating; however, I
have also argued that the theory has significant problems determining moral principles. Although
it is unreasonable to expect a moral theory to specify principles for every imaginable moral
situation, these problems are significant for two reasons.
First, they demonstrate the theory cannot determine principles in the way Scanlon claims.
Scanlon argues that the theory can accommodate both the Individualist Restriction that prevents
inappropriate aggregation and a principle that allows aggregation when harms are equal;
however, as has been shown, contractualism cannot have it both ways. One must either give up
the Individualist Restriction or recognize that the contractualist procedure does not specify the
right moral action in aggregative cases like the choice of saving either one or many persons.
Since the theory fails to deal with the most basic kind of aggregation, the question of whether it
should be able to handle more difficult cases does not need to be answered. Similarly, Scanlon
argues that contractualism is not subject to the charge of relativism. Although it allows for
variations in moral practices due to differences in social practices, the theory claims at the same
time to avoid conflicting judgments when they are objectionable. However, I have argued that
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there is no neutral way to choose between the moral practices of different societies when using
the contractualist procedure. Also, there are cases where different agents reach contradictory
judgments about which principles are reasonable in difficult moral cases. Thus, contractualism’s
ability to determine principles does not live up to Scanlon’s claims in these two important areas.
A second reason that these are serious concerns is that these kinds of problematic cases
often fall into what might be termed the “core” of morality.3 This core consists of cases where
there is no disagreement about the right thing to do—decisions on torture, murder, and so on.
Cases of aggregation for equal harms and cases in which certain societies adopt principles
permitting practices that are against generally accepted moral intuitions fall into this core, and it
is of great concern that contractualism is unable to determine the principles for such noncontroversial situations. Also, the fact that other cases involving objectionable relativism lie
outside this core does not, in my view, diminish their importance. This kind of relativism is
unacceptable for objectivists, like Scanlon, who recognize disagreement but not the view that
there can competing principles with equal standing.

3. A Modified Contractualism?
It has already been noted that Scanlon’s moralized account of friendship and other
personal relationships could be relaxed to better recognize the types of conflicts that exist
between the demands of these relationships and those of morality. The question at hand is
whether there is an equally effective way to address the problems of aggregation and relativism.

3
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morality supplies criteria independent of local standards in Philippa Foot, Morality and Art (London:
Oxford U.P, 1972). Also, Ross describes what he terms “modest moral realism” in which certain states of
affairs (like torture and slavery) are judged identically under all credible theories in Steven Ross, "Real,
Modest Moral Realism," The Philosophical Forum 35, no. 4 (2004).
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3.1. Aggregation: In his critique of Scanlon’s approach to aggregation, Derek Parfit
suggests that contractualism would be a stronger and more plausible theory if Scanlon eliminated
the Individualist Restriction which prohibits the summation of benefits to different people.4
Parfit is concerned that this restriction prevents contractualism from developing principles that
properly reflect the complexities of cases involving the aggregation of benefits. In his most
simple example, Parfit points to the choice of rescuing one person or five. He argues that the
right action is to save the five, and then concludes that Scanlon must give up the Individualist
Restriction to do so. This allows the five to argue that their reasons together outweigh the
reasons the single person has for being saved.
Using a series of more complicated examples involving different numbers of individuals
and types of harms, Parfit also argues that Scanlon is ignoring an important issue in his treatment
of aggregation—distributive justice—which requires consideration of not only the net sum of
benefits and burdens but also of the way those benefits and burdens are distributed over the
persons involved.5 Admittedly, there are differing points of view on just what distributive justice
requires; for example one stance emphasizes equality of distribution while another gives priority
to those who are worse off. However, once the larger problem is acknowledged, it is not possible
for a single formula, like one based on Scanlon’s Individualist Restriction or the utilitarian
maximization of benefits, to determine the right moral choice in all possible scenarios.

4

Parfit.
Parfit’s examples are designed to show that, in problems involving aggregation, one cannot simply
consider the gains or losses of the different parties. One must also consider the parties’ relative overall
welfare, both before and after the proposed actions. The specific details of the examples are not critical
for this discussion of Parfit’s proposed modification to Scanlon’s theory. The key point is that Parfit’s
proposal is needed to handle even the simplest cases of aggregation that are currently blocked by the
Individualist Restriction.
5
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The solution for contractualism, Parfit suggests, is to retain Scanlon’s guiding idea of
justifiability to each person. But, rather than limiting the grounds for rejecting principles to the
burdens imposed on a single individual, the grounds could include the burdens on multiple
people. For example, in the situation of saving one person or five, the single individual could
agree that, given everyone’s life has equal value, it is right to save the five because she could
recognize that the value of five lives outweighs that of her own. Or, in cases of unequal harms, a
single individual facing great harm might still conclude that her objections are outweighed by the
avoidance of lesser harms to many people. In this way, the revised contractualist procedure could
justify principles that match moral intuitions even though they cannot currently be justified under
the current Individualist Restriction.
How would Parfit’s suggestion affect contractualism? First, one basis of the theory’s
attractiveness—the role ‘justification to others’ plays in determining principles and explaining
moral motivation—is unchanged. In judgments about principles, the idea of justification
continues to be the lens through which an agent determines the reasons and factors that are
morally relevant; and, for this purpose, the contractualist procedure continues to be relevant and
non-redundant as argued previously.6 Justification also continues to support relationships of
mutual respect with others, thus providing the agent with the same reasons to act morally.
Therefore, the arguments for the appeal of the theory presented in the first section of this chapter
remain sound.
Second, the revised theory improves contractualism’s treatment of situations involving
aggregation. One could defend Scanlon’s two most basic principles: that aggregation is not
permitted when the harm to one group of parties is very minor and that aggregation is
6

Section 2 of Chapter 3 presents the arguments for the various ways the contractualist procedure adds
value to moral judgments, and these would still be relevant.
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appropriate when harms are morally equivalent. The theory would then, correctly, need to rely
on the moral intuitions of the agent for cases that fall outside the scope of these simple
principles. This provides contractualism with a better approach to aggregation given that
aggregation cannot be justified, even when obviously required, under the original theory. While
it is unlikely that the intuitions of different agents would agree in all cases, particularly when
complicated distributional questions are involved, this problem would be no different than that
under the original theory. Also, allowing an individual to consider others’ burdens in
determining her own grounds for objecting that a principle should be rejected seems more
aligned with normal moral argument.
Third, on the negative side, judgments about reasonable rejection would be more
dependent on the intuitions of individual agents, providing additional support to those who argue
that the theory is already too heavily influenced by previously held moral intuitions. The
modified theory eliminates the Individualist Restriction which Scanlon considers one of
contractualism’s most attractive characteristics, and its loss has two negative effects. It weakens
the theory’s clarity on forbidding the form of aggregation in which small benefits accruing to
many people are claimed to outweigh significant harms suffered by a smaller number. In the
original theory, this is a theory-level constraint so that individual agents have no choice but to
accept it, and this positioning reinforces Scanlon’s emphasis on the protection of individual
rights and distinguishes it from consequentialist theories. In the revised theory, the judgment that
this type of aggregation is wrong is made by individual agents. While it is likely most agents
consider this to be a reasonable judgment, it is possible that some will not. Thus, the theory loses
some of its emphasis on the protection of individuals. Furthermore, eliminating the Individual
Restriction changes the process for evaluating objections in many cases that are not obviously
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aggregative. The original theory specified that an agent must compare the strongest objections of
single individuals. In the modified theory, the agent needs to consider combinations of objections
from different individuals even if the objections are of different types. For example, if an agent is
evaluating a principle where A benefits, but B and C both have objections, Scanlon’s procedure
requires that the agent sequentially compare A’s objection to B’s objection, and then to C’s.
Under Parfit’s modification, the agent could choose to compare A’s objection to a combination
of both B’s and C’s. In many ways, considering all of the objections at once comes closer to
matching common ideas about the way moral arguments are conducted. However, it also leaves
moral judgments more dependent on agents’ intuitions by giving them more flexibility in the
way they group objections and evaluate their strengths.
My assessment is that Parfit’s modification might offer a better approach, primarily
because it removes a barrier that prevents aggregation in cases where harms are equal. But, the
change is not cost free. Eliminating the Individualist Restriction removes one of contractualism’s
most distinguishing features, lessens its emphasis on the individual, and makes judgments more
dependent on agents’ intuitions. The theory loses a key component of its distinctiveness if this
restriction is removed.
3.2. Relativism: In contrast to the conclusion on aggregation, there does not appear to be
a solution to the problem of relativism. One of the attractive features of contractualism is that
judgments are made by real individuals who have different experiences, capabilities, and
sensibilities. This mirrors the complexities a person faces as she chooses how to lead a moral
life, but it also can lead to a problematic variability in moral judgments. There are two potential
ways to eliminate this variability: change the role of single individuals in making judgments or
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idealize the process for moral judgments in a way that ensures individuals’ judgments are
identical. I argue that neither of these will be successful.
To eliminate the role of the individual, one could appeal to moral theories where
principles are determined by the outcome of a group negotiation or consensus. Scanlon
emphasizes that a distinction of his theory is that the parties involved are not seeking some kind
of advantage; rather, they are trying to find principles to govern behavior that others, who are
similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. Assume that one keeps this objective but
stipulates that a principle is not valid unless all the parties agree to its reasonableness, and that
the composition of the parties represents all relevant viewpoints. This approach seems sensible
but, unfortunately, it ends up mirroring the relativism problem it is intended to solve. On the one
hand, if the relevant parties are considered to be ones with similar backgrounds, perhaps because
those are the parties most directly affected by each other’s actions, then the parties are more
likely to agree on what judgment is reasonable. However, the principle determined only applies
to people who share this group’s characteristics. On the other hand, if one believes the relevant
parties should include all possible viewpoints from dissimilar cultures, then the likelihood of
agreement is diminished, and there is no way to adjudicate a disagreement about what is
reasonable. As shown in the analysis of relativism in Chapter 3, disagreements about what is
reasonable can occur based on the parties’ different sensibilities, even if they accept a common
set of facts. One would need to change the parties’ experiences to gain consensus—something
that cannot be done. In summary, a more homogeneous group reaches a common judgment about
what is a reasonable principle while a heterogeneous group cannot. This is simply a description
of the original problem where people in different cultures or with varying experiences reach
conflicting judgments about what principle is reasonable for a given case. Therefore, proposing
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that judgments be made by groups, rather than individuals, without changing the nature of the
individuals involved, does not solve the relativism problem.
The second approach is to idealize the process of making a judgment of reasonable
rejection. There are two important variables in this process: the completeness of the information
available and the sensibilities of the individuals who are making the judgments. One could
specify that a judgment of reasonable rejection requires complete information. In some cases,
this would improve the consistency of judgments, and Scanlon has noted that an agent’s
judgment can be criticized if she ignores information that is readily available or she interprets the
available information in the wrong way. But, there is still the question of time. It is impractical
for complete information to include information that becomes available at a later time, either
because the agent is unaware of it or because the information has not yet been discovered. And,
as was seen in the example of slavery, the point in time when a judgment is made can be a
significant factor.
But, more importantly, conflicting judgments are often caused by variations in agents’
sensibilities rather than by differences in the information they have. More complete information
about the effects of controversial ethical dilemmas like abortion and euthanasia is unlikely to
change the fact that variations in agents’ experiences lead them to conflicting judgments about
which principles are reasonable. Resolving the issue of sensibilities requires the specification of
an idealized agent with a given set of sensibilities. But, of course, this raises the question of how
to determine which sensibilities are appropriate. Making such a choice would involve a moral
judgment that certain sensibilities are “morally legitimate” whereas others are not. This approach
would change the key judgement from one about which principles are reasonable to one about
which sensibilities are reasonable. But, just as there is no neutral criterion for choosing between
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judgments about principles made by agents with different sensibilities, there is no neutral
criterion for determining which sensibilities are legitimate and which are not. The difficulty has
simply been elevated from a judgment about principles to one about the nature of agents.
Additionally, any move to idealize the procedure or the agents involved would also go against
one of contractualism’s key attractions: the theory involves agents making moral judgments
under the conditions that people actually face in trying to decide how to lead moral lives. Thus,
my assessment is that idealization cannot be used to solve the problem of relativism.
***
In summary, on the positive side, contractualism’s premise of justification to others
provides a compelling explanation of the way moral judgments are made and why agents have
reason to comply with these judgments. However, there are two significant classes of judgments
for which the theory cannot determine appropriate principles: cases of aggregation and complex
cases where differences in agents’ moral sensibilities lead to objectionable relativism. A
modified theory would not resolve the problem of relativism, but it could minimize the problem
of aggregation; however, doing this would eliminate one of contractualism’s most distinctive
features and make it more intuitive. Thus, in my estimation, contractualism remains “an
intriguing but flawed” moral theory. It provides many useful insights into the nature of morality,
but ultimately disappoints potential proponents who look for a complete moral theory.
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